أحمد عرابى المصرى



تقرير عن الأحداث التى وقعت بمصر
من يناير سنة ١٨٨١ إلى اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢

أحمد عرابى المصرى

هذا تقريرى عن الحوادث التى حصلت
فى مصر من تاريخ يناير سنة ١٨٨١ لغاية شهر
اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ مقدم من طرفى الى
وكيلى الشرعى المستر برودلى
ليدافع به عنى امام
المحكمة المصرية

قسم النشر بالجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة

تنويه

تم جمع وطبع هذا الكتاب نقلا عن التقرير الذى أعده الزعيم

احمد عرابى دون إدخال أى تعديل من الناشر

الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة – قسم النشر

طبعة ١٩٨٢

المحتويات

(الموضوع) (الصفحة)

القسم الأول - الباب الأول
فيما يتعلق بالحوادث التي حصلت قبل الحرب

ان الجيش المصرى كان مركبا من اثنى عشر الايا[1] بيادة فى سنة ١٨٨٠ واريد تقليله الى ستة الايات فقط فى سنة ١٨٨١ ميلادية فى مدة نظارة[2] عثمان باشا رفقى وكانت العادة بمصر الميل الى التعصب الجنسى فكانت جميع الترقيات والنياشين والمكافآت للجنس الجركسى لكونهم من مماليك العائلة الخديوية ومماليك الذوات الذين هم مماليك العائلة الخديوية ايضا وبعد هذه الطائفة الاتراك وغيرها الذين هم ليسوا بمصريين والمولدين[3] وبعد ذلك جنس المصريين لا يصير تقدمهم ولا استخدامهم الا للضرورة لعدم وجود غيرهم ولذلك لحد هذا التاريخ ما كان يوجد بالعسكرية مرتبة باشا اى (جنرال) من ابناء البلاد المصرية مع لياقتهم واستعدادهم الذى لا ينكر فشرع ناظر الجهادية فى ترتيب اللازم من الجركس ثم الاتراك وغيرهم من المولدين وما زاد عن ذلك حين اللزوم يكون من المصريين فاثر ذلك فى قلوب الضباط المصريين فاجتمعوا فى منزلى وكنت فى وليمة عند احد الحجاج فأرسلوا الى فوجدتهم فى غضب شديد فهونت عليهم الامر بان يتقدم غرضحال الى رئيس النظار رياض باشا بطلب المساواة بين المستخدمين وترك التعصب الجنسى وسن قوانين عادلة تكفل لكل انسان حقه وتوجيه مسند نظارة الجهادية الى رجل وطنى حسب قوانين الدول العادلة وان يكون العرض مختوم عليه من اثنين او ثلاثة فقط تنوبونهم عنكم فاستقر رايهم على ذلك وانابوا عنهم الميرالايات الثلاث المصريين وهم انا احمد عرابى وعلى فهمى الميرالاى وعبد العال حلمى الميرالاى وبنا[4] على ذلك تقدم العرض بما ذكر الى رئيس النظار وما ذلك الا لحصول الالفة والمحبة وصفاء القلوب بين جميع المستخدمين بل بين جميع ساكنى مصر وازالة ما فى قلوبهم من العداوة المتولدة عن عدم المساواة والميل الى التعصب المضر بمصالح العموم فانبنى على ذلك عقد مجلس من النظار والاختيارية[5] من الشركس تحت رياسة الحضرة الخديوى وانتهى بصدور امر خديوى بالتحقيق على حسب العادة المصرية ولكن

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(١) الآى : فرقة عسكرية مختلفة العدد

(٢) نظارة : وزارة

(٣) المولدين : الذين ولدوا فى مصر من نسل اجنبى

(٤) بناء .

(٥) حاشية الخديو

مقتضى الامر يشعر كل مطلع عليه بان يصير مجازاتنا بالاعدام بطريقة مصرية اى غير ظاهرة اذ ان عباراته لم يسبق لها نظير فى حق من يتظلم من مظلمه الى رؤساء الحكومة وكان ذلك فى ٣٠ يناير سنة ١٨٨١ ميلادية وفى يوم ٣١ منه تحرر لنا افادات من ناظر الجهادية بتوجهنا الى الديوان بقصر النيل فى صباح يوم غرة[٦] فبراير لاجل زفاف شقيقة الحضرة الخديوية وفى الميعاد المحدد توجهنا الى الديوان فوجدناهم اجتمعوا فيه جميع الباشاوات وامراء الالايات المستخدمين والمتقاعدين وفى الحال تلى علينا امر الخديوى بهذا الجمع وصار اعلامنا باننا مرفوتين من محل خدامتنا وبتعيين بدلنا فى المجلس امراء للألايات التى كنا بها وجردونا من سيوفنا واخذونا الى السجن وفى حال مرورنا كان فيه ضباط من اصاغر الشركس شاهرين الطبنجات علينا حتى دخلنا اودة السجن ومن بعد قفل الباب سمعنا خسرو باشا يضحك ويقول بلسان التركى (زنبلى هرفلر) كلمة استهزاء معناها (فلاحين شغاله بالمقاطف) ثم صدر بامر ناظر الجهادية قبل ذلك الى قايمقام بك اورطة مستحفظية مصر ابراهيم بك فوزى بتقوية عساكر القره قولات ومنع العساكر التى تريد الدخول الى مصر وباستحضار باقى عساكر الاورطة تحت الطلب وبانه يلقى القبض على جميع القايمقامات والبكباشية والصاغات الذين من ابناء العرب المستخدمين والمستودعين منهم ويرسلوا كل من قبض عليه الى الحبس بالقلعة وعند انتهاء القبض عليهم يرقيه الى رتبة ميرالاى ثم انه ارسل امر الى مصلحة وابورات الميرى[٧] باستحضار وابور وحضوره الى قصر النيل وما ذاك الا لحملنا فيه وقيل انه كان به ثلاثة صناديق من صاج بها ثقوب بقصد وضعنا فيها ورمينا فى البحر حسب عادة الحكومة فى مدة الخديو السابق ولما تم الامر على ذلك قامت عساكر اجى بياده الى قصر النيل واخرجتنا من السجن وفى الوقت نفسه وقفت على المحل المرتفع الذى امام الديوان وصحت على العساكر بصوت عالى ان يلازموا الادب وان لا يمد احد منهم يده بسوء الى احد الجركس او غيرهم فانهم اخواننا وان لا يقع منهم ما يخل بواجبات الانسانية ولولا وقوفى هذا لجبرهم الغضب على التهور ثم صرفت العساكر الى محلهم وتوجهت معهم الى قشلاق[٨] عابدين وتحرر منى بمعنى ما سبق ايضاحه الى حضرات قناصل جنرالية دولتى انكلترا وفرانسا وباقى وكلا دول اوربا نستغيث بهم ونطلب منهم النظر فى امرنا بوجه الحق والعدل وان جميع

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(٦) اول فبراير

(٧) هكذا وردت فى المخطوطة الاصلية

(٨) ثكنة الجنود

الاورباويين فى ذمتنا وارسلت تلك المكاتبة الى وكيل فرانسا حضرة البارون دورنج[٩] وترجيناه فيها ابلاغ ما فيها الى باقى وكلاء الدول كما وان ورقة العزومة التى حضرت لى بختم ناظر الجهاديه لزفاف شقيقة الخديو بطريق.التحيل تسلمت ايضا الى قنسلاتوا فرانسا وفى اثناء ذلك اجتمعت الذوات بطرف الخديو بعابدين واجمعوا امرهم على حضور جميع الالايات والطوبجية ويكلفوا عساكر برنجى الاى بان يلقوا السلاح ويسلمون لهم فان ابوا تضرب عليهم المدافع وفى ذلك ما لا يخفى من حصول فتنة عظيمة داخلية لولا ان الاى السودان حضر من طرا حين بلغه ما حصل لنا من الاهانة والسجن ذالك الذى اوقف عزمهم عن التشبث فى استعمال القوة وقد ادركنا حضرة وكيل انكلترا السياسى المستر ادوارد مالت[١٠] ووكيل فرانسا السياسى حضرة البارون دورنج وتوسطا فى اصلاح الامر وصدر من الخديو عفو عام وعطيت لنا اوامر خديوية بابقاء كل واحد فى وظيفته وفى آلاية كما كان وصدرت اوامر للالايات بابطال طريقة التعصب الجنسى وان الجميع يكونون اخوة على حسب طلبنا وترتب محمود باشا سامى ناظرا الجهادية بدل عثمان باشا رفقى اتباعا فى ذلك للقوانين العادلة وفى يوم اثنين من فبراير طلب جناب الخديو ظابطان[١١] برنجى بياده وتحالف معهم على حفظه وانه قد عفى عنهم حقيقة ولما تحقق لى ذلك توجهت اليه واستأذنت فأذن لى فتمثلت بين يدى جنابه الرفيع والتمست منه ان يدخلنى ضمن هذا اليمين فقبل منى ذلك فحلفت حلفت صادق انى احافظ عليه كما احافظ على نفسى وانصرفت داعيا بتشييد ملكه على قواعد العدل والمساواة وفى يوم الجمعة الموافق ٤ فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ امرنى أنا واخى على بك فهمى برنجى ميرالاى بان اتوجه الى كل من قنسل[١٢] جنرال انكلترى[١٣] وفرانسا ونبلغها باننا متكفلين وضامنين الراحة العمومية والمحافظة على الاورباويين وعلى اموالهم فتوجهت مع اخى المذكور لزيارة حضرات القناصل الجنرالية وبلغناهما ما امرنا به مع ان هذا البلاغ هو حقيقة افكارنا وعليه نبنى جميع اعمالنا .

ولحد هنا انتهت مسئلة غرة فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ .

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(٩) Baron de Ring

(١٠) Edward Malet

(١١) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

الباب الثانى من القسم الأول فى الحوادث التى اعقبت ذلك

... كنا نظن ان ذلك العفو هو حقيقى وان تلك الاوامر التى مقتضاها الالفة والمحبة والتباعد عن التعصب الجنسى صادرة عن خلوص نية واذا ببذر الشقاق والعدواة يبذر فى ارض القلوب الخالية من الشرف ذلك بان يوسف كمال باشا الشركسى وكيل دائرة الخديو امكنه بواسطة واحد باتجاويش جركسى من آلاى السودان بان يستحضر باتجاوشية السودان المتزوجين من دائرة الخديو وصرف لهم نقودا واغراهم بان يحملوا العساكر على مخالفة الضباط وعدم سماع اوامرهم ووعدهم بانهم سيترقون ضباطا وهذه التنبيهات عن اوامر الخديو ولما تحقق ذلك بالجرنال صار رفت الباشا المذكور من الدايرة ظاهرا ولكنه جارى اشغالها خفية ولما لم تنجح هذه المكيدة قام بعده ببث الفتن والدسايس ابراهيم اغا الخاص بخدمة الخديو ذلك بانه امر فرج بك الزينى السودانى من مستودعية الجهادية بان يغرى باتجاوشية السودان على قتل ضباطهم كاقرار المذكورين واعترافهم بذلك عند التحقيق ووجد معه ورقة مختومة بختم ابراهيم اغا المذكور ومذكورا بها انها بناء عن امر الخديو وتلك الورقة اطلع عليها محمود باشا سامى وقتها وحكم مجلس العسكرية على فرج بك المذكور بعزله وتنزيله الى رتبة بكباشه وارساله الى مصوع فصدر أمر الخديو بارسالة بشرفه ورتبته الى مصوع مستودعا ذلك بانه لم يفعل شئ من نفسه بل مامورا بما حصل منه ثم بعد ذلك صدر من الخديو امر بارسال فرج بك المذكور من مصوع إلى الخرطوم واستخدامه بها لكونها بلده وله فيها املاك وذلك من غير اطلاع النظار على هذا الامر ثم انه صار إرسال زوجة البك المذكور الى الخرطوم على طريق سواكن[1] بمصاريف على طرف الدايرة الخديوية بغير ترخيص من الحكومة كما الجارى فى مثل ذلك ولما لم ينجح الفساد بواسطة الباتجاوشية وفرج بك السودانى توجهت الأفكار إلى التمكن من الفساد بواسطة اليوزباشه سليم صائب واليوزباشه على لبيب كلاهما من الالاى السودان المذكور الذى تحت امرة عبد العال بك حلمى وقتها لكون سليم صائب المذكور متزوج من دائرة الخديو وصرفت لها النقود الكافية بواسطة ابراهيم اغا المذكور وهما صارا يجتهدان فى وقوع الفشل والمفاسد فى الالاى المذكور والى ان تكامل عدد من اتبعهم تسعة عشر ظابطا[2] وتحققت دسائسهم ومفاسدهم بمجلس عسكرى خصوصى مختلط من اورباوين وغيرهم تحت رياسة وكيل الجهادية حسن باشا افلاطون ولما تبين ان مصدر ذلك جميعه من الحضرة الخديوية توقعت عليهم أحكام خفيفة جدا بالسجن من ١٥ ايام الى شهرين من غير نقص شئ من مراتباتهم وارسال البعض منهم ليستخدم فى

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(١) سواكين

(٢) هكذا فى المخطوط

السودان برتبه وشرفه وبدل النقصان بالمثالث كل هذا التخفيف مراعاة لخاطر الخديوى ومع ذلك لم تنفذ تلك الاحكام قولا بان الخديو عفى عنهم (ذلك بانهم مامورين من طرفه) بواسطة ابراهيم اغا خادمه الخصوصى كل ذلك واضح بجورنال التحقيق ومثل تلك المفاسد جرى منها فى اجى الالاى وفى ٤ جى الالاى الذى كان بعهدتنا ولكن كنا نزيلها اول باول لعدم كثرة الاشاعات خرضا على مقام الحضرة الخديوية لكونى كنت اول مناضل عنه أمل اصلاحه وازالة ما فى نفسه ولما طال الامر ولم يتمكنوا من البطش بنا لواسطة عدم موافقة ناظر الجهادية محمود سامى باشا لتلك الأفكار امر الخديوى محمود سامى باشا بان يقدم استعفائه حسب العادة المصرية فاستعفى وتعين بدله داود باشا يكن ظهير الحضرة الخديوية رجل تربى فى بيت ابيه لا يعرف الحكومة ولا الادارة ولا الجهادية فاصدر اوامره بعدم توجه احد الضباط الى منزله وعدم اجتماع الضباط مع بعضها وكل من وجد مع آخر فى الطريق يجرى ضبطه بمعرفة الضبطية وعساكر المستحفظين امر لا يوافق الشرع ولا القانون حتى اداه الاستعجال فى حب الانتقام الى ان صار يتوجه ليلا فى مراكز الالايات ليتمم على ضباطها وضار وضع زنجال على بيتى وبيت عبد العال بك حلمى ليلا بقصد القبض علينا غدرا والفتك بنا ظلما ولكن عبد العال بك كان فى الالايه وانا كنت توجهت ليلتها الى العباسية فى مركز الالاى فخشية ان يتبعنى احد من الفتاكين دخلت فى بيت احد اصحابى لزيارته بعد مضى ساعتين من الليل حضرة خليل بك لبنان بشارع الفجالة ولاجل ان لا يدركنى احد بالطريق فبعد مضى عشرة دقائق مر بالطريق اثنين خيالة بحركة الهجوم ومازالوا كذلك حتى وصلا محل الالاى بالعباسية فاوقفهما عساكر الداورية وسألوهم عن امرهم فاخبراهم أنهما متوجهين إلى سراى القبة وانهم ضللوا عن الطريق فارشدوهما عساكر الداوريه الى الطريق الموصلة الى القبة بلدة بجوار العباسية ولاشك أن قصدهما ادراكى واخذى غدرا وكان ذلك ليلة ٦ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨١ وكان معى احد الضباط اسمه عبد الكريم افندي حتى انى ركبت فى عربيته لاجل ان لا يعرفنى احد وبالاسباب التى توضحت سلبت الامنية وصار كل إنسان خائف على نفسه يترقب ماذا يصنع به ولما احسبت نبهاء الاهالى الذين هم ابائنا واخواننا ورؤساء عشائرهم حضروا الى مصر وراوا إنه لا حاسم لسلب الامنية إلا افتتاح مجلس نواب للامة المصرية يضمن لها ارواحها واموالها واعراضها وسن قوانين عادلة يعتمد عليها فى حفظ الحقوق تضاهى قوانين المجالس المختلطة وحدود تامة المحاكم والمحكوم ليقف كل عند حده ولا يتعداه مع تغيير هذه النظارة التى فى مدتها سلبت الامنية وكثر الخوف وكتب بذلك عرايض منهم سلمت بايايديهم عند سقوط النظارة الى دولتو شريف باشا عند جعله رئيسا للنظار على يد ابى سلطان باشا بالنيابة عن نبهاء الامة المصرية ورؤسائها ولكون العسكرية والاهالى بعضهم من بعض ومعاملتهم فى الخير والشر واحدة فوصى هذا هذا[٣] الطلب للعسكرية ولكون ان جميع الآلايات إستنابت ضباطنا

(٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

وضباطها[٤] لوثوقهم بى واعتمادهم على امانتى فوضوا الى تلك الطلبات وعند شدة التهورات الواقعة من ناظر الجهادية داود باشا وزيادة الخوف كتب من طرفى الى ناظر الجهادية فى ٩ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨١ بان جميع العساكر ستحضر الى ميدان عابدين لعرض طلباتها وطلبات اهاليها على الحضرة الخديوية الساعة ٩ عربى من يوم الجمعة وفى الميعاد المذكور أتت العساكر من محلاتها الى ميدان عابدين بغاية الأدب والاحتشام وقبل ذلك تحرر من طرفى الى كافة قناصل الدول الاورباويه بما سيصر[٥] اجراه مع الهدو والسكون فى الوقت المعين وانه لا خوف على رعاياهم ولا على اموالهم وانه سيطلب فقط من الخديوى ما يجعل البلاد حرة حافظة لحقوقها ثم اعرضنا تلك الطلبات على الحضرة الخديوية بواسطة مستر كوكسن[٦] قنصل دولة انكلترا باسكندرية حيث كان موجودا وقتها فقبل الخديو تلك الطلبات جميعها التى هى مقررة باول ديكرتو[٧] صدر من جنابه الكريم فى أول ولايته وان تلك الطلبات هى من اقصى اماله لكونها شرعية جميعها وصدر امره الكريم بتوجيه النظارة ورياستها إلى دولتلو شريف باشا وانصرفت العساكر داعين له بطول العمر والجميع متشكرين له على احياء البلاد وتحريرها من ضيق ربقة[٨] الاستعباد المصرى ولما حصل من شريف باشا التاخير عن قبول الرياسة تقدم له من عمد الاهالى الذين كانوا موجودين خلف اظهرنا فى ميدان عابدين عرايض يلحوا عليه فيها بقبول الرياسة عليها نحو الاربعة الف ختم فرحا بخلاصهم من ذاك النظارة التى من جملة ما اصابهم فى مدتها من الضرر حرمانهم من فوائد سبعة عشر مليون ليرا قيمة المقابلة التى كانت تحصلت منهم فى مدة الخديو السابق لأجل سداد الديون الأجنبية التى كانت على الحكومة بل حرمانهم من اصل المبلغ المذكور برمته مع أنه كان الواجب اعتبار هذا المبلغ دين على الحكومة اسوة باقى ديون الاورباوين ومن جملة اعمالها رفت الوطنيين من الخدمات الميريه مع استعدادهم وقلة مرتباتهم واستخدام كثير من الاورباويين بمرتبات زائدة مع ان اعمالهم لا يمكن اجراها الا بواسطة الاصاغر من الوطنيين ولذلك صارت جميع الوظائف المهمة بيد الاورباوين من غير نظر لاعمالهم خلافا للقاعدة العادلة المرغوبة فى كل حكومة عادلة ثم تشكلت النظارة وترتب محمود باشا سامى ناظرا للجهادية وبناء على تلك الحوادث حضر وفد من طرف الحضرة السلطانية تحت رياسة دولتو على باشا نظامى فقبل وصوله بيومين جرى ارسال آلاينا الى التل الكبير وارسال آلاى

(٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٥) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٦) Cookson

(٧) مرسوم

(٨) حبل فيه عروة

عبد العال بك الى دمياط لاجل عدم تمكن الوفد من مقابلتنا ووقوفه على حقيقة ما كان جاريا ولما اراد الباشا المشار اليه اجراء التحقيق فلم يرغب الخديو ذلك اعتمادا على ان تلك الطلبات كانت من افكاره وانه عفى عن كل ما حصل وان الجند فى غاية الطاعة والانقياد وانصرف الوفد على ذلك ثم جرى تشكيل مجلس النواب وافتتاحه بعد تنظيم قانونه وسنت قوانين عادلة للعسكرية ولاختلاف وقع بين مجلس النواب ومجلس النظار بعد مضى عدة شهور استعفى شريف باشا رئيس النظار وانحلت نظارته واذ ذاك فوضت الحضرة الخديوية انتخاب النظار الى مجلس النواب فبمعرفة مجلس النواب وتصديق الخديو صار ترتيب محمود سامى باشا ريساً[9] للنظار والداخلية ومصطفى باشا فهمى ناظرا للخارجية والحقانية وعلى باشا صادق ناظرا للمالية ومحمود باشا فهمى ناظرا للاشغال وعبد الله باشا فكرى ناظرا للمعارف ومحسن باشا الشريعى ناظرا للاوقاف وحيث كان فى غضون ذلك كنت وكيل للجهادية جرى انتخابى وترتيبى ناظرا للجهادية الامر الذى ما كنت اتمناه ابدا ولكن لاجتماع واتحاد جميع افكار العسكرية واعضاء مجلس النواب على ترتيبى فبهذه[10] النظارة اذ بوجودى فيها لا يتصور حصول ادنى خطر على احد من العسكرية أو من الاهالى وتطمئن القلوب والخواطر قبلت تلك الوظيفة المهمة مع معرفتى بما انا محفوف به من المصاعب فى توقيف وتنظيم تيار افكار العموم المنبعث بقوة سريعة من عيون قلوب مختلفة متعددة كل يرى سرعة الوصول الى الغاية الوحيدة التى هى حرية البلاد وحياتها ولا يبالى بما يطرأ من المصاعب التى ربما تمنع الوصول الى تلك الغاية المقصودة كل هذا وانا اجهد نفسى فى سبيل التقدم مع الراحة والتؤدة حرصا على طلب النجاح مع حفظ الارواح والاعراض والاموال حتى بذلك نكون ادينا واجباتنا الوطنية ولم يلحق تاريخنا المصرى ما يسوّد وجهه امام العالم المتمدن وبعد ترتيب هذه النظارة استقامت الاحوال وترتيب الامور وخلص كثيرا من القضايا المهمة المتراكمة فى مجلس النظار وتنظمت احوال الجهادية وصار ترقية للمستحقين للترقى بدل النقصان وبعد ذلك احسنت الحضرة الخديوية علىّ برتبة باشا وسلمتنى فرمانها السلطانى مع اظهار الرضى على كما وجهت قبل ذلك الى كل من اخوانى على فهمى وعبد العال حلمى وطلبه عصمت ويعقوب سامى وحسن مظهر رتبة باشا أى جنرال مع اظهار غاية المسرة والممنونية ونحن الجميع داعين له بداوم توفيقه لنجاح البلاد وكنا نظن اننا خلصنا من تلك العراقيل والمصاعب التى كنا نعانيها ووصلنا الى ارض النجاح الواسعة ولم يبق الا سن القوانين العادلة وتحسين حال الدواوين والمحاكم وانه لم يبق حقد فى القلوب واذا بداعى الخيانة ينادى علينا اين المفر ذلك بان احد المماليك الخديوية الذين بمدرسة القبة

(٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة

اتفق مع غلام معه في المدرسة من اولاد الجراكسة في وصاية عبد العال باشا حلمي على مشترى مقدار من الزرنيخ لاجل تسميم عبد العال باشا وبالفعل اجروا ذلك بطريقة ان الغلام الذي تحت وصيته واسمه محمد خورشيد وضع السم فى اللبن المعتاد الباشا المشار اليه على شربه ليلا[11] ولولا الخادمة ضبطت اللبن والغلام لكان هلك الباشا بعد مضى قليل من الساعات واوراق تلك القضية موجودة بالضبطية منها يعلم ان ذلك الفعل بدسايس من سراي الخديو ولما لم تنجح تلك المكيدة تألف حزب كبير من الجراكسة وتآمروا وتحالفوا على قتلى وقتل جميع رؤساء الضباط ابناء العرب المصريين ولما دعى احدهم المسمى راشد افندى انور للتحالف معهم على ذلك وكان من الذين يخافون الله ومتحليا بحلية الانسانية ابى عن الاجابة وتوجه فى الحال واخبر طلبه باشا عصمت بحقيقة الامر وهو كتب للجهادية بذلك وباخبارية محمود باشا سامى رئيس النظار ومصطفى باشا فهمى ناظر الحقانية وباقى النظار بتلك المسئلة وعرضها على الخديو جرى تحقيق تلك المآمرة الجركسية في مجلس عسكرى تحت رياسة الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسنى الجركسى لكونه رجل ذو شرف وذمة وامانة ومن التحقيق اتضح عظم هذا الحزب وان مصدره الحضرة الخديوية كما هو واضح بجرنال التحقيق وتوقعت عليهم الاحكام بارسالهم الى البلاد السودانية نفيا مؤبدا وعرض هذا الجرنال على الخديو وتلى عليه بحضور جميع النظار ولما كانت بلاد السودان بها حرارة قوية شديدة لا توافق صحة الجراكسة المولودين فى بلاد باردة وانها تكون سببا فى ضياع حياتهم طلبت من اخوانى النظار مساعدتى على انقاذهم من تلك الاحكام وارسالهم الى بلادهم او الى محل ما يرغبون خارج الحكومة المصرية برتبهم وشرفهم حرصا على حفظ الحياة حتى لمن قصد اتلاف حياتى فاجابونى لذلك مع التعجب وعرضنا عريضة مختومة منا جميعا واعرضناها للحضرة الخديوية وتوجهنا اليها جميعا نرجوها قبول هذا الرجاء رحمة بهم فاجاب الخديو بانه من ضمن المتهومين[12] واجد باشا ولا يمكن تنفيذ احكام عليه الا بامر الحضرة السلطانية لذلك لا بد من عرض المسئلة على الباب العالى ثم صدر امره الى الداخلية بالتنفيذ خلافا للجارى إذ ان الاصول المتبعة هو ان الترقيات والمجازاة التى تكون من الجهادية تعرض بلا واسطة للمعية ومن المعية تصدر للجهادية بالتنفيذ بلا واسطة ايضا ولكون ان الداخلية لم تتوسط فى عرض هذا الجرنال ولم يكن لها حق فى الامر على الجهادية بتنفيذ تلك الاحكام توجه ناظر الداخلية ورئيس النظار محمود باشا سامى بعد اخذ راى اخوانه النظار الى جناب الخديو وعرضوا عليه ان يصدر امر الخديو بالتنفيذ على ذات اوراق القضية ومرسلى للجهادية لا جرى مفعولها وحفظها بها بدون واسطة اتباعا لاصول الجهادية فى مثل ذلك فصدر امره العالى على نفس الاوراق

(١١) الجملة هكذا فى المخطوطة الأصلية

(١٢) المتهمين

وارسلت للجهادية كما ذكر وجرى مفعولها وصار ارسال المحكوم عليهم الى بلاد الشام ومنها توجهوا الى الاستانة وبعد افتتاح الحرب ارسل لهم الخديو واحضرهم الى الاسكندرية وما ذلك الا لعلمه بانه هو السبب فيما حصل لهم وانهم لم يقدموا على تلك المؤامرة الا بارادته ثم انه بعد انصراف رئيس النظار من حضرته الخديوية فى مساء ذاك اليوم كنا فى وليمة بطرف عمر بك رحمى ومعنا ريس النظار محمود سامى باشا فجاؤه خبران حضرات قنصلى دولة انكلترا وفرانسا الجنراليه حضروا بمنزله وانهم يريدوا مقابلته فقام فى الحال وتوجه اليهم وبرفقته ناظر الخارجية مصطفى باشا فهمى فأخبراه ان حياة الخديو والاورباويين مهددة فاجابهما ان حياتهم جميعا مكفولة بحياته وسألها عن اسباب ذلك فاجاباه ان الخديو اعلمهما بذلك وان محمود باشا هدد الخديو بقوله له ان حياتك وحياة الاورباويين على خطر فانكر حصول ذلك واخبرهما بما اعرضه على جنابه العالى بخصوص عدم توسط الداخلية فى جرنال تحقيق قضية الشراكسة ليس إلا وصادقه على ذلك ناظر الخارجية فالحق والحق اقول ان هذه العبارة الحزنة التى لاحقيقة لها هى اصل البلاء الذى صُبَّ على مصر صباً وهى السبب لجلب المراكب الحربية من دول اوربا الى ثغر اسكندرية وبورسعيد وهى السبب فى حادثة ١١ جون بسكندرية[١٣] المفتتة للاكباد على حين كان المصريين[١٤] مع الاورباوين فى اهناء معيشة واحسن تودد اذ لولا وجود المراكب الحربية بسكندرية لما حصل ذاك النفور ولما حصلت تلك المصيبة الشنعاء وهى السبب ايضا فى ايقاد نار الحرب من امة عظيمة مشهورة بالعدل ومحبة للانسانية ومحررة للرقاب من الاستعباد على بلاد مصر سيئة البخت التى طالما دافعت عنها اطماع الطامعين ولطالما كانت مصر تعتمد اعتمادا جازما ان لا يأخذ بيدها وينشلها من بئر الاستبداد والاستعباد المملؤة بالافاعى ويوصلها الى بحبوحة الحرية الا حكومة الانكليز ولكن قضت افكار الحاكم الغير محب لبلادة بذلك ومن ذاك الحين حصل نفور الخديو من هيئة النظار وخصوصا من رئيس النظار ولطالما صرح بانه لا يريد ولا يود ان يرى محمود باشا سامى وفى تلك الايام غدر باحدى السيدات المعتبرات غدرا شنيعا المسماة عيشة هانم من عائلة مرحوم احمد باشا الطوبجى كانت من الذين يتبرك بهم فى سراى الخديو ذلك بانه الخديو ارسل لها عربة ليلا مع احد الطواشية واخذها من بيتها ليوصلها الى السراى فاوصلها الى الضبطية وبمعرفة مصطفى بك صبحى وكيل الضبطية ارسلت الى السكة الحديد وكان فى انتظارها وابور مخصوص فتوجه بها الى السويس ولما علمت المسكينة ابنتها بذلك ارسلت لها ملبوساتها مع خادمتها الى السويس ومن هناك نزلت الخادمة المسكينة مع سيدتها المظلومة بوابور فى البحر الاحمر بقصد

(١٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة

نفيها الى الحجاز ثم اشاعوا ان الست هربت فى جدة مع انها كبيرة فى العمر ضعيفة وعليها غفر مخصوص ثم لم يعلم لها ولا لخادمتها الى الآن مستقر سوى البحر الاحمر وذلك من غير جناية ولا تحقيق فأين نصراء الانسانية وكان جزاء ابنتها المسكينة على ارسال ملبوسات والدتها رفت[15] زوجها فلما علم زوجها اسباب رفته طلق زوجته المذكورة فكوفىء باعادته للخدمة حالا تلك السياسة المحبوبة عند بنى البشر يا نصراء الحق وبعد حادثة هذه السيدة المسكينة باربعة ايام اشيع فى سراى عابدين بان العسكر الغفراء سرقوا جواهر شوبكات[16] السراى مع انهم غفراء على السراى وما فيها فتوجه حكمدار برنجى الاى بيادة[17] الذى بعابدين احمد بك فرج وتفرس فى خدمة السراى فاشتبه فى المأمور بحفظ الجواهر محمد حسن المخصص لحفظ ملبوساة الخديو المتربى فى بيته صغيرا الى ان تزوج من سراى الخديو فأمر بارساله الى الضبطية وسئل[18] فيها فاعترف بالجواهر انها كانت معه وانه القاها فى مراحيض الضبطية ودل عليها فصار استخراجها تماما وتسلمت ليد الخديو حفظا لشرف العسكرية وبسؤال المذكور فى الضبطية اجاب انه ليس بسارق وانما ابراهيم اغا[19] توتنجى الخديو امره باخذ الجواهر وحفظها لحين عودته من ابعاديته ولا علم له باسباب ذلك وكان تحرر من الجهادية للضبطية بلزوم التحقيق اظهارا لحفظ شرف العسكرية ومنعا لحصول مثل ذلك ولاجل الوقوف على الحقيقة يلزم استحضار ابراهيم اغا المذكور وسؤاله عما نسب اليه فلما علم الخديو بذلك امر بارسال ذلك المسكين ليلا بوابور مخصوص الى السويس ومنها ارسل صباحا مع عيشة هانم المسكينة فى وابور واحد ولا يعلم مستقره الى الآن الا البحر الاحمر او الموت الاحمر من غير تحقيق ولا حكم شرعى واما ابراهيم اغا فعطيت له النقود اللازمة وارسل الى بلاد الشام والآن حضر يتهددنى فى السجن اذ كنت باكى العين حزين القلب على اولئك المساكين وبهذين الحادثتين وما هو متجدد فى كل وقت من الحوادث المفزعة صار كل مصرى لا يأمن على نفسه ولا يهنئ فى نومه فى بيته يخشى ان يصيبه ما اصاب اولئك المظاليم وذلك كله معلوم عند النظار وغيرهم واعضاء مجلس النواب ايضا كما انهم اى النظار اعرضوا للخديو عن منع ذلك ولا كان يفيد بشىء ان هذا لهو الاستعباد المطلق ولكن

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(١٥) كذلك فى المخطوطة

(١٦) هكذا فى المخطوطة .

(١٧) هكذا فى المخطوط

(١٨) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

اين المحررون لرقاب المصريين ثم لا يزال ذلك النفور متمكن من نفس الخديو الى ان جاءت مراكب انكلترا وفرانسا الحربية وتقدم من حضرات قناصلها لائحة بناء على راى ارتآه ابو سلطان باشا غير جازم به كما صرح بذلك غير مرة ومقتضى تلك اللائحة هو سقوط نظارة محمود سامى باشا وتوجهى الى اوربا وتبعيد على فهمى باشا وعبد العال حلمى باشا الى داخل البلاد المصرية ولما كان مقتضى هذه اللائحة هو من الامور الداخلية التى لا دخل فيها للغير لم صار[٢٠] قبولها بمجلس النظار لا لاجل حفظ وظايفنا ولكن حرصا على حقوق البلاد التى فوضت لعهدتنا وامانتنا اما الخديوى فقد قبلها بادىء بدء ولما كانت هذه المسئلة من المعضلات واختلف فيها بين الخديو والنظار عمل جلسة بديوان النظارة وتقرر فيها طلب اعضاء مجلس النواب للنظر فيما اختلف فيه وتسوية المسئلة بوجه مرضى اذ يجوز قانون ذلك اذا طراء على البلاد امر غير اعتيادى فحضروا النواب وصار اطلاعهم على تلك اللائحة فجميعهم رفضوا قبولها وطارت الاخبار فى جميع البلاد فحصل فزع شديد واجمع الرأى العمومى على عدم قبولها وحضرت عمد البلاد واعيانها الى مصر معلنين برفض هذه اللائحة ورفض من يقبلها وكتبوا بذلك محررات مختومة باختامهم واحضروها لطرفى لوثوقهم بى وكذلك لما لم يأذن الخديو بافتتاح مجلس النواب رسميا ختم على رفض تلك اللائحة كثير من اعضاء مجلس النواب وجاء كثير من العلما والتجار والاعيان من كل جهة وقدموا محررات باختامهم وفتوى شرعية من افاضل العلماء بوجوب خلع الخديو بمقتضى احكام الشرع الشريف الاسلامى وموجود بعض من تلك المحررات بطرفى وبعضها يوجد بطرف محمود باشا سامى رئيس النظار ولما صمم الخديو على قبول اللائحة وعدم افتتاح المجلس استعفت النظارة وقبل استعفائها وكان فى اثناء ذلك الحّ علىّ كثيرا قنصل جنرال فرنسا مسيو سنكوتس[٢١] ومسيو مونج[٢٢] قنصل فرانسا بمصر بأن اتوجه الى باريس واتخلص من تلك الصعوبات ولكن لعلمى بان جميع الناس متعلقين بى ونفس اعضائى[٢٣] مجلس النواب معتقدين بانه لا بقاء لمجلس النواب الا بوجودى ولا بقاء لسلامة والراحة الا بوجودى وانه اذا خرجت من مصر خربت بيوتهم جميعا كما ان جميع الاهالى والعسكرية لا يمكنونى من الخروج وانه يخشى من حصول حركة مدهشة تصدر عن طيش بسبب ذلك يعلم صحة قولى هذا من رأى

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(٢٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢١) M. Sinkiewicz

(٢٢) M. Monge

(٢٣) اعضاء

اهل اسكندرية ذكورا واناثا كبارا وصغارا يجتمعون بالشوارع ومنافذ البيوت ليسلمون على وينظرونى بعين المحبة وكذلك من رأى اجتماعهم بالسكة الحديدية من مصر الى اسكندرية هذا الذى منعنى من التوجه الى اوربا او الى الاستانة ثم فى صباح ليلة استعفاء النظار حضر لمنزلى حضرات قناصل جنرالية دول المانيا والروسيا والنمسا وايتاليا وكلفونى بأن اعطيهم كلمتى بحفظ الاوربا وين جميعهم واموالهم القاطنين فى القطر المصرى فاعتذرت لهم بانى استعفيت من الخدمة فلم يقبلوا عذرى بل الجأونى بانهم يثقوا بقولى وان جميع المصريين متى علموا كفالتى للاورباوين فانهم يحترمونهم غاية الاحترام فلوثوقى بان العسكرية لا يفعلون شيئا يخل بشرفهم العسكرى وان الاهالى يكرمون نزلائهم فاعطيت لهم كلمتى بحفظ جميع الاورباوين القاطنين بالقطر المصرى وحفظ اموالهم كما احافظ على نفسى وعلى اولادى ومالى لحين تشكيل هيئة حكومة فانصرفوا مطمئنين وفى مساء هذا اليوم اجتمعوا اعضاء مجلس النواب بمنزل ابى سلطان باشا رئيس النواب ودعونى للحضور اليهم فاجبتهم فكلفونى بان احافظ على الامن العمومى وكان معهم جملة من العلماء وقاضى مصر فذكرتهم بانى استعفيت وقبل استعفائى فكيف اكلف بهذا الامر وليس لى صفة فى الحكومة فاجابنى رئيس المجلس ابو سلطان باشا وسعادة سليمان باشا اباظة احد الاعضاء بانهم نواب الامة وانهم يكلفونى بذلك وانهم لا يقبلون استعفائى وانهم يتوجهون الى الخديو ويطلبون منه امرا بابقائى فى نظارة الجهادية كما كنت وفى تلك الليلة حصلت مذاكرات ومحاورات فى حالة البلاد وما كانت عليه فى الازمنة الماضية وما حل بها من النكبات وما ابيح فيها من الدماء كل ذلك نتيجة الاحكام الاستبدادية وفى الحالة التى وصلت اليها البلاد وفى امر اللائحة التى قبلها الخديو فالكل اجمع على طلب خلع الخديو اذا لم يرفض قبول اللائحة المذكورة وانصرف المجلس على ذلك وفى صباح غد حضر لمنزلى رئيس مجلس النواب وسليمان باشا اباظه وسلمنى سليمان باشا بيده امرا من الخديو بابقائى ناظرا على الجهادية وظنوا ان بهذا الامر يبطل مفعول اللائحة ولكن الظن لا يغنى من الحق شيأ ثم انى قدمت تشكراتى للخديو وقبلنى بغاية البشاشة وصرت اباشر جميع الاشغال فى مدة انحلال النظارة التى هى عبارة عن عشرين يوم ولم يحصل فيها ما يكدر صفاء الراحة وفى تلك المدة ملئت مصر بقبائل العربان حتى تخافت الاهالى والاورباوين من كثرتهم وكان السبب فى ذلك ان الجناب الخديو استحضرهم وقربهم اليه حتى كان يتخيل للزائرين ان سراى الاسماعيليه هى مجتمع العربان على غير عادة كل ذلك بقصد ان يكونون ضدا للعسكرية بغير موجب وكان مدير البحيرة ابراهيم بك توفيق يهيج العربان ويتوجه للمديريات بتعليمات سرية لاجل ايقاع الضرر بمن حرروا محررات برفض تلك اللائحة وتزويج

حركة الاحتلال ولكن العربان حريصين جدا على شرفهم فلا يركنوا الى اقوال لا توافق الشرع والشرف وفى تلك المدة حضر الوفد العثمانى تحت رياسة دولتلو درويش باشا وانزل فى سراى الجزيرة فهرعت اليه وجوه الناس ونبهائهم وعلمائهم ليسلمون[24] عليه ويشكون اليه ما هو حاصل من الخديو ومن لزوم مراعات احكام الشرع الشريف فصار سجنهم الآن جميعا ظلما وعدوانا بل انتقاما حتى غصت السجون بالمديريات ومصر واسكندرية. ثم وبتفقده احوال العسكرية تحقق له أن العسكرية محافظة على الطاعة والانتظام ولم يقع منهم ادنى شىء[25] يوجب المسئولية وبناء على ذلك طلب من الحضرة السلطانية نحو المائتين نيشان على ذمة ضباط الجيش مكافئة لهم على حسن سلوكهم وطلب لى ايضا النيشان المجيدى من الطبقة الاولى ذات الكوردون[26] وبعد ذلك شكلت هيئة نظارة جديدة برياسة سعادة راغب باشا فكان سعادته رئيسا للنظار وناظرا للخارجية وسعادة احمد رشيد باشا ناظرا للداخلية وعبد الرحمن رشدى بك ناظرا للمالية ومحمود باشا الفلكى ناظرا للاشغال وسليمان باشا اباظه ناظرا للمعارف وعلى باشا ابراهيم ناظرا للحقانية وحسن باشا الشريعى ناظرا للاوقاف وانا عرابى ناظرا للجهادية كما كنت اولا وقيل انه بذلك بطل مفعول اللائحة وزالت الكوارث ولاجل اطمئنان الجميع صدر أمر بالعفو اخيرا عن جميع الحوادث الماضية الا ما يختص بحادثة اسكندرية المحزنة الواقعة فى ١١ يونيه سنة ١٨٨٢ تلك الحادثة المريعة حدثت فى التاريخ المذكور على حين غفلة بين رعاع الاسكندرية وبين الاوروباوين وبناء على امر المعية بتعيين من يلزم من الجهادية لتحقيق تلك الحادثة تعين وارسل سعادة وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا سامى وارسل الآبين[27] بياده وبطاريتين طوبجية واورطتين سوارى لحفظ الامن العمومى داخل اسكندرية وخارجها وقد لهجت جميع جرانيل الاوروباوين بحسن تيقظ عساكر الالايات وسهرهم على حصول الامن والراحة وكانت تلك العساكر تحت قومندانية طلبه باشا عصمت فقام بتلك المأمورية احسن قيام وقد سمعت من الحضرة الخديوية بناء علينا وراد من محافظ اسكندرية ان اصل هذه الحادثة رجل مالطى ورجل حمار من اهل اسكندرية وانه باجتماع الناس اطلقت عليهم البنادق والطبنجات من الشبابيك وبناء على ذلك تحرر منى خطاب الى وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا بما هو متاع وانه يتبصر فى

(٢٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٥) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٦) شريط

(٢٧) مثنى

حقيقة تلك الحادثة بغاية الحزم ويجتهد فى إظهار الفاعل الحقيقى مع المحامات عن شرف الحكومة والعسكرية والميل الى اتباع الحق هذا ما علمته من امر تلك الحادثة وقبل تشكيل هذه النظارة كان جارى تصلح وترميم الاستحكامات على حسب العادة السنوية فصدر امر الخديو بناءً عن امر الحضرة السلطانية بابطال انشاء استحكامات فى اسكندرية بما ان ذلك يعد تهديدا للدوننمة الانجليزية وان لم يصر ابطالها تضرب الدوننمة بالمدافع على البلد حتى تهدمها وتحرقها حسب تبليغات كاتب سر سفارة انكلترا بالاستانة للمابين الهمايونى [٢٨] فصار ابطال جميع الاعمال حتى ان الخديوى ارسل مندوبان [٢٩] من طرفه وهما حسين بك الترك وحسين افندى [٣٠] فوزى من المعية لاجل تحقيق ابطال الاشغال وتحرر منه للاستانة بذلك وكنا نتعجب كيف ان الترميمات فى الطوابى العادية تعد تهديدا وحضور المراكب الحربية واحاطتها بالثغور المصرية لا تعد تهديدا ولكن نتذكر ان الحق للقوى . فى ٤ يوليو سنة ١٨٨٢ بعد تشكيل هذه الوزارة حضر النيشان المجيدى بمفرمانه العالى الشأن من الاستانة واستلمتها من يد الحضرة الخديوية اظهارا لرضائه عنى وابلغنى ممنونيته منى وانه تحقق صدق خدامتى وانصرفت شاكرا لهذه المنة واعرضت تشكراتى تلغرافيا للمابين الهمايونى وتشرفت برد جوابه تلغرافيا بابلاغ محظوظية الحضرة السلطانية من حسن طاعتى وخلوصى وان ذلك النيشان مكافئة لى على حسن سلوكى وصداقتى اما نياشين ضباط العسكرية فتوزع بعضها على خدمة المعية وبعضها تسلم للخديو ولم ينل احدا من الضباط شيأ منها مع ان بعضهم من بلغ رتبة الباشا ولم يعطا له نيشان ابدا مع ما ابرزه من الصداقة فى المحاربات والخدمات العديدة وما ذلك الا لكونهم مصريين جريا على العادة الغير المألوفة عند المتصفين بالانصاف وبعد استلامى النيشان كلفنى دولتلو [٣١] درويش باشا بان اتوجه للاستانة لاعيش فى كنف الحضرة السلطانية مع بعض اخوانى فاعرضت عليه اعذارى التى اخبرت عنها قنصل جنرال فرانسا وانى اخشى ان الناس يمنعونى من السفر بطريقة غير معقولة كما هو مشاهد لدولته من اذدحام الناس بالاسكندرية حين مرورى لشدة تعلقهم بى وكذلك سعادة راغب باشا رئيس النظار لعلمه بما يحصل للناس من الدهشة وتوقع ضرر عظيم اذا صار توجهى الى الاستانة عرف دولته بأن هذا التكليف لا يوافق المصلحة ومما سبق تسطيره يعلم انى كنت محبوبا عند جميع

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(٢٨) العرف والمكاتب الرسمية الخاصة بالسلطان بقصره بالاستانة

(٢٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة (أفندى)

(٣١) هكذا فى المخطوطة

الشعب المصرى محبٌ لخير العموم موثوق بأمانتى وشرفى وانه ليس لى غاية شخصية كما يزعموا المبطلون بل غايتى الوحيدة هى تحرير بلادى ورفاهية اهلها وتمتعهم بخيرها فى ظل حكومة شوروية عادلة تعطى الحقوق لاربابها بدون فرق بين الاهلين(٣٢) والاجنبين(٣٣) حتى يكون جميع سكان مصر كالواحد بدون فرق بين تعدد المذاهب والاعتقادات اذا الكل انسان تجمعنا جامعة الانسانية ومما يدل على عدم تمكنى من الخروج من مصر اذ ذاك ما عرض تلغرافيا من رؤساء العساكر البرية والبحرية بالاسكندرية للخديو بشأنى فى يوم استعفاء نظارة محمود سامى باشا ومما يدل على ان الناس غير قابلين لتلك اللائحة اعتراف الخديو بالتلغراف الصادر من جنابه الكريم الى الرؤساء المذكورين ردا لما ورد منهم فى اليوم المذكور . نعم قبل ختام هذا القسم اقول ان الحضرة الخديوية كانت ارسلت ثابت باشا الجركسى المشهور بالتعصب الجنسى الى الاستانة ليكون وكيلا له فيها فى شهر نوفمبر سنة ١٨٨١ ولاجل تغيير افكار رجال الدولة من جهة العساكر المصرية حتى بذلك يتوصل الى تغيير افكار الذات السلطانية اشيع فى دوائر الاستانة بان العساكر المصرية خرجوا عن الطاعة وانهم يريدوا تشكيل دولة عربية وانى متفق مع الانكليز على ذلك فكثر اللغط بذلك حتى توجست شرا اذ لا معرفة لى باحد فى الاستانة ليدافع عنى ويكذب ما نسب الى من الاباطيل واذا بحضرة الشريف السيد احمد اسعد وكيل الفراشة الشريفة بالمدينة المنورة عن السلطان حضر الى مصر فارفقته بعريضة تبرأت فيها مما نسب لى وللجيش بغير حق وورد الى من سيادته جواب بقبول تلك العريضة مع طلب محافظتى على الطاعة استجلابا لرضى الحضرة السلطانية هذا ما انتهى اليه علمى من تحرير القسم الاول المحتوى على جميع الحوادث المهمة التى حدثت من غرة فبراير سنة ١٨٨١ لغاية ٩ يولية(٣٤) سنة ١٨٨٢ قبل حصول الحرب الانكليزية فى مصر.

تم القسم الاول ويليه الثانى

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(٣٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٤) هكذا فى المخطوطه

القسم الثانى فى حوادث الحرب وما يتبعها

فى الحرب العوان وما ادراك ما الحرب العوان هى (حرب الانكليز) الأمة التى فيها نصراء الانسانية الامة المحامية عن المظلومين . الامة المحررة لرقاب العباد المستعبدين . الأمة المحافظة على اتباع الحق والقوانين . (مع من) مع مصر . البلاد التى لا ينكر احد ما فيه اهلها من الاستعباد وما تجرعوه من غصص الاستبداد . البلاد التى طالما سفكت دماء اهلها بغير وجه شرعى ولا حكم قانونى . البلاد التى طغت حكامها وبغت وتفننت فى انواع المظالم . البلاد التى لا يعتبر حكامها شرعاً ولا قانونا . البلاد التى عبدت حكامها من دون رب العالمين . البلاد التى كانت تظن ان لا منفذ لها من جبّ الظالمين ولا موصلها الى فضاء الانسانية الا دولة انكلترا الشفوقة على النوع الانسانى فخاب املها . وبعد ان قربت ابنائها من فم ذاك الجب وظنوا انهم ناجين اذ جاءهم الحرس الانكليزى فاوقع القبض على من خرج من الجب والقاه فى فى[1] قراره لتنهشه الافاعى خلافا لما هو معهود فى رجال الانكليز من الشفقة والرأفة على النوع الانسانى . ذلك لما اعلن الخديو ان حياته وحياة الاورباوين فى خطر حضرت المراكب الحربية من جميع الدول اى دول اوربا العظام وهاجرت الاورباويون من مصر الا قليلا منهم وهاجت افكار الناس جميعا لحضور المراكب واسف المصريون على فراق اخوانهم الاورباوين الذين كانوا معهم على وفاق تام ثم قيل بان فى ترميمات الطوابى تهديد للدوننمة الانجليزية دون باقى مراكب الدول الاورباوية الموجودة بسكندرية فابطل عمل الترميمات ثم حضر الى قومندان عساكر اسكندرية مخاطبة من جناب الاميرال سيمور[2] الانكليزى بانه جارى قفل بغاز مينا اسكندرية بالاحجار وانه ان لم يمنع رمى الأحجار فانه يقابل هذا العمل بمثله فبأمر الخديو ورأى النظار كتب له بانه لا اصل لرمى الاحجار ولا لزوم لذلك وارسل اليه ايضا وكيل البحرية ورخص لجنابه فى القبض على من يفعل ذلك ثم فى يوم عشرة يوليه سنة ١٨٨٢ حضر خطاب ثانى من الاميرال المذكور الى القومندان المذكور بانه جارى تركيب مدافع فى طابية صالح والمكس وقائد بآى وانه يريد تنزيل

(١) هكذا فى المخطوطة
(٢) Admiral Seymour

جميع الاسلحة الموجودة فى طوابى اسكندرية من العجمى الى برج قايد بك مع ان الطوابى المذكورة لا يكن فيها الا الاسلحة الموجودة بها من مدة محمد على باشا حتى القذافات الخشب اكلها السوس ولم يكن بها اسلحة جديدة اصلا الا الموجود[٣] فى طابية قائد بك من مدة اسماعيل باشا وان لم يجاب الى ذلك يضرب على الطوابى عند طلوع الشمس من يوم ١١ يوليه سنة ١٨٨٢ حتى يهدمها ويخربها فعقد لذلك مجلس النظار والاختيارية من الذوات وتحت رياسة الخديو ودرويش باشا وقدرى بك من الوفد العثمانى وبعد المذاكرة تقرر ارسال ناظر المالية وناظر الداخلية ووكيل البحرية واحد رجال المعية دكران بك الى الاميرال سيمور يترجوه فى ان الطوابى المذكورة لم يكن بها اشغال ولم يتركب فيها اسلحة مستجدة ابدا وها هى مستعدة للكشف عليها من طرفه ومع ذلك فيسمح له بتنزيل ثلاثة مدافع من الطوابى المذكورة ارضاء لخاطره فتوجهوا المذكورين ورجعوا بالبلاغ الاخير وهو انه لابد من تنزيل كافة المدافع وانما يتنازل فى كونه يسمح للعساكر المصرية انها هى التى تجرى تنزيل المدافع عوضا عن العساكر الانجليزية فبعد المداولة طويلا بالمجلس المذكور تقرر ان تنزيل اسلحة الطوابى الموضوعة من مدة خمسين سنة بلا موجب حربى عار كبير لا يمكن تحمله ومع كوننا لا نريد حربا مع اى دولة خصوصا دولة الانجليز لكن بطريق المجورية وحفظا للشرف اذا ضربت المراكب على الطوابى تجاوبها الطوابى انما تكون المجاوبة بعد خروج خمسة او ستة ضربات من مدافع المراكب وكان الخديو يظهر شدة الغيرة والحماس ولطالما قال اذا حصل ضرب فاءنه يحمل بندقية ويكون فى مقدمة العسكر ثم انصرف المجلس على ذلك وعرض للأستانة من طرف الخديو ودرويش باشا بما تقرر ولما اتت الساعة المعينة اطلقت كلة من مركب الاميرال ثم تتابع الضرب من جميع المراكب وبعد خروج نحو الخمسة عشر كله من المراكب جاوبتها مدافع الطوابى واحتدمت نيران الحرب مدة عشرة ساعات ونصف متوالية حتى تهدمت الطوابى جميعها لكونها من الطرز القديم وسقطت مدافعها وتهدمت سراى راس التين واحترقت من نيران الكلل مع هدم كثيرا من البيوت التى داخل البلد خصوصا جهة محطة اسكندرية لانه كثيرا من مقذوفات المراكب الهائلة كانت متوجهة على طابية الداماس التى كنت بها مع جميع النظار وكانت المقذوفات تقع على البيوت المجاورة لتلك الطابية والمحطة المذكورة وبعد ذلك انقطع الضرب من الطرفين وفى اثناء اشتداد القتال كانت تأتينا ياوران الخديو ومحى الدين افندى ياور درويش باشا يترددون فى كل ساعة يشجعوننا ويبلغوننا سلام الخديو ودرويش

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(٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

باشا ويمدحون العساكر على صبرهم وثباتهم مع عدم استعداد الطوابى وجودة اسلحة المراكب الحربية الانجليزية ونحن مع ذلك نتعجب من وجود الخديو فى سراى الرمل على شاطئ البحر من غير مبالاة ولا خوف من المراكب كانه لم يكن حرب بين حكومته وبين مراكب الانجليز ولكن لا عجب من امر الله ثم انه عند انقطاع ضرب المدافع توجهت مع النظار الى الخديو واعرضنا لجنابه الرفيع ما حصل فى هذا اليوم فشكر العساكر علما[٤] اظهروه من الثبات واعرضت له ايضا انه اذا كان الغرض.هدم الطوابى فقد تهدمت واذا كان الغرض غير ذلك فماذا نصنع فعقد مجلس النظار تحت رياسة الخديو ودرويش باشا المندوب السلطانى للنظر فيما يصير اجراء[٥] بعد اتلاف الطوابى اذا استمر القتال فبعد المداولة تقرر انه اذا اطلقت المدافع من المراكب ففى الحال ترفع الرايات البيضاء من جميع الطوابى علامة التوقيف عن الضرب والشروع فى المخابرات السلمية واذ ذاك يتوجه طلبه باشا وذكران بك فى صندل بحرى لطرف مركب الاميرال سيمور ويخبرانه بأن الحكومة المصرية لا يكن بينها وبين حكومة انكلترا ما يوجب تكدير الخاطر فضلا عن الحرب بل دائما محافظة على حقوقها وحقوق رعاياها واذا كان الغرض الاصلى تنزيل المدافع فقد تهدمت الطوابى جميعها وتكسرت المدافع وانه لا يكن عندنا قوة تدافع المراكب بل ولا تريد حربا ويأخذ رايه عن ذلك وانصرف المجلس ليلا وعطيت التعليمات بذلك الى كافة الطوابى وتوجهت الى باب شرقى وبتّ فيه وفى صباح يوم ١٢ يوليه سنة ١٨٨٢ قبل الظهر بساعتين ونصف ابتدأت المراكب تضرب على البلد فرفعت الرايات البيضاء من كافة الطوابى ولكن المراكب لم تلتفت اليها الا بعد ان اطلقت نحو الـ ٢٥ عدد او ٣٠ عدد كلة ثم بطل الضرب وتوجه طلبه باشا فى البحر الى طرف الاميرال فقابله مأمور من طرف الاميرال فاخبره بما قرّ عليه راى الخديو والمجلس فبلغه المأمور ان جناب الاميرال يطلب استلام ثلاثة مواقع متجاورة وهى طابية العجمى وطابية المكس وطابية باب العرب لاتخاذها معسكرا للجيش الانجليزى[٦] وانه يريد حضور امر بذلك من الخديو قبل الساعة ٣ بعد الظهر وان تأخر فاءنه يستأنف الضرب ثانية ويأخذ تلك المواقع قهرا وكان باقى عليهذا[٦] الوقت ساعة ونصف فقط فرجع طلبه باشا مسرعا وتوجه الى الرمل وكنت توجهت اليها ايضا مع رئيس النظار واعرض طلبه باشا طلب الاميرال على الخديو فعقد لذلك مجلس تحت

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(٤) على ما

(٥) هكذا فى المخطوط

(٦) على هذا

رياسة الخديو ودرويش باشا حضره اسماعيل باشا خقى المشهور بابى جبل من الاختيارية وابو سلطان باشا رئيس النواب وتقرر بالعرض عن ذلك للاستانة حيث ان الفرمان السلطانى لا يجوز للخديو ان يعطى قطعة ارض من اراضى الحكومة المصرية الى آية دولة اجنبية وان يعود طلبه باشا ليبلغ الاميرال ذلك فتوجه المذكور لكنه لبعد المسافة وقصر الوقت تأخر عن الميعاد المحدد وبوصوله الى ديوان البحرية وجد ان مندوب الاميرال حضر الى ديوان البحرية فى الميعاد وترك هناك خبرا بأن الميعاد مضى ولم يأت جواب من الخديو وانه عاد وسيستأنف الضرب على البلد ثانيا وأما الخديو فانه امرنى فى المجلس بأرسال قوة الى جهة طابية العجمى ولا يمكنون العساكر الانجليزية من الخروج الى البر فاعرضت على جنابه بأن هناك ارض مكشوفة ومقذوفات المراكب لا تمكن عساكر البيادة من الدنو الى شاطئ البحر فضلا عن قطع خط المواصلة ما بين اسكندرية وبينها فغضب لذلك وقال لم جعلتم عساكر اذا كنتم لم تمنعوا عساكر العدو عن بلادكم ثم انصرف المجلس وتوجهت مع راغب باشا الى منزله الكائن على شاطئ المحمودية ونحن نفتكر فى شدة الخديو وغضبه خوفا على طابية العجمى من استيلاء عساكر الانكليز عليها ونتعجب من تجمع العربان باسلحتها حول سراى الرمل مع وجود العساكر وان تجمعهم بغير واسطة الجهادية لا يكون الا لأمر غير اعتيادى ونتذكر ما كان اشيع من ان شيخ عربان اولاد على كلف من طرف الخديو بواسطة ابراهيم بك توفيق مدير البحيرة بأنه حرر تلغرافا الى أوربا انه ضد الجيش المصرى وانه اذا امره الخديو بتأديب الجيش المذكور فانه قادر على تاديبة وتشريده كان ذلك فى المدة التى كانت الحكومة فيها بدون نظار يعنى قبل نظارة راغب باشا ثم بعد ان مكثنا فى بيت سعادته نحو ساعة جاءنا طلب من الخديو فتوجهنا معا الى سراى الرمل واخبرنى الخديو بانه حضر اربع بلوكات[7] بيادة الى الرمل لاى سبب وحيث كنت لا اعلم حقيقة ذلك فاعرضت على جنابه بأنه لا علم لى الا انه يمكن انهم حضروا لتقوية الغفر على السراى فقال لا يلزم وجودهم هنا وان الغفر الموجود من قبل كفاية فدعهم يتوجهوا لتأدية خدمة فى الجيش اولى وانفع فخرجت اليهم وطلبت الضابط المعين منهم وسألته عن أسباب حضوره وبأمر من حضر فاخبرنى ان رئيسه سليمان بك سامى امره بالحضور لتقوية الغفر فامرته بالتوجه الى الآليه لعدم لزوم العسكر بطرف الخديوى وان الغفر الموجود من قبل كفاية وتركته وتوجهت الى جهة اسكندرية فلما قربت من وابور المياه القريب من باب الشرق وجدت ازدحام شديد والعساكر مختلطة مع الاهالى والجميع متوجهين

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(٧) فرقة مشاة

جهة المحمودية فكان الرجل لا يلتفت لزوجته والمرأة لا تسأل عن طفلها والاطفال تصيح والنساء تبكي كأنه يوم المحشر تدهش لرؤيته ارباب العقول فنزلت عن العربة وتخللت الناس ماشيا حتى وصلت الى باب شرق فوجدت عيد بك الميرالاي وسالته عن هذه الحالة فقال انه اشيع بأن المراكب ستضرب على البلد فخرج من كان باقيا فيها وخرجت العساكر باولادها وازواجها بغير انتظام وانه يجمع عساكر الآلاية فامرته بسرعة تجمعهم ومنع العساكر عن الخروج ثم انى وقفت بنفسي فى الباب امنع العساكر وقيل لى ان سليمان بك سامى مع جانب من العساكر يريد احراق البلد وانه فى حالة جنون فارسلت له حالا بالحضور فحضر ومعه نحو بلوكين غير منتظمين فسألته عما نسب اليه من كونه يريد احراق البلد فانكر ذلك وقال انه كان معه اورطة متفرقة فى الشوارع الموصلة الى المينا لمنع خروج عساكر المراكب الحربية الى البر ولكن وجدت بعض العساكر معهم اقمشة بفته فامرته بضبط تلك الاقمشة ومعرفة الذين وجدت معهم فجمعها واولع النار فيها فامرته بعدم احراقها وحفظها حتى تسلم للمحافظة بعد معرفة اسباب وجودها مع من وجدت معهم وما زلت اجول بين العساكر واذكرهم بالشرف والعار وامنعهم عن الخروج وآمرهم بالمداومة على حفظ البلد وكنت ارى كثيرا من العربان خارجين من البلد مع الاهالى وجميعهم حاملين السلاح ومعهم اشياء تظهر انها جديدة وانها لا تليق ان تكون من لوازم العربان سكان البادية وكانه ما كان اجتماعهم حول سراى الخديو بالرمل الا لهذا الغرض ولا يبعد انهم اخذوا بعض البضائع من الدكاكين وحرقوا البعض لعدم معلوميتهم بعواقب الامور ومازلت امنع العساكر واشجعهم على عدم ترك البلد واذا بحضور حسن باشا الشريعى وسليمان باشا اباظه وحسين بك الترك ياور الخديو ومحى الدين افندى ياور درويش باشا واخبرونى ان العساكر الذين بالرمل وقفت تحت السلاح سوارى[٨] وبياده واحتاطوا بالسراى فلأى سبب حصل ذلك فدهشت لما سمعت هذا الكلام وبعد افاقتى ارسلت طلبه باشا ليفرق العساكر عن السراي ويبحث عن السبب وتبرأت من هذا العمل وسألت سليمان بك سامى عن اسباب ارسال عساكر البياده من الآليه الى الرمل فقال انه وجد مراكب متوجهة جهة الرمل فارسل لها اربعة بلوكات تقوية من نفسه بدون امر ولما توجه طلبه باشا الى السراى المذكورة لم وجد شئ[٩] من ذلك واتضح ان العساكر رأت مراكب متوجهة جهة طابية برج السلسلة القريبة من الرمل فظنوا انها آتية لتاخذ الخديو فحملوا اسلحتهم

(٨) فرسان ، خيالة

(٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

واحتاطوا بالسراى لحفظ الخديو فتشكر الخديو لذلك وارسل حسين بك الترك ياور خديو[10] مع سعادة طلبه باشا ليبلغنى سلام الخديو ولكنه ما وصل الىّ سيذكر ذلك بان معظم العساكر خرجت من البلد بصورة غير منتظمة ولم يتجمع عند باب شرقى الا القليل وحضر كثير من الضباط وفيهم نسيم بك قيمقام سواحل اسكندرية واخبروا ان المراكب اتت تحت برج السلسلة لتتمكن من الضرب على قشلاق باب شرق ولتقطع خط الرجعة فرايت انه غير متيسر جمع العساكر فى هذه الحالة وانه لابد من اتخاذ موقع مناسب لتجمع العساكر وازالة ما قام بافكارهم من الدهشة والاضطراب فامرت اميرى الالآيين هم عيد بك وسليمان بك سامى بان يذهبوا بمن تجمع معهم من العساكر الى المحمودية بعد خروج جميع الاهالى وخرجت مع راغب باشا راكبا عربته لحد مفرق السكة فنزلت من عربته حيث كان هو متوجه الى الخديو وانا توجهت الى المحمودية ولازلت اسرع فى المسير بقصد ان ادرك اول الناس لاوقف العساكر حتى وصلت بعد المغرب الى كوبرى المحمودية المارة عليه السكة الحديدية وهناك انتخبت قطعة ارض خلف المحمودية ووجدت بروجى[11] فامرته بضرب علامة التجمع ولا زالت العساكر تتوارد شيئاً فشيئاً الى الصباح والضباط الذين تركتهم باسكندرية ما حضروا بعساكرهم الا الساعة ٧ ليلا لعدم خلو الطريق حيث كانت شواطئ المحمودية مزدحمة بالناس والبهائم والعربات وغيرها والكل يبكى ويصيح على ما حل به وفى الساعة الخامسة من الليل تقريبا حضر طلبه باشا واخبرنى بامر العساكر المقال بانهم احتاطوا بالسراى وانه ما وجد اثرا لذلك وان الخديو مسرور وارسل معه حسين بك الترك ليبلغنى السلام وانه كان مرافقا له لحد الكوبرى ولكنه لكثرة الأزدحام وشدة الظلام وعدم معرفة الموقع رجع الى الرمل وفى صباح يوم الخميس ١٣ يوليو سنة – ١٨٨٢ – رأيت ان الذى تجمع من العسكر لا يبلغ الثلث وان معظم الجيش تقدم الى قدام وان الموقع لا يصلح لانه تحت نيران مقذوفات المراكب وخلفه الملاحة فتوجهنا بالعساكر حتى وصلنا الى محل يقال له عزبة خورشيد الكائنة فى جنوب محطة الملاحة بمسافة خمسة الآف متر وهناك أقامت العساكر الى اليوم الثانى فتجمع نحو نصفهم وفى اليوم المذكور كان اورسل[12] وابورات مخصوصة من مصر الى الرمل لاجل ركوب الخديو وفامليته ومن بمعيته فيها ورجوعهم الى القاهرة فتوجهت الوابورات

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(١٠) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(١١) مبوق ، نافخ بالبوق

(١٢) هكذا فى المخطوطة

وعادت فوارغ واتضح ان الخديو توجه بعائلته ومن معه الى اسكندرية وانه تحت الحرس الانجليزى وفى يوم الجمعة ١٤ يوليو توجهت بالعساكر الى عزبة كنج عثمان وهناك اتخذت المعسكر وتجمعت العساكر فيه وابتدئ فى اعمال المتاريس وحيث انه فى ١١ يوليو يوم الضرب على اسكندرية كان تحرر اعلان بالتلغراف من رئيس مجلس النظارة الى كافة جهات الحكومة ان البلاد صارة فى حالة حربية وان الحكومة صارة فى هيئة عرفية تحت احكام القوانين العسكرية حسب الاصول فكل من وقع منه ما يخل بالراحة العمومية يجازى على مقتضى الحكم العسكرى فترتب لذلك مجلس حربىّ بالجهادية ولما ان الخديو توجه الى اسكندرية بعد خروج الاهالى والعساكر منها تحت الحرس الانجليزى فأما ان يكون اسيرا وأما ان يكون انحاز الى الجيش المحارب لبلاده وفى كلا الحالتين لا يجوز ترك البلاد بلا حاكم حسب احكام الشرع الشريف الاسلامى اذ ان فى الحالة الاولى وهى الاسر لا يجوز ان يكون اسيرا وحاكما ينظر فى مصالح البلاد كما انه لا يجوز ترك البلاد فوضى بلا حاكم ينظر فى مصالح اهلها وفى الحالة الثانية وهى الانحياز فكتاب الله يحكم عليه بخروجه من جماعة المسلمين وبذلك لا يصح ان يكون حاكما عليهم من اجل ذلك تحرر تلغراف منى الى وكيل الجهادية يعقوب باشا سامى لنظر ذلك فى المجلس وتحرر المابين الهمايونى تلغرافا بذلك وفى ١٧ يوليه تقريبا حضر لى تلغراف من الخديو يوجه علىّ جميع المسؤلية وانى السبب فى حدوث الحرب وان اشغال الطوابى وتركيب المدافع فيها لم كان ينقطع وانه حصل الصلح ومقتضى توجهى له للمكالمة معى مشافهة فعلمت من ذلك انه مأسور وانه مأمور بطلبى للقبض علىّ وانه ينفى عن نفسه بنسبة اسباب الحرب الىّ فكتبت له تلغرافا بان انحياز جنابه الى الجيش المحارب لبلاده اثر فى قلوب الناس تاثيرا عظيما والتمست تعريفى بشروط الصلح حتى اتمكن من التوجه الى اسكندرية فلم كان يجاوبنى بشئ فكتبت تلغرافا الى وكيل الجهادية للنظر فيما ذكر فى المجلس وكذلك تحرر من الخديو ومن راغب باشا الذى كان رئيس[١٣] النظار لكافة جهات الحكومة محصول الصلح وابطال التجهيزات الحربية فتعطلت حركة التجهيزات الحربية نوعا مع حصول المناوشات بين مقدمات الجيشين عند حجر النواتية فكتبت لوكيل الجهادية بنظر ذلك فى المجلس وان المناوشات حاصلة بين مقدمات الجيشين ومن ذلك يعلم انه لم حصل صلح وكتبت للمديريات بارسال طلبات الجهادية بدون تأخير ولا يلتفتوا لأوامر تصدر بشأنها من غيرى هنالك عقد مجلس عام بديوان الداخلية للنظر فى كل ما ذكر حضره وكلاء النظارات ورؤساء

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(١٣) هكذا فى المخطوطة

الدواوين والمصالح والعلماء والأعيان وتذاكروا فيهذا الامر الذى دهم البلاد فقرّ رأيهم على أرسال وفد منهم الى الخديو باسكندرية ويطلبوا منه ومن النظار ان يتوجهوا الى القاهرة عاصمة البلاد فاءنكانوا[14] مطلوقين السراح فيجيبونهم الى ذلك وان كانوا مقهورين على بقائهم فى اسكندرية تحت حفظ العساكر المحاربة للبلاد فيعود الوفد الى مصر ويخبر المجلس ليرى رايه وتألف هذا الوفد من على باشا مبارك ورؤف باشا ومن العلماء الشيخ احمد كبوه شيخ رواق الصعايده بالازهر والشيخ على نائل ومن التجار السيد احمد بك السيوفى وسعيد بك الشماخ وكيل طرابلس الغرب وارسلوا وغادوا الى مصر ثانيا ما عدا على باشا مبارك والسيد احمد السيوفى حجزا فى اسكندرية وبعودة الوفد علينا بكفر الدوار افادونا بان الباطل لا يغنى من الحق شيأ وان من غش المسلمين فليس منهم وان الذين باسكندرية تحت قهر الانكليز وانه لا يستطيع احد أن يخرج منها الا بورقة رخصة من الانكليز ولكنهم مأمورين بأن يقولوا غير ذلك هذا وتشر اعلان من الخديو بختمة فى ٤ رمضان الموافق ٢٠ يوليه سنة ١٨٨٢ يعلن الناس فيها بعزلى حيث انى لم اعمل على مقتضى الامر الخديو فى ارسال العساكر الى جهة العجمى لدفع ومنع عساكر الانكليز عن تلك الجهة بل تركت اسكندرية بلا موجب واخذت العساكر وتوجهت الى كفر الدوار فعرضن هذا على المجلس ايضا وصدر امر من الخديو بالتلغراف الى وكيل الجهادية بذلك وبابطال التجهيزات الحربية هنالك عقد مجلس حافل يزيد عن خمسماية نفس حضره ثلاثة من البرنسات[15] وشيخ الاسلام وقاضى مصر والشيخ المفتى والسيد السادات والسيد البكرى وكثير من العلماء الاعلام وبطريرك الاقباط والمطران وكثيرين من القسس[16] وحضره حاخام اليهود ووكلاء نظام الدواوين ورؤساء جميع المصالح ووكلاءها والمديرون وقضاة المديريات والمفتين اللذين بالاقاليم وكثير من نبهاء مجلس النواب وعمد الاهالى ونبهائها وأعيان التجار وغيرهم وكثير من ذوات المعية الخديوية والاختيارية من الزوات المتقاعدين ونظرت فيه جميع الاوراق والمنشورات التى صدرت من الخديوى وما كتب منى وبعد المداولة بالمجلس المذكور تقرر فيه بتوقيف الخديوى وان لا يسمع له امر اصلا لكونه خرج عن حدود الشرع الشريف والقانون المنيف وتقرر ايضا بوجوب المدافعة عن البلاد والزامى بالمحاماة وبالمدافعة عنها حيث كنت موجود

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(١٤) فان كانوا

(١٥) امير ، سليل الملوك

(١٦) قسيس ج قساء

مع العسكر بجهة كفر الدوار وختم بذلك على هذا القرار من جميع اعضاء هذا المجلس وتحرر منه تلغرافيا للحضرة السلطانية مع ذكر اسماء المشاهير من الموقعين على هذا القرار وصار اعلانى بذلك رسميا فترتب مجلس ادارى للنظر فى احوال البلاد من ضمنهم حسين باشا وكيل الداخلية وبطرس باشا وكيل الحقانية ويعقوب سامى باشا وكيل الجهادية واحمد باشا نشأت ناظر الدايرة السنية وغيرهم عبارة عن جمهورية مؤقتة لحفظ نظام البلاد الى أن تنقشع سحب المصائب المتكاثفة على مصر كل ذلك ولم احضر هذا المجلس ولم اشاهده ولم يكن لى فيه رأى حتى انهم لقبونى بلقب حامى حمى البلاد المصرية وصاروا جميعا يخاطبونى بهذا العنوان ولكن اين المنصفون فما ذكر جميعه يعلم بادنى تأمل ان هذه الحرب التى لم يسبق لها نظير فى منزعة بتنوعها وتشكيلها باشكال غريبة متباينة كانت شرعية قانونية وانى مأمور بالمحاربة بمقتضى قرار المجلس المشكل تحت رياسة الخديوى وبمقتضى ما ذكر فى امر الخديوى الصادر بعزلى واوامره التى نشرت فى شأن ذلك الدالة على انه امرنى بالمداومة على الحرب وعزلنى بسبب انهزام الجيش ومأمور بالمدافعة والمحامات عن البلاد بمقتضى قرار المجلس العام الذى هو عبارة عن الأمة المصرية على اختلاف اديانها ومذاهبها وان الخديوى صار لا حق له فى الحكم على البلاد التى قرر اهلها بخروجه عن حدود الشرع والقانون من المعلوم ان الجهاد على مقتضى الشريعة الإسلامية اما ان يكون بالنفس او بالمال او بالرأى وقد ادت الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها ما يجب عليها فى سبيل المدافعة عن الوطن فانهم قدموا انفسهم واولادهم متطوعين عن طيب نفس وبذلوا اموالهم فى سبيل الشرف والوطن فمنهم من تبرع بنصف ماله ومنهم من تبرع بماله اجمع ومنهم من تبرع بثلاثين راس من الخيل وثلاثة الاف اردب من الغلال يعلم ذلك من التلغرافات الوارده من اهالى المديريات بدون واسطة إلى ديوان الجهادية او الينا بكفر الدوار ومن التلغرافات التى كتبت من طرفى للمتبرعين بالتشكر لهم ويعلم ايضا من التلغرافات الواردة لنا من حكام المديريات حتى انه فى امدة ثلاثين يوم اجتمع نحو المائة الف نفس من العساكر والمتطوعين والعربان وملئت الإشوان بالذخائر الوافرة واجتمع نحو الثمانية الاف من الخيول والبغال من المتبرعين ونحو الاربعة الاف جمل وكثير من النقود من غير واسطة تلك غيرة لم يسبق لها نظير من عهد صدر الاسلام للآن واما السراى فجميع الذوات والعلماء واعيان البلاد كانت تأتينا بدون انقطاع فى كفر الدوار وحتى فى راس الوادى وكل يجود بما عنده من الراى وبناء عليها ذكر تكون الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها اما انها محاربة بالحق والقانون واما انها عاصية باغية بالقوة والقهر المنافيان للحق والعدل هذا واما ما تبرعت الناس به من البقر والجاموس والاغنام فهذا شئ لا يمكن تقديره ومن جملة التبرعات

توارد الخوخ والعنب والبطيخ للجيش من جميع الجهات بدون انقطاع واضح ذلك بقيودات التلغراف بكفر الدوار والتل الكبير ورشيد ودمياط حتى ومن جملة المتبرعين دائرة رياض باشا وخيرى باشا مع كونهما غائبين عن مصر وجميع دوائر اعضاء العائلة الخديوية ومع كل ذلك كانت المخبرات الجفرية[١٧] التلغرافية لا تنقطع ما بين راس التين وبين بعض الناس بمصر والاستانة الى ان حصل تبويظ التلغراف اخيرا من جهة راس التين وفيما ذكر تبصرة وذكرى للمتصفين هذا وفى ابتدا حضورنا الى كفر الدوار وجدنا رعاع العربان والمولدين منهم جارين النهب والسلب فى المهاجرين من الاسكندرية وفى الأباعد والعزب وبلاد مديرية البحيرة فى هياج عظيم حتى ان المديرية كتبت لنا تلغرافا بان العربان هددوا نفس العزب المجاورة لدمنهور قاعدة المديرية وصار قتل رجل قبطى وزوجته وتركا طفلا صغيرا رضيعا من احد العزب واضحة اسماؤهما بالاعراض المتقدم لنا من احد اقارب المذكورين هذا الامر الذى احزننى كثيرا ولم ازل اتذكر واتصور صورة ذاك الرضيع المسكين ففى الحال كتبت للمديرية بسرعة القبض على الفاعلين والتحفظ على حياة ذاك الرضيع وتكررة[١٨] منى الاستعجالات الاكيدة حتى صار ضبط الفاعلين واعترافهم بقتل الرجل المذكور وزوجته وها هم موجودين للآن بسجن المديرية لا أعلم ماذا تم نحوهم من اجل ذلك ارسلت ما يلزم من العسكر لحفظ المديرية والبلاد والعزب وحفظ اهلها واموالها ومنع تلك التعديات وتحرر للمجلس بتغير[١٩] مدير هذه المديرية ابراهيم بيك توفيق الترجمان وقد علم اخيرا ان المدير المذكور كان اعطى تعليمات الى مشايخ العربان باجرى[٢٠] نهب البلاد عند حصول الحرب لاجل تفريق قوة العسكرية وتحرر لمدير الدقهلية بارساله الى الجهادية محفظا عليه وتحرر للجهادية بما علم عنه وبلزوم تحقيق ما نسب اليه بالمجلس العرفى واما مشايخ العربان فانهم لم يسمعوا تلك الاوامر المغايرة للانسانية الا انه صار اشاعتها بين رعاع الناس والمولدين من الاعراب ففعلوا ما فعلوا وصار كثير منهم بما معهم من المنهوبات وارسلوا للمجلس بافاده دالة على ما توقع منهم وما وجد معهم لمجازاتهم واضح ذلك فى قلم الوقوعات فى اركان حرب الذى كان بكفر الدوار ثم حكم المجلس عليهم بالسجن بالطوبخانه بمدد معلومة .

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(١٧) يعنى بالشيفر
(١٨) هكذا فى المخطوطة
(١٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة
(٢٠) باجراء

وبما حصل من زيادة تيقظ العساكر التى تفرقت بانحاء المديرية المذكورة تبدد الخوف بالامنية واطمأنت الخواطر واستقامت الاحوال يشهد بذلك الخواجه ابراهيم رجل اسرائيلى اورباوى عزبته بالقرب من بركة غطاس وصادر المديرية كما انه حصل بمديرية طنطا هيجان من المهاجرين الاسكندرانين قتل فيها بعض الاورباوين بنفس المديرية من اجل ذلك صار استبدال المدير ابراهيم باشا ادهم وارسل الى المجلس لمحاكمته على عدم حفظ الامن فى المديرية وفى الحال ارسلت العساكر البياده والسوارى الى طنطا وزفته والمحله وغيرها من مراكز المديرية فاستتبت الراحة وحصل الامن ومن قبل ذلك كان تحرر منى منشورا الى كافة المديريات والمحافظات وجميع الدواوين بالمحافظة على ارواح جميع الاورباويين اللذين بالمدن منهم والذين بالارياف وحفظ اموالهم حيث ان من اقام منهم معنا آمنا فله ما لنا وعليه ما علينا وانهم اخواننا فى الانسانية حتى ولوكان انكليزيا اذ انه لا يعد محاربا الا اللذين بايديهم السلاح فى ميدان الحرب ومن اراد منهم التوجه الى بلاده فعلينا حفظه وصيانته كما نحافظ على انفسنا واولادنا الى ان يبلغ مأمنه حسب احكام الشرع الشريف المحمدى معلوم ذلك بدفاتر كل ديوان من دواوين الحكومة حتى أن من كان يريد التوجه منهم الى الاسماعيلية كان يتعين معهم عساكر لمحافظتهم لحد تلك الجهة يعلم ذلك المسيو دليسبس والمسيو مازتو[٢١] قنصل دولة ايطاليا بالزقازيق والمسيو دبون[٢٢] قنصل فرانسا بها ايضا والتحريرات التى تحررت منى تلغرافيا بهذا الخصوص للجهادية والضبطية والمنصورة والزقازيق وغيرها وبما حصل من تلك النصائح والتنبيهات كانت جميع الاهالى مع من بقى من الاورباويين اخوة فى غاية التودد حتى ترتب على ذلك اعادة كثير من الاسماعيلية وبورسعيد من التجار الاورباويين الى مصر معلومة اسماؤهم بطرف ابراهيم بيك فوزى مأمور الضبطية وقتها وكذلك كان تحرر منى لضبطية مصر ومديريات الوجه البحرى بتوزيع مهاجرى الاسكندرية على البلاد والبيوت الشهيرة وان يدعوا الناس لاعانتهم وان يسكنوهم فى مساكن طيبة ويحسنوا اليهم غاية الاحسان فى مدة هجرتهم وبذلك حصل لهم من اقبال الناس عليهم بالاكرام ما لا يقدر قدره وفى اوائل شهر اغسطس سنة ١٨٨٢ وقع الضابط دادلى دوشير[٢٣] الانكليزى اسيرا فى يد عساكر فرقة ابو قير فارسله لى قومندان الفرقة المذكورة خورشيد باشا طاهر

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(٢١) M. de Lesseps; M. Mazzetti

(٢٢) M. Dupont

(٢٣) Dudley de Chair

مكرما فاستقبلته واجلسته بجانبي وازلت روعه واتخذته صديقا لى واكرمت مثواه ثم ارسلته الى مصر بافادة للجهادية بأن يصير اقامته فى محل يليق لاقامة الاشراف ويتعين له من يوانسه من الضباط الذين يعرفون اللغة الانكليزية ويكرمونه غاية الاكرام وان يقبلوا منه التلغرافات والمحررات التى يكتبها لوالدته او لرئيسه او لاى جهة حتى ان والدة الضابط المذكور حررت لى تلغرافا من لندن تشكرني على حسن عنايتي بولدها كما تحرر من طرفه وتخصص لاقامته السراى المعدة لتعليم اولاد الخديو ثم وقع اسيرا ضابطا قيل انه تليانى فصار اكرامه وارسل ايضا بالافادة لاقامته مع دادلي دوشير لكونه كان مستخدما فى الجيش الانكليزى ثم جئ لى بضابط بحرى تليانى وجدته داورية فرقة مريوط وهو منفردا ماشيا بارض الملاحة لا ملابس عليه اصلا الا قميص فقط ولا قوة له على السير فالبسوه ملابس احدى(٢٤) العسكر وارسلوه مكرما فوجدته ضعيفا واقدامه متورمة من تاثيرات الاملاح عليها فاكرمته وارسلته اسبتالية(٢٥) كفر الدوار واستحضرت له ملابس مخصوصة من مصر ولا زال هناك الى اخر يوم ولا ادرى محله الآن وهذا الضابط كان خاطبني عنه مسيو دليسبس قبل وجوده وعند حضوره انقطعت المخابرات التلغرافية بين مصر والاسماعيلية فلم امكن اعطاء خبر عنه كما انه ابى ان يعطى عنه اخبار الى قنصل دولته واسباب وجوده بدون ملبوسات قال انه كان التى جزمته ومشى فتاه فى هذا المكان فاحترقت اقدامه من الاملاح فقطع قطعة من ملابسه وربط اقدامه بها ومشى بها حتى ثقلت عليه الاربطة من تعلق الاتربة والطين بها فخلعها من اقدامه وقطع غيرها وربط اقدامه ثانيا ومازال على هذا المنوال حتى قطع جميع ملابسه ولم يبق معه الا قميص فقط وكذلك ضبط اثنين ضباط وواحد حاكم وتسعة عساكر كانوا خرجوا من فلوكة الى البر جهة ابو قير وارسلهم لطرفنا قومندان فرقة ابو قير مع الاكرام وبالتحقيق اتضح انهم نمساويين من مركب نمساوية وكانوا اتوا الى تلك الجهة عن غلط حصل من عدم معرفة الخرطة جيدا لتغيير البنانة من محل الصنحة وجائنا مكاتبة من قنصل النمسا في اسكندرية فارسلناهم مكرمين الى مركبهم يتحدثون بما لاقوه من الاكرام وكذا الاثنين ضباط اللذين صار ضبطهم بمعرفة طلائع فرقة الصالحية وارسلوا الى مصر بغاية الاكرام بما وجد معهم من النقود التى تبلغ ثلثماية جنيه انجليزى وكذلك الضابط الذى وقع اسيرا يوم اختلاط سوارى الجيشين فى معركة القصاصين ارسل مكرما لاقامته مع دادلى دوشير تلك كانت معاملتنا مع

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(٢٤) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٥) مستشفى

الاسرى ونحن متهومين[٢٦] بالتوحش فما بالنا الآن لا نعامل بمعاملة مثلها ونحن مستسلمين بانفسنا لدولة عظيمة ذات شرف وذمة هى انجلترا وما بالنا وضعنا فى سجن خصمنا الذى طالما تمنى وقوعنا فى حالة كهذه كانه لم كان محاربا لدولة الانكليز معنا فنكل الامر فى فضل ذلك لنصراء الانسانية واما احترامى للمنافع العمومية فثبوت بما حررته مرارا الى جناب مسيو دليسبس تلغرافيا وما ورد لى من طرفه تلغرافيا بخصوص احترام كنال[٢٧] السويس كل الاحترام ما دام ان المراكب الحربية لم تتخذه ميدانا للحرب ولازال هذا الاحترام الى ان شغلته المراكب الحربية واجرت الضرب على جهة نفيسة فكتبت الى المسيو المذكور منطرفى بأنه ما دام ان القنال اتخذ ميدانا للحرب فقوانين الحرب تقضى علينا باعتباره كذلك فاجابنا بان نعمل بما يسوغه لنا قانون الحرب هنالك تحرر تلغرافا من طرفى بذلك الى قومندان فرقة الخط الشرقى الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسنى وباشمهندس عموم الاستحكامات محمود باشا فهمى وباجراء سد الترعة الحلوة والقنال ان امكنهم ذلك حسب ما تقتضيه الاحوال الحربية ومن الاطلاع على صور محررات جنابه الى ولده وزوجته فى باريس يعلم شدة حرصنا على احترام القتال المذكور وكذلك مداومة مراكب البوسطة على السفرية بعد حصول الحرب ولما حصل توقيف من العساكر عن السفر وتحرر لنا عن ذلك من وكيل السفن بالسويس فامرته تلغرافيا بمداومة السفرية[٢٨] حسب المعتاد حيث ان ذلك من المنافع العمومية مع تفهيم العسكر بذلك فكانت البوسطة منتظمة فى سيرها لحين خروج العساكر الانجليزية الى السويس وبالنسبة لحرصنا على احترام القنال لم كان ارسل الى الجهة الشرقية قوة عسكرية لحفظها لاننا كنا لا نتصور اصلا انتهاك حرمة القنال من اجل ذلك لم صار ايجاد متاريس وطوابى للمدافعة تحمى بعضها بعضا فلما اتخذت الاسماعيلية مركزا للجيش الانجليزى وحصلت المحاربة مع العسكر المصرية الذين كانوا فى المحسمة لاعمال المتاريس فى يوم الجمعة الموافق ٢٥ اغسطس سنة ١٨٨٢ والخيل الانجليزية اخذت عليهم خط الرجعة انهزمت عساكرنا ومعهم راشد باشا وخالد باشا واما المهندس الشهير محمود فهمى باشا فانه اخذ اسيرا لما ناله من شدة الاسف على ترك هذا الموقع المهم الذى لم تسمح له نفسه بتركه وفراره لالحاقه بالتل الكبير هنالك توجهت فى يومها من كفر الدوار الى التل الكبير اكتفاء بوجود طلبه باشا بفرقة كفر

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(٢٦) متهمين

(٢٧) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٢٨) السفر

الدوار وكذلك على باشا فهمى قام من مصر ومعه الالآى الاول من البياده الى التل الكبير لتقوية عساكره وتتابع ورود العسكر طوبجيه وسوارى وبياده واخذ فى عمل المتاريس والطوابى بقصد توصيلها من الصالحية الى التل الكبير الى الدار البيضاء[٢٩] الى جبل عتاقة بوضع تتمكن به العسكر من ان تحمى بعضها بعضا وبذلك يمكن المدافعة عن البلاد من غير خسارة كما حصل فى جهة كفر الدوار ومع ذلك حصل حركتين حربيتين بجهة كبرى القصاصين ثبت فيها الجيشين المتحاربين ثباتا عظيما وجرح فى ثانيتهما الجنرال الكبير راشد باشا حسنى وسعادة على باشا فهمى فارسلا الى مصر وجاء بدلهما على باشا الروبى ليكون قومندان للجيش ومن قبل ان نتمكن من اتمام عمل المتاريس كما ذكر عاجلتنا العساكر الانجليزية والهندية وهاجمتنا السوارى ومعها الطوبجية السوارى الى تطير معها أينما طارت على حين غفلة فى ظلمة الفجر واشتعلت نيران الطوبجية والبياده المهلكة من الطرفين مقدار ساعتين ثم اتت فرقة سوارى بطوبجيتها من خلف الجيش فكان ذلك سببا لخذلان الجيش وتشتته فى يوم الاربعاء ٢٩ شوال سنة ١٢٩٩ الموافق ١٣ سبتمبر سنة ١٨٨٢ ميلادية ولما حصل هذا الخذلان توجهت من الجبل الى بلبيس وسوارى الانجليز على مقربة منى وهناك تقابلت مع على باشا الروبى فتوجهنا الى الشاطئ[٣٠] ثم ركبنا وابور السكة الحديد وتوجهنا الى القاهرة فوجدنا اهل المجلس جميعهم فى ديوان الجهادية وحضرات البرنسات حضروا ايضا بالديوان وبعد المداولة والتيقن بأن دولة الانجليز لا تريد الاستيلاء على مصر تقرر انه حيث الامر كما ذكر فلا لزوم للدفاع بعد ذلك اعتمادا على ان دولة الانجليز موصوفة بحب الانسانية والاعتدال فى كل امر وانها متى تحققت الامر ووقفت على افكار اهل البلاد لا شك انها تسعى فيما يوجب تحريرهم وراحتهم وحفظهم وبناء على ذلك كتب تلغراف من طرفى لحكمدار فرقة العباسية المكونة من خمسة وثلاثين الف عسكرى سعادة رضا باشا فى يوم ١٤ سبتمبر سنة ٨٢ بانه اذا حضرت عساكر الانجليز ترفع لهم الرايات البيضا ويتقابل مع ريس العساكر الانجليزية ويخبره بانتهاء الحرب اعتمادا على شرف دولة الانجليز وحرصا على حفظ البلاد من الدمار وعند الغروب اتت العساكر السوارى البريطانية والهندية فرفعت لهم الرايات البيضاء وتوجه رضا باشا لمقابلة الجنرال (لوى)[٣١] وكذلك ارسلت ابراهيم بيك فوزى ضابط مصر لمقابلة الجنرال ايضا

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(٢٩) هكذا فى المخطوطة

(٣٠) الشاطى

(٣١) General Lowe

وارسل وفد قبل ذلك من قبل المجلس لمقابلة الجنرال (ولسلى)[٣٢] فى بنها وبعد الغروب بساعة ونصف حضر ابراهيم بيك فوزى المذكور واخبرنى بان الجنرال (لوى) الانجليزى يريد مقابلتى فى العباسية وكذلك قومندان فرقة عساكر كفر الدوار كان حضر فى هذا اليوم الى الديوان فجأة تلغراف من قومندان فرقة العباسية بان الجنرال المذكور يريد مقابلته فى هذه الساعة وتوجهنا جميعا الى طرف الجنرال (لوى) بالعباسية وكذلك ارسلت له على بيك يوسف رئيس الالاى الذى فى القلعة حسب طلب جنابه ولما تقابلت مع الجنرال ومعى طلبه باشا فقال الجنرال (لوى) المذكور هل تقبلا ان تسلما انفسكم اسرى للدولة الانجليزية فقلنا نعم على شرط ان نكون فى ذمة دولة انجلترا وشرفها وخلعنا سيوفنا وسلمناها ليد الجنرال (لوى) نيابة عن القائد العمومى الجنرال ولسلى وقلنا له سلمنا سيوفنا وانفسنا الى ذمة انجلترا وشرفها فصوت اولادنا وصوت الانسانية يطالبون انجلترا وكل الانجليز بحقوقنا وجنابكم بالنيابة عن الحكومة الانجليزية وعن كل انجليزى واعلم انه موجود بالعباسية خمسة وثلاثون الف عسكرى ومثلهم فى كفر الدوار ورشيد ودمياط وغيرها ولكن حرصا على البلاد وحقنا للدماء واعتمادا على شرف انجلترا وانها لا تريد الاستيلاء على البلاد المصرية قد ابطلنا المدافعة وسلمنا انفسنا لذمتكم وشرفكم فقبل ذلك منا وبقينا بطرفه ثلاثة ايام ثم حضرنا الى عابدين ومكثنا بطرف الكولونيل (تين)[٣٣] قومندان آلاى الغونارديا الانجليزى لغاية ٤ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ ونحن فى غاية الراحة ثم صار تسليمنا الى السجن المصرى فى يوم الخميس الموافق ٥ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢ فذاك اليوم كان يوما عظيما حيث فرقوا بينى وبين صاحبى طلبه باشا الذى كان يوانسنى واوانسه ووضعونى فى اودة لا شى فيها ولا كرسى وقفلوها على فمكثت فيها حتى جاء خادمى فلم يسمح له السجان بدخول شئ غير سجادة ولحاف ثم دخل على الضابط الموكل باهانة المسجونين وفتشنى واخذ ما كان معى من الاوراق الخصوصية لارسالها لمجلس التحقيق وخرج هو ومن معه من رجال الاهانة ثم دخل بعده طائفة من حاشية الخديوى اعرف منهم عثمان بيك رأفت ناظر الاسطبل الخديوى وحسين افندى فوزى من قلم تشريفات خديوى وتقدم الى رجل من الاتراك اللذين يركبون دائما ويسيرون امام الخديوى المعدين لاعدام الحياة عند اللزوم وصار يفتشنى ويخرج قميصى من تحت البنطلون فلم يجد معى الا

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(٣٢) General Wolseley

(٣٣) Colonel Thynne

احجبة[٣٤] كنت حاملها لحفظ اولادى الاطفال من داء التشنج العصبى الذى كانوا يموتون به فاخذها بعنف وقوة وكنت اقول له دعنى اخرجها اليك فيقول لا انا مأمور بصوت مزعج حتى انه اخرج الجزمة من قدمى وفتشها ثم خرجوا وبعد ساعة فتح الباب واذا بمحرر جريدة الاهرام اسمه (بشاره تقله) فظننت انه جاء ليزورنى ويهون على المصاب لكونه كان معنا قبل الحرب وكان يحلف بدينه وشرفه انه كواحد منا وانه من دعاة الحرية وكنا نجله ونكرمه واذا به اتى بوقاحته ليشمت بنا وقال لى بنفور عرابى اى شئ سويت رايت اى شئ صار لك فعلمت انه ذو وجهين وانه لا شرف له فلم اجاوبه فتوجه وبعد ساعة اخرى دخل طايفة ثانية من الاتراك اتباع دايرة الخديوى وبعض عساكر المراسلة الذين هم بمعيته وفتشوا السجادة واللحاف والقوهم يمينا وشمالا وخرجوا واقاموا ليلتها غفراء على المسجونين وفى يوم ٦ اكتوبر توجهوا لاشغالهم وفى ليلة ٩ اكتوبر الساعة ٨ افرنكى من الليل يوافق الساعة ثلاثة ونصف عربى تقريبا بعد ان خلعت حوايجى ونمت واذا بالباب قد فتح ودخل على جماعة نحو العشرة اشخاص او اثنى عشر شخصا لا حققتهم لشدة الظلام وقال قائل منهم بصوت قبيح هائل يا عرابى اما تعرفنى فظننت انهم مأمورين بقتلى الا انى تثبت وقلت له لست اعرفك فمن انت وما الذى تريده فى هذا الوقت فقال انا ابراهيم اغا وسبنى وشتمنى بقوله يا كلب يا خنزير انت كنت عايز ايه منى وثقل على ثلاث مرار وعلمت انه ابراهيم اغا تتونجى الخديوى الذى كان توجه الى الشام هربا بسبب سرقة الالماس من سراى عابدين لاجل عدم التحقيق مع محمد حسن الذى ارسل الى البحر الاحمر ليلقى فيه كما سبق ذكره وها انا فى اودة ذات منفذين من جهة واحدة عليهما اقفاص من حديد وخارجهما شمسيات من خشب مسمرين لا ينفتحان أبدا وعند مجئ الطعام من البيت بصحبة الخادم ياخذه منه احد الاتراك غفراء السجن ويفتح الباب ثم يدخل الطعام داخل الباب ويقفله سريعا ويتركنى وشأنى كأنى وحش داخل قفص الا ان قفص الوحش متجدد الهواء دائما وينور له ليلا ونحن محرم علينا القيان[٣٥] وغيرها مطلقا مبالغة فى الاهانة وكذلك صار القبض على جميع الضباط من رتبة البيكباشى فصاعدا وبعض الصاغات واليوزباشى والملازمين وسجنوهم وكذلك على كثير من العلماء واعضاء مجلس النواب والاعيان من العمد والتجار وغيرهم حتى غصت بهم السجون فى مصر واسكندرية والمديريات وظهر مصداق قول اعضاء مجلس النواب ان بقاء

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(٣٤) حرز ، عوذة

(٣٥) قينة قيان : خدم

المجلس لا يكون الا ببقائى فان خرجت من مصر فلا مجلس ولا بلاد بل بعد ازالة جميع الاعيان والمتنبهين من المصرين وتبعيدهم وخراب بيوتهم تصير اهالى مصر عبيدا ارقاء يستخدمون فى اقذر الخدمات تلك المحاربة التى لم يسبق لها مثيل حيث ان الخديوى تسبب فى حضور المراكب الحربية الى مصر ثم كان أول مسارع الى الحرب ومحرض عليها حتى التبس علينا الامر ثم انحاز للجيش المحارب لبلاده ثم استمر الحرب باسمه فكانت عساكر الانجليز تقاتل باسم الخديوى اعتمادا على ان الجيش المصرى عصاة والخديوى ينشر المنشورات بان عساكر الانجليز لا تريد الاستيلاء على البلاد وهكذا تنوعت فى صفاتها وظهرت فى اشكال غريبة فاذا كان الجيش عاصيا على زعمهم فما بال الناس جميعا ينظرون الى كثير من الذوات الملكية مسجونين وكثير من العلماء الاسلام واعضاء مجلس النواب واعيان العمد والتجار ونبهاء الدواوين وغيرهم من الاهالى صار سجنهم حتى ملئت السجون بكافة المديريات والمحافظات وغيرها واذا كان الجيش والمذكورين وباقى الامة المصرية على اختلاف مذاهبها كلها على راى واحد مشتركين فى امر واحد وهو الحق فما بالنا نرى اول دولة مشيدة لاركان العدل والحق تقهر تلك الامة سيئة البخت ارضاء لشخص واحد على ان هذا الشخص لا تجيز له شريعة قومه ان يكون اميرا عليهم ابدا هذا مع احترام دولة انكلترا للشرائع والاديان وكيف تكون تلك السيرة فى بطون التواريخ لدى عالم الانسانية فنكل الحكم فى ذلك لشرف الامة الانجليزية . ان مصر لم تكن محاربة لدولة الانجليز اصلا ولكنها كانت مدافعة عن نفسها فقط حرصا على اعادة المودة مع دولة انجلترا المحافظة على حقوق المصرين منذ زمن مديد وطلبا لبقاء ابواب الصلح مفتحة واعتمادا على انها متى تبينت الحقيقة لا تظلم المصريين حقوقهم وحجتنا فى ذلك ما هو مشاهد فى تحسين حالة الزراعة وحفظ النيل وعدم ما يخل بالراحة العمومية التى بها يتخيل ان البلاد لم يكن فيها حرب اصلا هذا مع حفظ املاك الاورباوين وزراعاتهم فى العاصمة والارياف وغير ذلك حصول التسليم مع وجود سبعون الف من العساكر والمتطوعين وكثير من الاسلحة والذخاير الحربية فضلا عن كثرة الترع والجسور والخلجان التى يستعان بها كثيرا فى المحاربات خصوصا فى مدة النيل فاذا كنت عاصيا فكيف اسلم نفسى مع وجود تلك القوات الكبيرة الكثيرة معى والبلاد مستعدة لاعانتى بالرجال والمال واذا تقطعت جميع الاسباب فكيف اسلم نفسى الم تكن ارض الله واسعة فاهاجر فيها او لم كنت اتوجه الى لندره فاحتمى فيها ان فيذلك لتذكرة لمن يتذكر . فالحق والحق اقول انى لنست بعاصى وانما قمت وقامت البلاد اى الامة المصرية فى طلب تحرير بلادها مع غاية الشرف وحفظ الناموس لا لغاية شخصية كما يفتروا المبطلون بل انى مكلف بحفظ البلاد من طرف الحضرة

السلطانية حيث تبين بعظمة اخلاصي وسوء مقاصد الخديوى كما ورد لى بذلك كتاب من حضرة الشيخ محمد ظافر من خواجى الذات الشاهانية وكتاب اخر من سعادة احمد باشا راتب ياور الحضرة السلطانية موجودين بطرفى للآن ثم انى صرت قائد للجيش فى المدافعة عن البلاد بوجه الشرع والقانون وامر الخديوى والمجلس اولاً وقرار الامة ثانيا وليس بعد ذلك بدليل ولا برهان . هذا ما انتهى اليه البيان فيها حضرات المحامين عنى ذو الشرف المستر برودلى[٣٦] ومستر نابير[٣٧] ذو الشرف ومستر ايف[٣٨] ذو الشرف ويا حضرات نصراء الانسانية والمحامين عن الحق بانفسهم وباموالهم من غير ان تأخذهم فيه لومة لائم صديقى الامين مستر بلونت[٣٩] ذو الشرف والكمال والمشتركين معه من احبائه المحافظين على شرف الانسانية بانجلترا هذه الرسالة كتبتها بيدى عما صار من الحوادث الابتدائية والانتهائية على مقتضى الحق والانصاف بدون شك فيها ولا ريب وليس بعد الحق الا الظلال المبين .

انتهى

١٦ ذو الحجة سنة ١٢٩٩ هجرية

موافق ٢٩ اكتوبر سنة ١٨٨٢

بمدينة كولمبو بجزيرة سيلان

احمد عرابى المصرى

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(٣٦) Broadley

(٣٧) Napier

(٣٨) Eve

(٣٩) Blunt

meant nothing more than words, seeing that he had taken the army with him, and that Loutfi Pasha's appointment meant little less, seeing that the English were in command of the city, it must strike one as being almost Gilbertian." **Reflections of Egypt,** p.222.

81. The Arabic is **tawqīf al-Khediwi:** the word more commonly means to seize or 'to arrest', but here a less specific translation seems preferable. The 'Commission' had, after all, no power to arrest him nor did they seek to appoint a new Khedive.

82. The S.O.A.S. manuscript specifically uses the Arabic words **jumhūriyya mu'aqqata** i.e. "provisional republic." The Sabry version, has, surprisingly, instead of these words: "une sorte de comité de salut public...." **L'Esprit National Egyptien**, p.279

83. British historians, for all their bias against ʿUrābī, have given the Khedive little credit for his conduct during this crisis. Major E.W. Polson Newman, for example, in whose work we find a closely researched account of the ʿUrābī period, comments about the Khedive:

> The only loyalty he showed was to those support he wanted He had now deserted his country and, according to Moslem law, had no more authority over his people. His whole conduct with regard to British armed action had placed him in a position which no man could justify, and dispelled once and for all the charge of rebellion which was made against ʿUrābī and his followers. **Great Britain in Egypt** (London 1928), p. 108.

84. This paragraph and the following one are omitted from Sabry.

85. A remarkably different view of the Egyptians' treatment of their prisoner appeared in the official **British Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt,** under the authorship of Colonel J. Maurice (London 1887). Therein, p. 17, it is stated: "Mr. De Chair, a Midshipman, sent with despatches, had been captured on the 29th July, and being sent to Cairo, was paraded through the streets with an announcement that it was Sir B. Seymour who had been made prisoner." One cannot but wonder who would have taken the young De Chair, from his rank not yet a full adult, for the senior and distinguished British Admiral

86. This interesting digression, over the following three paragraphs, that offers further proof of ʿUrābī's humane treatment of prisoners, was omitted from Sabry and abridged in the **Review** version

87. The following two sentences are omitted from Sabry.

88. This conversation, like much of the preceding paragraphs, is condensed and given in narrative form in both the **Review** and Sabry versions.

89. Bishāra Taqlā and his brother Salīm, both Lebanese by birth, founded **al-Ahrām** in August 1876 as a weekly journal. Within a short period it expanded in size and became a daily newspaper gaining support from its progressivist and reformist editorial policies. Trying to maintain a middle ground between Nationalists and the Khedive it satisfied neither totally and in its early life was much assisted by French support. In 1892, following the death of Salīm, Bishāra became its editor as well as manager and in 1898 the newspaper moved its offices to Cairo. It remains, of course, in publication today as the most prominent newspaper in the Arab world.

90. This remark offers an equation by which to interpret ʿUrābī's other references to specific times. See note 74 above.

91. The following two sentences were omitted from both the **Review** and Sabry versions.

92. The rest of this paragraph and the following two were omitted from Sabry; the passage was given in condensed form in the **Review** version.

93. A Turkish title given to the confidential secretarial staff of the Ottoman state who worked directly with the Sultans.

94. These words of reference to the Island of Colombo, where ʿUrābī began his exile in January 1883, seem written with a different pen and may perhaps have been added, along with a second mark of ʿUrābī's seal, when he despatched the manuscript to Blunt in England. This final page of the manuscript is reproduced in this present text, **vide** p. ii above.

Sāmī in which he admitted carrying out the burning of Alexandria and charged that he had done so on direct orders from ʿUrābī. Further attempts by the prosecution to corroborate these charges failed, however, and Sāmī was soon removed to Alexandria. Although he later tried to attenuate and finally to deny his 'confession', he was tried and convicted by Court Martial and hanged there on June 9 of the following year. He was, therefore, the only prominent Nationalist figure to be executed.

72. The Arabic word used is **bafta** which referred to a low-grade, loose-woven cotton cloth. The **Review** version mistranslated this as "silk" and condensed the passage, omitting reference to the burning of this material.

73. The four lengthy paragraphs that follow were much condensed in the Sabry version.

74. The Arabic is **fī al-sāʿat al-khāmisa fi al-layli.** Precisely what time is intended by this is unclear. In a later time designation, see p.99 and note 88 below, ʿUrābī makes a differential of 5 hours between "European time" and "Arab time," a practice apparently then widespread in the Near East and now still used by some of the older generation in the Arabian peninsula. If he is in fact here referring to "Arab time" then, in accord with his own equation mentioned above, this would be equivalent to 10 p.m. "European time."

75. The Arabic word used is **al-ḥars**. The **Review** version has the sentence describing the Khedive as under British "protection." Although capable of this meaning, ʿUrābī would scarcely have used the word here in that sense, no doubt preferring the English word "guard." His carefully elaborated case that follows depends, after all, on his assumption that the Egyptian sovereign was unwillingly in enemy hands. This understanding alone justified his own initiatives and acceptance of instructions from the Cairo citizen-councils. ʿUrābī would surely not have accepted the interpretation that the Khedive needed "protection" by the British from himself!

76. This presumably is the telegram dated July 14, the text of which is given in John Ninet's account. Blunt concluded from its wording that it was dictated by the British; its text was not, it is interesting to note, included in the official **Blue Books**.

77. ʿUrābī was clearly correct. Cartwright's telegram to Granville the following day, July 15, stated: "The Khedive has summoned him here. If he comes he will be arrested, if not, declared an outlaw." Quoted in Blunt, **Secret History,** p.393.

78. ʿAlī Pasha Mubārak (1824-1893) was one of the most remarkable Egyptians of the late nineteenth century. Born of poor fellah parentage, he received training for the army and reached officer status. Serving later with the Egyptian army contingent during the Crimean war, he specialised in engineering and became his country's leading expert on irrigation and drainage. An extraordinarily versatile man, he received many high administrative appointments, including the posts of Minister of Education and of Public Works. He was a founder of Egypt's first National Library and founding editor of the country's earliest educational-cultural-scientific journal the **Rawdat al-Madāris al-Misriyya** begun in Cairo in 1870. An impressive geographer-historian as well, his **al-Khitat al-Tawfīqiyya li Misr al-Qāhira**, published in twenty volumes, is a mine of information on an extensive range of subjects. Mubārak was also innovative as a proto-novelist; his **Alam al-Din**, published in 1882, is a four-volume fictional account of the travels, observations, and discussions of an Egyptian Sheikh and a British Orientalist in Egypt and Europe, a formula that al-Muwailiḥi and Hāfiz Ibrāhīm were later to emulate.

Apparently an early supporter of the Nationalists, ʿAlī Mubārak did not report back from his mission as a member of the delegation who went to see the Khedive in Alexandria on behalf of this Cairo "Council." He was later rewarded by the Khedive with high executive positions in his new government. In his **al-Khitat** (vol. IX pp.57-58) Mubārak wrote disparagingly of ʿUrābī and of the Nationalist movement.

79. The names of these two men are omitted, without explanation, from the the Sabry version.

80. De Kusel neatly underlined the absurdity of this situation: "Two things done always strike me as not being wanting in humor, one being the dismissal of ʿUrābī from his office and the appointment of Omar Loutfi Pasha as Minister of War. When one thinks that ʿUrābī's dismissal

62. The **Review** version adds the detail that this meeting lasted "for an hour and a half."

63. De Kusel, who witnessed the bombardment from one of the ships, gives a colorful account of this unequal confrontation between a static line of forts using antique weaponry and the superbly equiped and armoured British naval units. He comments on the gallantry of the Egyptian defenders and quotes a personal letter he received dated that day from Captain Molyneux on the flagship **Invincible** commenting that "The Egyptians gave it us much hotter than we expected." **Reflections of Egypt**, p. 203.

64. Blunt charged (**Secret History**, p. 380) that there was a prior understanding between the Khedive and the British that he should be at a palace on the Maḥmūdiyya Canal during the bombardment, of which he received notice as early as July 6. In the event, however, Tawfīq preferred to retire to the palace at al-Ramla from where he could view the battle, having been, according to Lord Charles Beresford (Blunt, **Secret History**, p. 381), who received the Khedive at the official Ra's al-Tin palace after the British landing, genuinely uncertain as to its outcome Gladstone, the British Prime Minister, replied to a July 12 question in Parliament that "...we have no information whatsoever at present as to the state of things in Alexandria or as to the position of the Khedive." Hansard, vol. CCLXXII, 1882, p.166

65. It is amusing to read how Sir Charles Dilke, British Foreign Secretary, also stressed, in the acrimonious House of Commons debate of July 12 on the bombardment, the Khedive's courage at this time in behaving as a friend of Britain: "If His Highness were not already the true friend of this country, we should especially admire, at all events, the courage he has displayed on this occasion: and I can assure the right honorable Gentleman that every possible step will be taken under the circumstances, which can be taken, to secure the safety of the person of the Khedive." Hansard, vol. CCLXXII, 1882, p.190.

66. The Arabic is **lā ᶜajaba min amri Allah**. This remark is omitted from the **Review** version and the whole passage is missing from the **Taqrīr** Arabic printing.

67. The **Review** translation adds the detail that ᶜUrābī went: "to Ramleh about sunset." Does this insertion and that of note 62 above reflect Broadley's interest, like the meticulous lawyer that he was, in establishing precise references to time and place?

68. The **Review** version states "...that the Admiral required three forts to be occupied by British troops." But the manuscript wording is **li ittikhādhihā muᶜaskaran lil-jaysh al-injilīzī**, implying the establishment of a camp or barracks for the British army. This demand clearly presented a grave legal problem for the Egyptians and they were keenly aware of the possible parallels with the French occupation of Tunisia. The Egyptian response, insistence on the need to gain the Sultan's permission, was surely predictable to the British.

69. The Arabic is **dīwān al-baḥriyya**, which the **Review** version strangely mistranslated as "...arrived at the beach."

70. Sabry (see **L'Esprit National Egyptien**, p. 275 footnote), suggests that, bowing to pressure from other revolutionary leaders who feared the Khedive might flee and advocated that he be sent under guard to Cairo, ᶜUrābī compromised by despatching 400 troops to surround the palace. Their commander, however, Muḥammad Munīb, was a known supporter of the Khedive and allowed him to leave the next day to join the British forces in Alexandria. ᶜUrābī's denial here of knowledge of the sending of the troops and the subsequent events seem to argue against Sabry's interpretation. ᶜUrābī did not, after all, have to refer to the troops in this his defence statement and only does so to provide evidence of his innocence of evil intent regarding the Khedive.

71. A substantial part of Alexandria burned to destruction after the military engagements. It was later charged, and widely suggested in the European press, that ᶜUrābī had ordered the burning of the city. Whoseever the guilt, however, it was Sulaimān Sāmī who paid with his life. Escaping with Ḥasan Mūsā al-ᶜAqqād to Crete after the defeat at Tell el-Kebir, the pair were soon captured and returned to Egypt by the island's Ottoman authorities. Jailed in the Dāira al-Sanīya, Sāmī was vigorously interrogated without the knowledge of Broadley and contrary to a prior agreement between the defense team acting for the Nationalists and the government prosecution. Two days later the **Egyptian Gazette** began publishing a sensational statement by

Shereef Ahmed Asaad, who came to Cairo with Dervish Pasha in May 1882, also concurred in these injunctions, and took charge of a petition to the Sultan on our behalf. He also wrote me, much later on, a letter in a similar strain.

During the early part of the hostilities I telegraphed several times to Constantinople About the beginning of August, I telegraphed to Yaseen Bey, one of the Sultan's attendants, stating what had taken place during the hostilities, and submitting that the war was a legitimate and legal one, that the Khedive had gone to the enemy, and was therefore in exactly the same position as the Bey of Tunis.

On the 12th of Ramadan 1299 (August 6, 1882) I telegraphed to Yaseen Bey, stating that Dervish Pasha, instead of advising the Khedive to remain with his people, had allowed him to join the enemy, and that the town of Alexandria had been delivered to the British Admiral.

When the news reached me that the Porte proposed sending troops to Egypt, knowing that this would be injurious to the Egyptians, I telegraphed on the 8 th of Ramadan (August 2, 1882) to Yaseen Bey, stating that Egypt was sufficiently provided with men, arms, and ammunition to defend the country and protect the Sultan's rights, and that we were unanimous in our decision to stand by those rights.

Never, during those negotiations or afterwards, up to the present time, has the Porte disapproved of our doings. The Sultan has both by act and letter often approved them. How can I then be a rebel? Is not the Sultan admitted by Englishmen to be sovereign of Egypt?" **Nineteenth Century Review**, pp. 981-2.

This passage is perhaps one of the "additional notes" and "one or two corrections" Broadley reports (p. 114) that ᶜUrābī later made to his original manuscript.

56 Asᶜad's title, here translated roughly as "custodian of the holy places in Medina," was **vakīl al-Farāsha**. The post originally applied to those given the honor of sweeping the holy buildings in Mecca and Medina. By this date, of course, the title was honorary and conferred on a court official to indicate the high degree of the Sultan's confidence the holder enjoyed.

57. The highly emotional opening paragraphs of this section were toned down and much condensed in both the **Review** and Sabry versions.

58. ᶜUrābī's tribute to the reputation of the British is strangely twisted in Sabry's version. His translation reads, "Ou est cet amour de l'humanité dont les Anglais sont si fiers?" **L'Esprit National Egyptien,** p. 271.

59. The European sources cast serious doubt on the veracity of ᶜUrābī's insistence in the following passages that the Egyptian army was not taking measures to strengthen and to protect its forts. Baron de Kusel, at the time the Acting Director-General of Customs at Alexandria and a British witness to the city's bombardment, also tells an extraordinary story of a secret underwater weapon that seems to indicate a high degree of Egyptian interest in defending the country's ports. The weapon is said to have originally been ordered from the United States by General Stone Pasha, the American Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian army, and ᶜUrābī seems to have known of its delivery to the Alexandria customs building. De Kusel reports how his curiosity was aroused by the constant visits from high-level Egyptian Ministry of War emissaries asking the whereabouts of a mysterious package. He therefore located and opened it himself and, discovering it to be a "submarine, explosive weapon," had it dismantled and despatched at night directly to Admiral Seymour's flagship. The Admiralty in London were later, he reports, "profuse in thanks!" See de Kusel, **An Englishman's Reflections of Egypt 1863-1887**, (London, 1915,) pp. 179-183.

60. This seems to convey the meaning of the Arabic: **wa lam yakun bihā asliḥatun jadīdatun aṣlan illā al-mawjūd (sic) fī ṭābīyat Qā'id Bey min muddati Ismāᶜīl Bāshā**. The sentence was omitted from the **Review** version.

61. The **Review** version gives the full composition of the delegation: "It was presided over by the Khedive in person, and the following personages were present, viz. Dervisch Pasha and Kadri Bey, the Sultan's envoys, Ragheb Pasha, Ahmed Rashid Pasha, Abderrahman Bey Ruchdi, Suleiman Pasha Abazah, Hassan Pasha Sherai, Mahmoud Pasha Fehmy, Ismaᶜil Pasha Hakki, Varashli Pasha, Raouf Pasha, Mohamed Pasha Sais, Kassim Pasha, Ibrahim Pasha Ferik. I was also there as Minister of War. The Khedive took notes of the opinions of the members in his own handwriting." **Nineteenth Century Review**, p. 982. It is easy to visualise Broadley suggesting inclusion for the English translation of an exhaustive listing of all those present at this vitally important meeting.

whose support for ᶜUrābī vacillated frequently, held the post of President of the Chamber of Deputies at this time.

47. ᶜUrābī is here implying that Sulṭān Pasha had indeed, however fleetingly, suggested ᶜUrābī's exile, inter alia, as a solution to the crisis. In Sabry's version, however, there is the implication that Sulṭan never made the suggestion at all: "...note commune sur l'avis de Sultan Pacha qui en répudia, à plusieurs reprises, la paternité. Cette note..." **L'Esprit National Egyptien**, p. 264.

48 The government resigned on May 26, 1882.

49. Some financial guarantees would clearly have had to be made early in the discussions to which ᶜUrābī here refers. In his so-called **Autobiography** stated verbally to Blunt in Cairo in March 1903, twenty years later, and attached as Appendix I to Blunt's **Secret History**, ᶜUrābī reported that the French Consul did in fact offer him, on behalf of the French Government, £500 a month for life if he would take up permanent residence in Paris. ᶜUrābī denied in the same conversation knowledge of involvement by the Rothschilds, whose investments are said to have totalled some £9,000,000 in Egypt at the time, in the offer. For Blunt's contrary views and comments see his **Secret History**, especially pp. 241, 334, and 487.

50. The inverted commas are not present in the original Arabic. The phrase is a commonly employed quotation from the Koran. Vide Sura 53 **al-Najam** v. 28.

51. The following sentences relating to the Khedive were omitted without comment from the original English translation.

52. Blunt maintains, in the **Secret History** pp.301-303, that it was the British Cabinet that requested to the Sultan the appointment of such a Commission. The plan, he states, was to have an Ottoman military representative of such stature and known ruthlessness lead the Commission that he would by his sheer force of character prevail on ᶜUrābī to agree to self-exile in Istanbul. If this failed then, according to Blunt, the Commissioner was simply to shoot ᶜUrābī dead. The Egyptian leader's popularity seems, however, to have been greater than London or Istanbul realised and so the Darwish mission failed. The Commission also included Sheikh Aḥmad Asᶜad, who was sympathetically inclined to ᶜUrābī and whose function was to report independently to the Sultan. Contrary to the understanding of the British Cabinet, Blunt suggests (op. cit. p. 305), the Sultan had actually reached no prior decision to execute ᶜUrābī and viewed him as a potentially more compliant substitute to the Khedive Tawfīq for close Ottoman control over Egypt. This view seems substantiated by the letters quoted in Note 46 above.

53. The **al-mabeyīn al-humāyūnī**, the Turkish term given in the manuscript, refers to the suite of offices and apartments within the palace in Istanbul where the Sultans met with their closest advisors and made their policy decisions.

54. The remainder of this paragraph is omitted from the Sabry version but given in condensed form in the **Review** version.

55. The **Review** version differs remarkably from both the S.O.A S. manuscript and the Sabry translation from this point until the final paragraph that ends this section The additional passage states:

> I was therefore obliged to have recourse to the learned and pious Sheikh Mohamed Zaffer, the Sultan's confidant and spiritual advisor, whom I knew by fame, although I had never met him personally. I wrote to him, through Ali Fetoor Ragheb, contradicting all the projects which had been attributed to us, and requesting him to explain to His Majesty the loyalty of my feelings, and my strong attachment to the fundamental principles of our sacred law, which make it a duty to obey the Ameer El Moumeneen (Commander of the Faithful).
>
> The Sheikh was pleased to answer through Ali Fetoor aforementioned, his letter, written in the Turkish language, stated that he had laid before His Majesty the contents of my communication, that the Sultan was satisfied with my loyalty, and commanded me to persevere in my obedience; but added that His Majesty desired me to defend the country at all costs from invasion, lest it should share the fate of Tunis, and that he cared neither for Ismail, Halim or Tewfik, but for the man who should carry out his instructions. So, also, wrote Ahmed Ratib Pasha, with whom I had a long personal conference when he was journeying to the sacred places, whose letter came along with that of Mohamed Zaffer.

because Ahmed Pacha Ratib only arrived three days ago, and yet in that time, owing to his declarations of your fidelity and true intentions, His Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you. I only received the message I have just given you yesterday, and I hope to be able to send you by next week's post a more detailed letter. In every case be careful not to let any letters you send fall into strange hands, but try to get a special messenger, and as for this time it would be better if you were to send your answer by the hand of the man who brings this letter
Your servant,
Muhamed Zaffer,
4 Rebi-al-Akhir, 1299. (February 22, 1882).

The following letter, of the same date, is from the Ahmed Ratib, aide-de-camp and Secretary to the Sultan, mentioned in the above:

I related to His Majesty the Sultan the conversation we had on the railway between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa on my return to Stamboul, and it caused great pleasure to His Majesty, and he ordered me to communicate to you his Imperial compliments I related to His Majesty all the kind treatment I received at your hands, and the courtesy my eyes witnessed while I was in Cairo, and His Majesty was extremely gratified thereat, so that the satisfaction he felt in your devotion and fidelity was increased manyfold. People had made him think that you were acting, I know not how, contrary to right, and had succeeded in perverting His Majesty's ideas about you; but now that I have exposed the true statement of the case to him I swear to you that His Majesty deeply regrets ever having paid any attention to these false and lying statements about you, and, as a good proof of this, His Majesty has commanded me to write this letter, and to express to you the sentiments which follow. It matters nothing who is Khedive of Egypt The thoughts of the ruler of Egypt, his intentions and his conduct, must be governed with the greatest care, and all his actions must tend to secure the future of Egypt, and to uphold intact the sovereignty of the Caliph, while he must show the most perfect zeal in upholding the faith and the country's rights This will be required of him. Of the persons who have been on the Khedivial throne, Ismail Pacha and his predecessors gave bribes to Ali Pacha, Fuad Pacha, Midhat Pacha, and other representatives of the Sublime porte, traitors, and, after shutting the eyes of the officials, dared to overtax and oppress the Egyptians, and in addition to this they made heavy debts and brought the Egyptians under a grievous yoke, and today in the eyes of the world their state has specially appealed to our pity; (sic) but the whole position is an extremely delicate one, which calls for the necessity of finding a speedy and sure remedy. Therefore, it behoves you above all things to prevent anything that might lead to foreign intervention, and never to stray from the just and true path, nor to listen to any treacherous falsehoods, but in every way with watchful care to hinder the seditious projects of foreigners. This is the great hope of the Sultan, and, since we two shall correspond in the future, you must take the necessary precautions to prevent our letters from falling into strange hands. For this, the easiest way at present — and there is no safer channel you can find - - is to trust your correspondence to the true and trusty man who carries this letter and that of Sheikh Muhamed Zaffer. I would also add that it is indispensable that you should send secretly some officer who knows well what is going on in Egypt, and who is a trusted friend of yours, to present at the footstool of His Majesty reports on the state of the country in true detail I beg you to send the answer by the man who brings this letter.
Ahmed Ratib,
Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan
4 Rebi-al-Akhir. (February 22, 1882.).

Given in Broadley, op. cit. pp. 166-170.

The originals of these two letters eventually passed into the possession of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and he reproduced, almost verbatim, these same translations in his **Secret History** commenting on their significance as follows:

These two letters are records of such high historical importance that if ever my memoirs come to be printed they should be annexed to them in facsimile. They explain much of what happened later in June at the time of the Dervish Mission, and they prove that if Arabi took upon himself then and during the months of the war the position in some degree of dictator in Egypt, it was not without ample justification from a Mohammedan point of view, in 'the commands of the Caliph as head of his religion to protect the province against Christendom. They show, too, why it was that in the month of August Abdul Hamid was so loath to proclaim him a rebel, and how absurd was the charge of rebellion brought against him at his trial.

46. Abū Sulṭān Pasha, the respected Fellah octogenarian and early Constitutionalist leader

pour lui remettre une requête à S M le Sultan réduisant à néant cette légende de rébellion qu'on m'avait imputée. Je reçus, en réponse, une lettre concluante de Sa Majesté, une autre de S E Ahmed Rateb Pacha une troisième du Cheikh Mohamed Zafer tendant, toutes, à me rassurer Du reste, elles sont encore en ma possession L'Esprit National Egyptien, pp 263-264

The sense of this comment, and with reference made to 'Asaad, Ratib and Zaffer', is reported in the **Review** version p. 981, suggesting that Broadley repositioned the information in this paragraph to a point in the summation of this section of the manuscript where its impact would be greatest

The papers that ʿUrābī had kept stored in his house were released to his lawyers and translated by a "Mr Beaman." Broadley reports, however, that there was no trace of the "more explicit letters" of Ahmad Asʿad despite references to them in other letters by the same writer But ʿUrābī's wife had preserved, in their original sealed envelopes, the following letters. Their evident importance, since they came from two of the Sultan's closest advisors, justifies their reproduction in the present text

From Muhamed Zaffer, Chaplain to the Sultan

To his Excellency the Egyptian Minister of War

Excellency, I have presented your two faithful letters to His Majesty the Sultan, and from their contents he has learnt all your sentiments of patriotism and watchfulness, and especially have the promises you make of your efforts to guard faithfully and truly His Majesty's interests been a cause of lively satisfaction to His Majesty, so much so that His Majesty ordered me to express his pleasure and his favour to you, and further bade me write to you as follows viz —

As the maintenance of the integrity of the Caliphate is a duty which touches the honour of every one of us, it is incumbent on every Egyptian to strive earnestly after the consolidation of my power to prevent Egypt from passing out of my hands into the rapacious grasp of foreigners, as the vilayet of Tunis has passed, and I repose all my confidence in you, my son, to exert all your influence and to put forth every effort to prevent such a thing happening. You are to beware never for one moment to lose sight of this important point, and to omit none of the precautionary measures which are called for by the age in which we live: keeping always before you as a perpetual goal the defence of your faith and of your country, and especially you must persist in maintaining your confidence and the ties which bind you.

That country Egypt - is of the highest importance to England and France, and most of all to England and certain seditious intriguers in Constantinople, following in the path of these Governments, have for some time past been busy with their treacherous and accursed projects Since they have found it to their profit jealously to promote these intrigues and seditions in Egypt, it is the especial desire of His Majesty that you should keep a very careful eye on these persons and things. According to the telegrams and news sent by the Khedive Tewfik, one of this party, we see that he is weak and capricious, and also it is to be remarked that one of his telegrams does not corroborate another, but they are all in contradiction In addition to this I may tell you that Ali Nizami Pacha and Ali Fuad Bey have spoken to His Majesty most highly in your favour, and Ahmed Ratib has repeated to His Majesty the substance of the conversations he had with you in the railway carriage between the stations of Zagazig and Mahsa, and, as His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed Pacha, he desires me again for this reason to express his trust in you, and to say that, as he considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness, he requires you above all things to prevent Egypt from passing into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for intervention there. The orders which Ahmed Pacha Ratib will receive on this head will be separately communicated to you. Both my letter and that of Ahmed Pacha Ratib, by order of His Majesty, have been written by one of His Majesty's own private secretaries, and, after we have affixed our seals to the letters, we also put an extra special seal on the envelopes. In a special and secret manner I tell you that the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik, but the man who thinks for the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind him to the Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to His Majesty's firmans, who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere, who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials, who does not deviate one hair's breadth from his line of duty, who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against them, and ever preserve his country and his faith intact—a man who does this will be pleasing, agreeable to, and accepted by our great lord, the Sultan. If I have not entered into any further details in this letter of mine I beg you to excuse me,

paragraph, as follows: " The Sircassians were at once arrested, tried, and were all sentenced to exile in the Soudan, knowing that the climate there would be most trying to men born in a cold country, and would possibly be fatal to them " **Nineteenth Century Review**, p. 976.

32. The reference is to ᶜUthmān Rifqī, who had earlier served as Minister of War and whose elevation to the rank of Pasha had originated with the Sultan.

33. This further charge of direct involvement by the Khedive was, of course, omitted from the Review version.

34. This sentence was omitted from the Sabry version.

35. The several paragraphs preceding, following and including this one are much abridged in the **Review** version, the damaging criticism of the Khedive and reference to his hatred for Sāmī being thus tactfully omitted.

36. Reference to the following events was totally omitted from the **Review** translation. A series of dots across page 978 suggest but do no specify an omission. The references to the demands of the British and French Consuls for changes in the Egyptian government and the accompanying circumstances were condensed into three short paragraphs on that same page; a close association between text and translation recommences with the paragraph " On the morning after...."

37. Interpreting a passive verbal form as an active, Sabry mistranslated this passage and directly to the Khedive as having: " .. commit lachement un acte de traitrise à l'égard de **L'Esprit National Egyptien**, p. 262.

38. The Arabic **kānat min alladhīna yatabarraku bihim...** suggests that she was a clairvoyante, palmist or dream interpreter, a person credited with special powers and whose counsel might therefore be sought on personal matters. ᶜUrābī's **Kashf al-Sitār** gives her name as ᶜĀ'isha al Kudiyyā. The somewhat garbled account therein states that her function was to prepare incense and perfumes for the Khedive and to recite incantations for him. The passage suggests that she offended the ruler by advising him to stop plotting against the reformists and to institute reforms himself. **Kashf al-Sitār**, p. 227.

In his introductory comments on ᶜUrābī's 'Defense Statement' Broadley reports: "As an example of the events which appear to have been only too common at that time, he tells the story of the Lady ᶜAisha Hanem, who on an allegation of undue interference by supernatural means in the affairs of the Khedivial family, was banished either over or under the Red Sea without a hearing or a trial." **Nineteenth Century Review**, p. 115

39. A sarcastic reference, of course, to the British. In its paraphrase of this passage Sabry's version moves substantially away from the Arabic text while maintaining the general sense.

40. An Ottoman title, the Tutunji was traditionally in charge of the ruler's smoking pipes. The position permitted, as in Ibrāhīm Āghā's case, prominence as the Khedive's trusted confidant and instrument of his personal instructions.

41. Ibrāhīm Āghā had been implicated in the 'Circassian plot' and expelled with the others to Syria.

42. Presumably Muḥammad Ḥasan.

43. The Arabic is **aw al-mawt al-aḥmar**, there being a play on **al-baḥr al-aḥmar**, the Red Sea. His murder is obviously implied.

44. Broadley reports as factual the complaints of ᶜUrābī and of the other defendants at threats of violence and attempts at intimidation made by this same man against them while awaiting trial in prison.

45. Sabry at this point translates as follows a paragraph that is not present in the Blunt manuscript:

Entre temps, Sayed Ahmed Assaad arriva au Caire, en route pour Constantinople. Je profitai de sa presence

23. Sabry gives the penalty as: "entre quinze jours et un mois." The **Review** version omits all details of the attempts mentioned here to subvert the army

24. No less an authority than the British Consul General in Egypt at the time, Sir Edward Malet, substantiated ᶜUrābī's fears. He stated that: "spies were continually hovering about the residences of the Colonels... there was no doubt in the mind of Arabi Bey that he was to be murdered." Malet also gave his opinion that it was an incident on "the night of the 8th September," when an unidentified man who demanded but was refused access to ᶜUrābī's house and was later seen entering the police headquarters, that directly precipitated the ᶜĀbdīn confrontation of the following day. Most of the works of history, however, see the crisis arising directly from ᶜUrabi's reluctance to accept a posting outside Cairo. For comments from Cromer and the quotation from Malet see Cromer, **Modern Egypt,** p. 143.

25. The International or "Mixed" Tribunals were instituted in February, 1876. Prior to their establishment suits against foreigners in Egypt had to be brought before the appropriate Consular courts, these were widely agreed to act in favor of the foreign communities. The foreigners could themselves sue native Egyptians before the same Consular courts and gain advantageous settlement by bringing diplomatic pressures to bear. The "Mixed" Tribunals were established to decide all cases involving a plaintiff and a defendant of different nationalities, whether or not either party were Egyptian. In suits involving real estate only, both parties could be of the same nationality. The composition of the Tribunals was international: the panels established for the Courts of First Instance and Appeal had a slight majority of foreign judges but were in all cases under the nominal presidency of an Egyptian. As is seen from ᶜUrābī's admiring comment, the "Mixed Courts" were viewed as having greatly improved the prior system.

26. The section up to this point in this important paragraph is condensed to one sentence in the Sabry version, the references to Sharīf, Abū Sulṭān and Dā'ūd Pasha being omitted.

27. The following important passage, up to the sentence beginning: "As a consequence of these events..." in the following paragraph was condensed and adjusted in the **Review** version to read, "...seventeen millions of the public money instead of using it to pay the just debts of the country. Amongst other things they had discharged almost every native from the service, though their pay was small, and have given all responsible posts to Europeans, indifferent to the laws of right or wrong." ᶜUrābī's emphasis on the financial grievances and the appointment of Sāmī as Minister of War, both significant elements in the crisis, were thus omitted from the original English translation

28. In 1871 Ismāᶜīl had instituted a **muqābala** system under which a property owner could pay his taxes for six years in advance and thereafter for perpetuity pay only one half the taxes that would otherwise have been levied. The Khedive's objective at the time was to have the resources to pay off the increasingly onerous National Debt. The plan failed, however, to achieve its purpose and in 1880 Sir Rivers Wilson prevailed upon the government to repeal the **muqābala** laws. This action was most unpopular with the landed aristocracy, many of whom became convinced that their interests would best be served by alignment with ᶜUrābī and the Nationalists.

29. The **Review** version tactfully avoids ᶜUrābī's implication of direct involvement by the Khedive. The sentences from "Within a few hours" to "the Khedive's palace" were changed to read: "The papers relating to this matter are to be found at the chief police station, indicating how and where the plot first originated." A.M. Broadley, "Instructions to my counsel," in **Nineteenth Century Review,** December 1882, p. 976.

30. The Sabry version gives the man's name as "Rachid Pasha Hassan." M. Sabry, **La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien** (Paris, 1924) p.260.

31. This entire paragraph, which underlines the Khedive's role in the plot, was omitted from the 1882 translation; the references to the exile of the Circassians that follows provide, moreover, the best example of the mistranslations occurring in that document. The **Review** version reads, from the reference to the Khedive and up to the sentence beginning "I asked..." in the following

ᶜAlī against the Mamluk princes, when he invited them to a celebration at the Citadel and then massacred them." ᶜUrābī and his friends, he goes on, made plans to be rescued if taken into custody. But we are also told that ᶜAlī Bey Fahmī was so disturbed to find himself in prison that he almost tried to kill himself by leaping out into the Nile! See **Kashf al-Sitār**, pp. 157-158.

12. The Arabic wording is **al-mustakhdimīna wa al-mutaqāᶜidīna**.

13. In his **Kashf** memoirs ᶜUrābī details how four named officers of middle rank refused to accept the appointment of the three regimental commanders to replace those dismissed and persuaded their soldiers to revolt. See **Kashf al-Sitār**, pp. 160-161.

14. ᶜUrābī recounts in the **Kashf** memoirs how he publicly embraced a Circassian officer, Ismāᶜīl Pasha Kāmil, in front of the troops he was addressing to give dramatic impact to his speech. See idem, p. 159.

15. Baron de Ring is accused by Cromer of an active role in intrigues by ᶜUrābī against the Khedive. Following representation from the Khedive to the President of France, de Ring was recalled, leaving Egypt on February 28. See Cromer, **Modern Egypt**, p. 141.

16. The **Kashf** memoirs give interesting details of this meeting. General Charles P. Stone Pasha, the American graduate of West Point who was then Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army, is said to have argued for military action against the rebels but was opposed by Lieutenant-General Ismāᶜīl Pasha Kāmil, the Circassian officer referred to in note 14 above. The Khedive did decide to send orders to the Sudan regiment to advance to Cairo to put down the rebellious Guard regiment but Major Khuḍar Effendī Khuḍar, a supporter of ᶜUrābī, had already imprisoned the regiment's high command and was himself leading the soldiers to assist ᶜUrābī. **Kashf al-Sitār**. pp.162-4.

17. Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī, whose name appears so frequently in the **Defence Statement**, was of mixed Circassian and Egyptian ancestry from an ancient and privileged family; he was a prominent figure in Cairo before ᶜUrābī's rise to fame. Service with the army had taken him on important assignments to Istanbul, Paris and London and had drawn him to the attention of Khedive Ismāᶜīl, who appointed him head of his palace guard and sent him on diplomatic missions abroad. Under Tawfīq he played a major role in reorganizing the Egyptian General Staff and later served him as Minister of Waqfs. An intellectual, he was an influential figure in the foundation of the Khedivial library and the establishment of a Museum of Fine Arts in Cairo, and is still best known as a gifted and dedicated poet, a pioneer in the renaissance of Arabic poetry.

The native-born Egyptian officers ᶜUrābī headed looked on Sāmī as an ally against the court and Circassian elite in the power struggles of early 1880 and 1881. Sāmī headed the government in which ᶜUrābī became Minister of War and that was briefly in power prior to the crisis leading to the British bombardment of Alexandria. Having remained loyal to the Nationalists throughout the months of war preparation that followed, he was charged with sedition along with ᶜUrābī and was convicted and exiled with him to Ceylon. His seventeen years of enforced residence there resulted in the posthumously published volumes of his original verse and anthologies for which he is now chiefly known.

18. The two preceding sentences are much condensed in the Sabry version.

19. The Arabic word used is **dā'ira** and refers to the Khedive's personal court administration.

20. The Khedive's harem and entourage included women of Circassian origins who were given in marriage to bureaucrats and soldiers to ensure their loyalty to the Egyptian throne and administration.

21. The **Kashf** account refers to the subversion of eight sergeants but curiously states that they were paid only eight Egyptian pounds apiece for their loyalty! **Kashf al-Sitār**, p. 219

22. The Ottoman military title given, **bekbāshi,** approximates that of Major or Lieutenant-Colonel; Sabry strangely gives 'sergent' indiscriminately for both this senior rank and that of **yuzbāshī,** approximately Captain, in his French version.

NOTES

1. Since the early thirteenth century Egypt had been dominated by descendants of a caste of mercenaries purchased, by the country's then rulers, from the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The 'mamluks', as they were known, the word meaning 'slave' or 'one owned', soon established their own controlling dynasties over Egypt. Even at the end of the nineteenth century the country was still largely controlled by an elite of Turkic-Circassian origin allied to the court of Muḥammad ʿAlī and his heirs which was itself, of course, Albanian in origin and Turkish in speech.

2. The word used is **muwalladīna** (i,e., bred as an Arab, but not an Arab) a term recognized in Ottoman canonical law as connoting that the individuals to whom it referred had the status of adopted slaves or ex-slaves.

3. A high Ottoman title awarded to those who have performed some signal service to the state. The title could be applied to both civilians and those in the military services.

4. It is clearly stated in ʿUrābī's autobiographical account given to Blunt in Cairo in March 1903 that only ʿAbd al-ʿĀl and ʿAlī Fahmī were in fact waiting at his house. ʿUrābī states there also how he learned at this party that he and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl were to be removed from their commands. The point is important, as the impression given in the present manuscript is clearly that the petition the three officers signed was on behalf of the army as a whole and bore no direct relationship to their personal situation. The Autobiography account is straightforward and specific. Describing the discussion between the three officers at ʿUrābī's house, it also states:

> We therefore took council what was to be done. ʿAbd el-Aal proposed that we should go in force to Osman Rifqi's house and arrest or kill him, but I said, "No, let us petition first the Prime Minister, and then, if he refused, the Khedive." And they charged me to draw the petition up in form And I did so, stating the case, and demanding the dismissal of Osman Rifqi, and the raising of the army to 18,000 men, and the decreeing of the promised Constitution. This we all three signed, though knowing that our lives were at stake.

5. The pilgrimage to Mecca is, of course, obligatory for all Muslims who have the means The return home of a **Hajji**, someone who has made the pilgrimage, is traditionally accompanied by elaborate celebrations arranged in his honor by the pilgrim's family and friends.

6. The Arabic given is **rajul waṭanī**. ʿUrābī and the reform movement were widely referred to as 'nationalists'. The **Taqrīr** printed version substitutes the words **aḥad al-miṣrīyyīna,** 'an Egyptian'.

7. At the time colonels ʿUrābī, Fahmī, and Ḥilmī commanded respectively regiments stationed at ʿAbbāsiyya, ʿĀbdīn, and Ṭūra.

8. Cromer later observed that Sir Auckland Colvin and M. de Blignieres, the British and French Comptrollers, were "most unwisely excluded" from this meeting. **Modern Egypt**, 2nd edit. (London 1911), p.139.

9. The decision was then made that, after the dismissal and arrest of the three officers, there was to have been a Court-Martial. Rifqī, as Minister of War, was to have presided over a court consisting of Circassian officers and two foreigners, Stone Pasha, an American and Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian army, and Laramie Pasha, a Frenchman who was Director of the Military Schools. See **Kashf al-Sitār an sirr al-Asrār**, (Cairo, no date), p. 157. and Salīm al-Haqqāsh, **Miṣr lil-Miṣrīyyīna** (Cairo 1884), vol. 7. p.5.

10. The Qaṣr al-Nīl housed the official quarters of the Minister of War. It became subsequently the headquarters and Cairo barracks for the British forces in Egypt. Now demolished, its site approximates that of the present Maidān al-Taḥrīr.

11. ʿUrābī's later account in his **Kashf** memoirs suggests that the Khedive's plot was very transparent. He states that the three colonels were sure it was a trick since they knew it was too early for the wedding celebrations. They assumed a deception similar to that of "Muḥammad

recounts truthfully, fairly and incontrovertibly the full story, from beginning to end, of the events that occurred. And all else but what is true is plain falsehood.

The End

16th Dhū al-Ḥijja 1299 A.H.
Equivalent to October 29, 1882 — in the town of Columbo on the Island of Ceylon.[94]

Aḥmad ʿUrābī
The Egyptian

(Signed and marked twice with his seal.)

religions of others, and so how will mankind view such conduct in the annals of history? We will put our trust in the honor of the British nation to decide the issue.

Egypt was not at first engaged in war with the British government. Egypt was merely defending herself and hoping for the return of friendly relations with the British government which has for so long protected the rights of the Egyptian people. Egypt sought to keep the doors of peace open wide and was sure that when the truth was established Britain would not deny the Egyptian people their rights.[92] Our proof for this is in the apparent general improvement in agriculture, our measures controlling the Nile river, and the absence of anything detrimental to public tranquillity, making one think at first there were no war in progress in the country. Another proof is our protection of the properties and plantations belonging to Europeans, both in the capital and the countryside.

Yet a further proof is our surrender, even though we still had 70,000 regular and volunteer soldiers and great quantities of arms and military supplies. There were, too, numerous canals, bridges and ditches such as are commonly put to good use in military engagements; they would have been especially effective at a time when the Nile was high.

If I were a rebel why would I have surrendered when I still had all those large and numerous forces with me and the country ready to help me with men and money? And if all else had failed, why would I have surrendered myself in any case? Was not the whole wide world there to flee to? Or why could I not have gone to London and sought refuge there? All that should give cause for thought.

The absolute truth is that I was no rebel. I took action and the country, the whole Egyptian nation, took action with me to seek the emancipation of our land. We behaved with the utmost honor and respected all laws. I did not pursue any of the personal ambitions that detractors ascribe to me. In fact, I was entrusted with the country's protection by the Sultan himself, for my sincerity and the evil intentions of the Khedive had become quite clear to His Majesty. A letter to this effect came to me from His Excellency Sheikh Muḥammad Ẓāfir, one of the **khodjas** of the Imperial presence,[93] and there was another letter from Aḥmad Pasha Rātib, aide-de-camp to the Sultan; both are still in my possession.

My appointment, moreover, as commander of the army, charged to defend the country, came about in a perfectly legal way, firstly by order of the Khedive and of the Chamber of Deputies and secondly by the decision of the nation. Clearly no further proof is needed.

So, then, my statement herewith is at an end. For you, the counsels for my defense, the Honorable Mr. Broadley, the Honorable Mr. Napier, the Honorable Mr. Eve, and for all those champions of civilization who defend with their own persons and possessions the cause of justice, caring nothing for criticism and slander, and for you my trusted and admired friend, the Honorable Mr. Blunt and for his friends in Britain who also act to preserve the dignity of humanity, I have written this statement by my own hand. It

calling me a dog and a pig and asked, "What did you want from me anyway?" Then he spat at me three times. This, then, was Ibrāhīm Āghā, the Khedive's personal servant who had got away to Syria because of the theft of the diamonds from ᶜAbdīn palace and the failure to hold an investigation with Muḥammad Ḥasan who had been sent off for disposal at sea, as I earlier mentioned.

And so here I am now in a room that has on one side two iron-barred windows with wooden shutters outside nailed tight which are never opened. When the servant brings the food from the house one of the Turkish guards takes it from him, opens the door and pushes it inside. Then he immediately locks the door again, leaving me alone as if I were some wild beast inside a cage! But cages at least have constant fresh air and are lit up at night. Yet we are absolutely deprived of valets and servants, which is insulting and degrading to the extreme.

All officers of the rank of major and above, along with some senior captains, captains and lieutenants, have been put in jail. This has also happened to many scholars of Islam, to members of the Chamber of Deputies, and to prominent mayors and merchants and others. The prisons of Cairo, Alexandria, and the provinces are consequently filled with them. The belief expressed by many Deputies that their Chamber would remain operative only so long as I did myself has indeed been proved true.[91] If I were removed from Egypt there would be no Chamber and no nation left. Following the elimination and exile of all Egyptians of prominence and distinction along with the destruction of their seats of influence the people of Egypt will become slaves in bondage and will be given only the meanest forms of employment.

That, then, was a war without precedent. It was the Khedive who caused the arrival of the warships to Egypt. Thereafter it was he who first both planned and agitated for war and foisted the whole affair on us. But then he sided with the army fighting against his country, the war continuing in his own name. The British soldiers actually fought in the name of the Khedive, on the justification that the Egyptian army was in rebellion. The Khedive issued proclamations saying that the British troops had no wish to seize possession of the country.

The war had thus many strange and different facets. If it were the army that was in rebellion what must all the people think now, when they see so many high members of the royal family in jail? And how about all those scholars of Islam, members of the Chamber of Deputies, prominent mayors and merchants, along with important government officials and other citizens filling the prisons in all the provinces and towns? And if the army and all those mentioned, along with all the rest of the Egyptian nation regardless of their religious affiliation, were united about and participating in one single action, which was that of justice and right, what must we think when we see that nation foremost in the support of those values actually overpower that unfortunate nation to please just one person? And all this even though that person is definitely not permitted, by the laws of his people, to be their ruler.

The British government has always, moreover, respected the laws and

Damyāṭ, and elsewhere. But out of our concern to prevent the country's destruction and relying on the honor of Britain and the fact that it does not want to annex Egypt, we have decided against further combat and have delivered ourselves up to your protection and honor."

He accepted this statement of ours and we remained with him for three days. Then we went to ʿĀbdīn and remained under the charge of Colonel Thynne, the Commander of the British 'Grenadier' regiment, until October 4, 1882, living in great comfort. Then, on Thursday October 5, we were delivered over into the Egyptian prison. That was a terrible day for me, since they then separated me from my companion Ṭulba Pasha, whose friendship I had so enjoyed. They put me in a totally empty room, without even a chair, then locked it. There I stayed; eventually my servant arrived but the guards refused to let him bring anything in except a rug and a blanket.

Then in came the officer whose task it is to degrade the prisoners. He searched me and took all personal papers I had with me to send them to the Commission of Inquiry. He and his aides left and then a group from the Khedive's entourage came in. Of them I knew only ʿUthmān Bey Ra'fat, manager of the Khedive's stables, and Ḥusayn Effendī Fawzī who belonged to the staff of the Khedive's protocol office. One man, one of those Turks who always ride in front of the Khedive and are willing to give up their lives if necessary, came over and set about searching me. He pulled my shirt outside my trousers but found only the amulet I wore to protect my children from the illness that produced the nervous convulsions from which they so suffered. He snatched at it forcibly and although I offered to take it off for him, he yelled, "No! I'm ordered to do it!"

He even took the shoes off my feet and searched them. Then they left. An hour later the door opened again and in came the editor of the Ahrām newspaper, Bishāra Taqlā.[89] I thought he had come to visit me and to console me for my difficulties, since he had been with us before the war. He had sworn by his religion and his honor that he was truly one of us, a genuine partisan of liberty. We had admired and honored him. But now he had come only to berate and insult us. "Oh ʿUrābī," he said disgustedly, "what have you done? What do I see has become of you?"

I could see that he was two-faced, a man without honor, and made him no reply. He then left.

Another hour later a group of Turks came in, all members of the Khedive's entourage, along with some of the guardsmen from his court. They searched the rug and blanket, threw them to left and to right and then left. That night they placed guards over the prisoners and then on October 6 at about 8:30 European time, equivalent to about 3:30 Arab time,[90] after I had taken off my shoes and fallen asleep, the door suddenly opened and in came a group of ten or perhaps a dozen people. I could not see them properly because it was so very dark. One of them spoke, his voice ugly and menacing: "Hey, ʿUrābī, don't you know me?"

I thought they had orders to kill me, but I kept my poise and replied. "No, I don't. Who are you anyway and what do you want at a time like this?"

"I am Ibrāhīm Āghā!" he announced. Then he swore and cursed at me,

and artillery from the two sides lasted for two hours. Then a detachment of cavalry with their artillery came from the rear of the army and that caused our army to be cut up and dispersed ; that was on the 29th of Shawwāl 1299 A. H., equivalent to September 13, 1882.

Following the collapse of the army, I went from Jabal ᶜItāqa to Bilbays, with the British cavalry following close behind me. There I met ᶜAlī Pasha al-Rūbī and we went together to 'Inshās and took a train up to Cairo. We found the Council in session at the Ministry of War, with Their Highnesses the Princes also present. Following lengthy discussion and having assured ourselves that the British had no intention to annex Egypt, and the situation being as it was, the decision was made that there was no further need to resist. we relied on the fact that Britain is characterized as having a love for humanity and for justice in all matters. We believed that having studied the situation properly and having become aware of the feelings of the people, the British would surely strive to emancipate and protect them.

Following that, I sent a telegram on September 14 to His Excellency Riḍā Pasha, the Commander of the army division at ᶜAbbāsiyya which numbered some 35,000 men, that he should raise white flags if British troops approached. I instructed him to meet with their commander and to tell him that the war was over, that we were putting our trust in the honor of the British and were anxious to preserve the country from destruction.

At sunset, British and Indian cavalry units did arrive, the white flags were raised, and Riḍā Pasha went forward to meet General Lowe. I also sent out Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī, the Cairo chief of police, to meet the General. Prior thereto the Council had sent a delegation to Benhā to meet General Wolseley.

An hour and a half after sunset Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī arrived and informed me that the British General Lowe wished to meet with me at al-ᶜAbbāsiyya. Similarly the Commandant of the army division at Kafr al-Dawār who had arrived that day at the Ministry of War suddenly (received) a telegram from the commandant of the army division at al-ᶜAbbāsiyya informing him that the General wished to meet with him at once. We all went together to meet him at al-ᶜAbbāsiyya; I had similary sent ᶜAlī Bey Yūsuf, the commander of the regiment at the Citadel, to His Excellency (the General) as he had asked.

When I, along with Ṭulba Pasha, did meet General Lowe he asked, "Do you agree to give yourselves up as prisoners of the British government?"

"Yes," we replied, "on condition that we will be under care of the protection and good honor of the British government."

We then took off our swords and surrendered them into the hands of General Lowe who was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wolseley. We also[88] told him that as we were surrendering our swords and ourselves to the care and honor of Britain, our children and the voice of all humankind was calling upon England and all Englishmen to give us our full rights.

"Your Excellency," we told him, "is acting for the British government and for all Englishmen. You should be informed that at al-ᶜAbbāsiyya there are 35,000 soldiers and a similar number at Kafr al-Dawār, Rashīd,

My respect for the public welfare and property is proved by my frequent telegraphic communications with His Excellency M. de Lesseps and his replies stressing the need to strictly respect the neutrality of the Suez Canal so long as warships did not use it as a battlefield. This neutrality was maintained until the warships did use it to shell the Nafīsha region. I then wrote to M. Lesseps stating that since the Canal had now been used as a field for battle, the laws of war now required us to consider it as such. He replied that we should do as the laws of war prescribe. I then telegraphed that to the commander of the Eastern Front, that great General Rāshid Pasha Husnī, and to the director of all the engineering projects, Maḥmūd Pasha Fahmī, to construct a dam over the Sweetwater Canal and over the Canal itself if that were possible under the war-time circumstances. By examining copies of the letters sent by de Lesseps to his son and to his wife in Paris, the intensity of my wish to respect the neutrality of the Canal may be clearly seen.

The fact that the mailboats continued to move after the outbreak of the war provides similar evidence for this.[87] When we received a report from the Director of Traffic at Suez that our soldiers were stopping the ships, I telegraphed him to keep things moving as usual since a public facility was involved and to so explain the matter to the soldiers. The postal service continued to run smoothly until the British troops landed at Suez.

Also regarding our respect for the neutrality of the Canal, no armed force at all was sent over to protect the East bank. This was because we could not imagine the Canal being violated. We therefore made no defensive fortifications and ditches which could have been used to protect one another. And so when the British took Ismāʿīliyya as their headquarters and engaged the Egyptian army, busy building defenses at al-Maḥsama, on Friday August 25, 1882, our forces were beaten. The British cavalry cut off their line of retreat and so Rāshid Pasha and Khālid Pasha were captured. The famous engineer Maḥmūd Fahmī was himself also taken prisoner; he was so overcome with grief at the loss of that vital position adjoining al-Tall al-Kabīr as it did, that he was simply unable to leave it and take flight.

That same day I moved to al-Tall al-Kabīr, leaving Kafr al-Dawār under the command of Ṭulba Pasha. ʿAlī Pasha Fahmī left Cairo, bringing the First Regiment of infantrymen as reinforcement to al-Tall al-Kabīr. More detachments of men of the artillery, the cavalry and the infantry arrived constantly and worked to construct the fortifications and ditches which would lead from al-Saliḥiyya to al-Tall al-Kabīr, to al-Dār al-Bayḍā' to Jabal ʿItāqa in such a way as to enable the positions to protect one another and to defend the villages without loss, as had happened at Kafr al-Dawār. Nevertheless two military engagements did occur near the bridge at al-Qaṣāṣīn, at both of which the opposing armies fought most bravely. In them General Rāshid Pasha Husnī and ʿAlī Pasha Fahmī were wounded and sent back to Cairo, ʿAlī Pasha al-Rūbī coming down instead as commander of the Army. But before we were able to complete the defense fortifications I mentioned, British and Indian forces made a surprise attack. It was a cavalry charge including mobile artillery that can be moved quickly anywhere, and came unexpectedly at early light of dawn. Devastating fire from the cavalry

accept any letters or telegrams he might like to send to his mother, his commanding officer or to anyone else. Eventually this officer's mother sent me a telegram from London thanking me for the fine care of her son about which he had written to her. For accommodation he was given the palace that had been set up for the upbringing of the Khedive's sons.

Then another officer, who was said to be Italian, was also captured, well treated and sent up with similar instructions that he be accommodated along with Dudley de Chair, since he was in the service of the British army. Then I was brought a naval officer, an Italian who had been found by a patrol of the Maryūṭ division wandering near exhaustion in the salt-fields wearing nothing but a shirt. They gave him some soldiers' clothes and sent him up, treating him with all respect. I found him to be very weak and with his feet badly affected by the salt and so I had him conducted to the hospital at Kafr al-Dawār and had some clothes brought specially for him from Cairo. He was still in the hospital until the final day and I do not know where he is now.

M. de Lesseps had spoken to me about this officer before we found him. By the time he was there the telegraphic communications between Cairo and Ismāᶜīliyya were disrupted and I was unable to give any information about him; he also declined to give any news of himself to the Consul of his own country. The reason for his being found without clothes was as follows: he said he had thrown away his shoes and walked barefoot but that eventually the salt had burned his feet. He had then torn up one piece of his clothing to make bandages for his feet and walked on with them until they became loaded with dirt and mud. He then took them off his feet and replaced them with other pieces of clothing he tore off. This went on until he used up everything except his shirt.

We also captured two officers, one doctor and nine soldiers who came ashore from a sail boat over towards Abū Qīr. The officer in command of the Abū Qīr division sent them to us with all dignity. After an investigation, it became clear that they were Austrian and from an Austrian ship. They had come to that area by mistake having failed to understand the map correctly because the position for al-Bathāna had been replaced with that of Maḥall al-Siḥḥa. After we received a letter from the Austrian Consul in Alexandria, we sent them back to their ship, with them expressing their thanks for the proper treatment they had received. The case of the two officers captured by forward troops of the division at al-Ṣāliḥiyya was similar. They were sent with every dignity to Cairo along with the cash they had with them which totalled three hundred pounds sterling. Similar also was the case of the officer who was captured in the cavalry engagement between the two armies in the battle at al-Qaṣāṣīn; he too was honorably treated and sent to stay with Dudley de Chair.

This, then, was the way we treated our prisoners, though we are accused of being barbarous. How, one wonders, are we not treated in a similar way, having surrendered ourselves to a great and honorable nation, the British? How is it that we have been put in jail by our enemy, who longed so much to see us in such circumstances, as if he was not himself, like us, at war with England. We will rely on those who champion civilized conduct to decide.

give them prison sentences of specific lengths in the Citadel. The greater vigilance of the soldiers, who were now dispersed into various parts of the province, resulted in fear being replaced by a widespread sense of hope and security of mind. A certain European Jew named Ibrāhīm, with an estate near Birkat Ghaṭṭās, will testify to this fact.

Civil disorders also similarly occurred in the province of Ṭanṭa, where refugees from Alexandria went on a rampage and some Europeans were killed. Because of this the governor, Ibrāhīm Pasha Adham, was replaced and sent for trial by the Council for his failure to maintain security in the province. I also quickly sent in both infantry and cavalry troops to Ṭanṭa, Zifta, al-Maḥalla, and other important towns in the provinces and this action restored peace and security. Even previously to this I had sent out notices to all the provinces, governorates, and administrative offices emphasizing the need to protect the lives and property of all Europeans both in their towns and villages. I instructed that all those dwelling with us were under our protection and subject to the same privileges and obligations as ourselves. They were our brothers in common humanity and that included even the British. Only those actually bearing arms against us on the battlefield could be considered our enemies. Similarly, it was our duty to protect any foreigners wishing to leave for their native countries; we should guard and preserve them as we did our land and children until they should reach a place of safety. This was in accord with the honored precepts of Islamic law. All this is quite apparent from records kept in each office of the governmental administration. In fact, some Europeans wanting to go to Ismāʿīliyya were provided an army guard to see that they arrived there safely. M. de Lesseps and M. Mazzetti, Italian Consul at al-Zaqāzīq, and M. Dupont, French Consul there, will testify to this. Similarly, the despatches I sent by telegraph to this effect to the Ministry of War, to al-Manṣūra, to al-Zaqāzīq and elsewhere provide similar testimony. The effect of these instructions was to reestablish good friendly relations between the people and the remaining Europeans so that many European businessmen did return from Ismāʿīliyya and Port Saʿīd to Cairo. The names of these are known to Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī, officer-in-charge of the Police Department at that time.

I also sent instructions to the Cairo Police Department and to the various provincial administrations of Lower Egypt that refugees from Alexandria should be distributed among the towns and wealthy families of prominence. I recommended that people be asked to help and accommodate them in all ways possible while the refugees were away from their own homes. As a result they did receive fine treatment of inestimable value.

Early in August 1882 an English officer named Dudley De Chair was taken prisoner by our troops of the Abū Qīr detachment. He was well treated and sent up to me by their commandant, Khurshīd Pasha Ṭāhir. I welcomed him, offered him a seat, made him feel at ease and treated him like a friend. I housed him like an honored guest and then sent him up to Cairo with instructions to the Ministry of War that he be given accommodation worthy of the nobility and provided with an English-speaking officer for companionship. I ordered them to treat him with the utmost respect[85] and

accordance with what was both right and legal or in treason and violent aggression and therefore contrary to both right and justice.

As well as all this,[84] people donated cattle, water-buffalo and sheep in amounts impossible to assess. Large quantities of plums, grapes and melons were also constantly arriving as gifts for the army from all quarters, as is clear from the records of telegrams at Kafr al-Dawār, al-Tall al-Kabīr, Rashīd and Damietta. Donations also came from the estates of Riyād Pasha and Khayrī Pasha, even though they were both out of Egypt, as well as from the estates of members of the Khedivial family.

In spite of all this, messages continued to be sent in cipher code by telegraph between Ra's al-Ṭīn Palace (the Khedive's headquarters at Alexandria) and certain individuals in Cairo and Istanbul; this went on until telegraph communication with Ra's al-Ṭīn was eventually cut. This gives cause for reflection to fair-minded people.

Shortly after we arrived at Kafr al-Dawār, moreover, we discovered that some bedouin and half-breed louts had been pillaging and robbing the refugees from Alexandria and those in the suburbs. The country estates and villages of Buḥayra province were consequently in a state of great agitation — so much so that the provincial government sent us a telegram that the bedouins had even threatened estates close to Damanhūr, the capital of the province. On one estate a Copt and his wife had been killed, leaving an unweaned baby; their names are on the complaint presented to us by one of the family's relatives. This incident greatly distressed me and I kept thinking about that poor baby. I promptly wrote to the provincial government ordering the capture of those responsible and instructing that the baby be properly cared for. I continued pressing the matter until finally they (the culprits) were captured; they confessed to having killed the man and his wife and are still held in the provincial jail, although I do not know what it has been decided to do with them.

Because of all this, I sent out the troops necessary into the towns and estates of the province to protect the inhabitants and their property and prevent such violence. Then I wrote to the Council to replace the governor of that province, Ibrāhīm Bey Tawfīq al-Turjumān. It was later learned that this man had given instructions to the bedouin chiefs to pillage the countryside if war broke out in order to disperse the strength of the army. I sent word to the governorate of Daqhiliyya province to send him under guard to the Ministry of War. To that Ministry I wrote a report of what was known about him and stressed the need for an investigation by the Military Court of the allegations against him. The bedouin sheikhs did not, in fact, obey his instructions, which were so inhumane and barbaric. His orders did, however, become rumored amongst some of the bedouin riff-raff and half-breeds and so their misdeeds resulted. Many of them were seized, along with their plunder, and they were sent for punishment to the Council, along with information regarding what they had done and the items found in their possession. Details of all this are with the records office attached to the military staff command which was at Kafr al-Dawār. The Council did later

Minister for the Interior, Buṭrus Pasha, the Deputy-Minister for Justice, Yaʿqūb Sāmī Pasha, Deputy Minister for War, and Aḥmad Pasha Nash'at, Director of the Khedivial Affairs Administration, along with others. It was somewhat similar to a provisional Republic,[82] designed to preserve the country's order until such time as the disaster-filled storm clouds gathering over Egypt might disperse.

All this transpired without my attendance at or participation in any way in this Council or its deliberations until they themselves entitled me "Protector and Guardian of all Egypt," a designation by which everyone began addressing me.

But where now are men of justice and honor? From all that has been stated it must be overwhelmingly obvious that this war, without precedent in the speed and manner in which it materialized so strangely and unexpectedly, was indeed lawful and legitimate. I was clearly ordered to go to war by authority of that Council over which the Khedive presided, as also by reason of the Khedive's very edict issued dismissing me and his accompanying instructions. These showed he had commanded me to continue fighting and only dismissed me because the army had been routed. I was similarly ordered to defend and protect the country by authority of the decision of the General Council, which was itself an expression of the entire Egyptian nation regardless of religious affiliation or denominational differences. The Khedive, moreover, no longer had authority to rule over the country after its people decided that he had stepped beyond the boundaries of the law.[83]

It is commonly understood that, in accordance with the law of Islam, one must participate in the **jihād**, the righteous and holy war, either with one's person, one's wealth, or one's moral support. The Egyptian nation, for all its variety of religious affiliation, did indeed do its duty in defense of the homeland. The people offered themselves and their sons, volunteering willingly, and did spend their wealth for the sake of honor and the nation. Some contributed half their work and others contributed everything they owned. One person gave thirty horses and 3,000 ardabs of grain. These facts can be verified from the telegrams that arrived directly and without intermediary from the people in the provinces either to the Ministry of War or to us at Kafr al-Dawār. These facts are also apparent from the telegrams of thanks I sent to these voluntary contributors, as well as from the telegrams we received from the governors of the provinces.

In a period of thirty days approximately 100,000 men, regular soldiers, volunteers, and bedouin, had assembled and the stores were filled with plenty of provisions. Some 8,000 horses and mules also were contributed and about 4,000 camels along with considerable sums of money that was equally unsolicited. Such enthusiasm as this knows no parallel in all the history of Islam up to the present time. Public opinion was united; all the most prominent men of the country, men of stature and education, kept coming to us at Kafr al-Dawār and even Ra's al-Wādī, offering their best advice.

This all being as we have stated then, the Egyptian nation, regardless of religious affiliations, must be viewed as having gone to war either in

they would no doubt agree. But if they were being compelled to stay in Alexandria under guard by the troops at war with the country, then the delegation would return to Cairo and report to the Council for what action it might then decide. This delegation was composed of ʿAlī Pasha Mubārak[78] and Ra'ūf Pasha, along with Sheikh Aḥmad Kubbūwah, The Sheikh in charge of the Upper Egyptian division of al-Azhar, and Sheikh Alī Nā'il representing the scholars of Islam; al-Sayyid Aḥmad Bey al-Suyūfī and Saʿīd Bey al-Shammākh,[79] the Agent for Western Tripoli, represented the merchant class.

They were despatched and returned again to Cairo, except for ʿAlī Pasha Mubārak and al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Suyūfī who were detained in Alexandria. When the delegation came back to us at Kafr al-Dawār, they reported that: "Truth can never gain from falsehood" and that a man who has deceived the Muslim community could not be considered a Muslim himself. Those at Alexandria were, they said, totally under the control of the British. No one could leave the city without a permit from them, although they had been told to state the contrary. A proclamation had, moreover, been signed and issued by the Khedive on the 4th of Ramaḍān, equivalent to July 20, 1882 that is, informing the people of my removal from office.[80] The grounds stated were that I had failed to obey the Khedive's orders to send troops towards al-ʿAjamī to defend it and to prevent the British forces landing in that area. I had, it said, also abandoned Alexandria without cause and taken the troops to Kafr al-Dawār. All this was also presented to the General Council.

A telegram from the Khedive to the Deputy-Minister of War now came to that same effect and also ordered him to cease all preparations for battle. At that point, an enormous meeting was held, attended by over 500 people including three princes, the Sheikh of Islam, the Chief Judge of Egypt, the Grand Mufti, al-Sayyid al-Sādāt and al-Sayyid al-Bikrī as well as many of the most renowned scholars of Islam. The patriarch of the Copts, the Bishop, as well as many priests also attended, along with the Chief Rabbi of the Jews. The Deputy-Ministers and Directors and Deputy-Directors of all government agencies, governors, and judges and Muftis from the provinces as well as many Deputies of the Chamber, village mayors, important merchants, and many senior and retired members of the Khedivial court and administration were present as well.

All the documents and proclamations that were issued by the Khedive and what I had written were examined by the Council, and following their deliberations it was decided to put a stop to[81] the Khedive. His orders would in future be disregarded since he had acted outside both civil and religious law. It was also decided that the country must be defended and that I be charged with conducting this defence, since I was already there with the army at the front at Kafr al-Dawār.

A document to this effect was signed by all members of this Council and a report about this decision was sent by telegram to His Majesty the Sultan giving the names of its most prominent signatures. My appointment was officially announced and an Administrative Council was formed to examine the state of the country. Its members included Ḥusain Pasha, the Deputy-

in a state of war and that, martial rule having gone into effect, anyone disturbing the peace would be punished according to military law. A military tribunal was for that purpose set up within the Ministry of War.

Since the Khedive had gone into Alexandria after the civilians and soldiers had left it, and was under British guard, either he was now a prisoner or he had deserted to that army engaged in battle with his country. In either case, the nation could not, in accordance with the stipulations of Islamic law, be left without a ruler. For in the first case, that of his capture, he could not be both a prisoner and a ruler properly caring for his country's interests. Similarly, the country could not be abandoned to anarchy, with no ruler to care for the people's interests. In the second case, that of his desertion, the Koran would have judged him to exile from the community of Muslims and it would therefore not be right for him to govern Muslims-Because of all this, I sent a telegram to the Deputy Minister of War, Ya ͨqūb Pasha Sāmī, to have the Council look into the matter. I also sent a telegram about this direct to the Sultan's personal quarters in Istanbul.

On approximately July 17, a telegram[76] from the Khedive arrived which placed all the responsibility on me as the cause for the outbreak of war. It insisted that the works in progress in the forts and the installation of guns in them had not been stopped. It said that peace had now come and that I had to go to speak with him personally. From that I learned that he was a prisoner and that he had been ordered to summon me so that I could be seized.[77] I also concluded that he was blaming me for having caused the war to save himself.

I consequently sent a telegram to His Highness saying that his siding with the army at war with his country had had a very bad effect on people. I requested him to inform me of the terms of the peace so that I would be able to go to Alexandria. He made no reply to me and so I sent a telegram to the Deputy-Minister of War to have this matter discussed by the Council. Telegrams were also sent by both the Khedive and Rāghib Pasha, who was the Prime Minister, to all agencies of the government saying that peace had come and that preparations for war should be discontinued; these preparations were, as a consequence, somewhat curtailed, despite the occurrence of skirmishes involving some of the army's advanced elements at Ḥajar al-Nawātiyya.

I therefore wrote again to the Deputy-Minister of War to have that fact too discussed at the Council; since skirmishes involving advanced elements of the army were occurring, we knew that we were not, in fact, at peace. I wrote to the provincial governments that they should comply with supply requests from the Ministry of War without delay and that they should pay no heed to any orders other than my own.

At that point a General Council Meeting was held at the Ministry of the Interior to consider all these matters. It was attended by the Deputy-Ministers and heads of governmental agencies and also by men of prominence in every field; they engaged in discussions about this whole affair that had so dumbfounded the country. They finally decided to send a delegation to the Khedive at Alexandria to request both him and the Ministers to return to Cairo, the nation's capital. If they were free agents

surrounded the palace to protect him. The Khedive then sent back Ḥusain Bey al-Turk, his aide-de-camp, along with His Excellency Ṭulba Pasha to convey his regards and thanks to me. But by the time they reached me most of the troops, for reasons that will be explained, had left the town in disorderly fashion, only very few having assembled there at Bāb-Sharqī. Many officers did arrive including Nasīm Bey, the officer-in-charge of the Alexandria shoreline. They reported that the ships had gone below Burj al-Silsila to be able to shell the Bāb al-Sharqī barracks and to cut off the lines of retreat.[73]

I considered that it would be impracticable to assemble the troops in such circumstances and that I had to find a suitable position where this could be accomplished and where they could overcome their state of shock and confusion. I therefore ordered colonels ʿĪd Bey and Sulaymān Bey Sāmī to gather the men with them together and to move out to the Maḥmūdīyya Canal after all the civilians had left. I then went in Rāghib Pasha's carriage as far as the railway junction. There I descended from his carriage since he was going on to the Khedive. I set off to the Maḥmūdīyya hurrying as fast as I could to reach the head of the line of people in order to stop the soldiers. It was after sunset when I reached the railway bridge over the Maḥmūdīyya Canal and there, over behind the canal, I selected a piece of land. Then I found a bugler and told him to sound the signal to assemble. From then on till morning the soldiers gradually gathered. The officers I had left in Alexandria arrived with their troops only at seven o'clock at night because the roads had not been clear; the canal banks were both very crowded with people, domestic animals, carriages and the like, all shouting and lamenting what had happened.

At approximately five hours after nightfall[74] Ṭulba Pasha arrived and told me about the soldiers who were supposed to have surrounded the palace and how this was not at all the case. He told me that the Khedive was pleased with me and had sent Husain Bey al-Turk to give me his regards. The latter had accompanied him as far as the bridge but since it was crowded and dark and he had no knowledge of that area he had returned to al-Ramal.

On the morning of Thursday, July 13, 1882, I could see that the troops now gathered there were less than one third of the total; the greater part of the army had gone on ahead. I also perceived that the position selected was not appropriate, since it was within range of the shells from the ships and there were salt-beds at its rear. So we led the troops away until we reached a place called ʿIzbat Khurshīd, which lay some 5,000 metres to the south of Milāha station. The troops remained there until the next day, about half the army now having gathered. That day special trains were sent from Cairo to al-Ramal to transport back to Cairo the Khedive, his family and those of his court there with him. The trains were in fact sent but returned empty; it was clear that the Khedive had gone along with his family and entourage into Alexandria and that he was now under British guard.

On Friday, July 14, I accompanied the troops to ʿIzba Kanj ʿUthmān which we made our camp; there the work of building defenses began. On July 11, the day Alexandria was bombarded, the Prime Minister had sent telegrams to all agencies of the government announcing that the country was

Mahmūdīyya Canal. They were panic-stricken, men caring nothing for their wives, women making no attempt to find their children. The children were screaming and the women weeping, as though judgement day had come. It was an awesome sight to witness. I got down from my carriage and went forward on foot until I reached the East Gate, where I found ʿĪd Bey, a Colonel. I asked him the reason for all this and he said that rumors that the ships were about to shell the town had caused those still there to flee. The soldiers were also in disorderly flight with their wives and children. ʿĪd Bey said he was in the process of gathering some troops from the regiment and I told him to hurry up and do so and to prevent the soldiers from leaving. I then took up position at the Gate myself to stop them.

I was told that Sulaymān Bey Sāmī was acting insanely and that he and a body of troops had tried to set the town afire.[71] I sent for him at once and he soon arrived with one or two ill-ordered companies. I asked him about the report that he wanted to burn down the town but he denied it and said he had a battalion of men scattered through the streets leading to the harbour to prevent the soldiers from the warships from getting ashore. But I discovered that some of the men had quantities of calico[72] cloth with them and I ordered Sulaymān Bey to confiscate it all and identify those on whom it was found. He did gather it together and set it alight but I told him not to burn it but to keep it until it could be handed over to the police department, after investigation of why and how it came into the possession of these soldiers.

I continued passing around among the soldiers reminding them of their honor and duty, discouraging men from desertion and ordering them to continue in defense of the country. I also saw that among the civilians leaving the city there were many bedouins. They all bore arms and carried piecces of color-printed calico that seemed to be new and not the sort of necessity that seems appropriate for desert-dwelling bedouins. It seemed that their gathering around the Khedive's palace was for this purpose alone; they must have taken some goods from the shops and burned others, not realizing the consequences.

I was still there restraining the soldiers and persuading them not to leave the town when Ḥasan Pasha al-Sharīʿī, Sulaymān Pasha Abāẓa, Ḥusain Bey al-Turk, the Khedive's aide-de-camp, and Muḥī al-Dīn Effendī, who was Darwīsh Pasha's aide, arrived on the scene. They informed me that the troops at al-Ramal, both cavalry and infantry, had drawn their weapons and surrounded the palace; they demanded why this had happened. I was dumbfounded to hear this and when I overcame my surprise I despatched Ṭulba Pasha to disperse the troops from the palace and to find out why this had happened. I was innocent of any role in this affair. I then asked Sulaymān Bey Sāmī why the infantrymen had been sent from the regiment to al-Ramal. He replied that he had observed ships heading for al-Ramal and so had sent four companies there as reinforcements on his own authority alone. When Ṭulba Pasha arrived at the palace he found no problem. It became apparent that the soldiers had seen ships moving towards the fort at Burj al-Silsila, which was near al-Ramal, and had thought they were moving in to capture the Khedive. They had therefore drawn their weapons and

the territories of the Egyptian government to any foreign state. Ṭulba Pasha was, therefore, to return to the Admiral and so inform him.

Ṭulba Pasha did set off but because it was a long way and time was too short, he was late for the appointment. When he arrived at the Naval headquarters[69] he learned that the admiral's representative had indeed been there at the stated time and had left a message saying that since the appointed hour had passed with no reply from the Khedive, he had gone back, and that the bombardment of the city would recommence.

At the Council meeting, the Khedive had ordered me to send a force of men over to Fort al-'Ajamī so that the British troops would be unable to make a landing. I objected to His Highness that the land was exposed there and that shells from the ships would prevent our infantry from getting near the coast, apart from the fact that communications between the fort and Alexandria had been broken. The Khedive therefore became very angry and demanded: "What sort of soldiers are you if you can't keep enemy troops out of your country?"

Then the meeting broke up and I went with Rāghib Pasha to his house on the bank of the Maḥmūdīyya Canal, discussing on the way the violence and anger of the Khedive and his fear that Fort al-'Ajamī would be taken by the British. We were very surprised to see so many armed bedouin around the palace at al-Ramal, despite all the soldiers there. We thought there had to be some extraordinary reason for them to have gathered there without the Ministry of War having played any rôle. We recalled the rumors that the Sheikh of the ʿAwlād ʿAlī bedouins had been asked by the Khedive, through Ibrāhīm Tawfīq, the Governor of al-Buḥayra province, to send a telegram to Europe saying that he was opposed to the Egyptian army and that on receiving orders from the Khedive, he would be quite capable of teaching the army a lesson and putting it to flight. That was during the period when the government was without a Ministerial Cabinet, before the appointment of Rāghib Pasha.

We remained in his house for about an hour: a summons came then from the Khedive and we went together to the palace at al-Ramal. The Khedive informed me that four companies of infantry had arrived there and asked me why this was. Since I was unaware of the real reason for that I told His Highness that I did not know[70] but assumed that they might have come to strengthen the palace guards. He replied that the guards already present were sufficient and told me to order them off to service in the army, which would be more appropriate and useful. I therefore went out and asked the officer in charge of them why they had come and on whose orders. He told me that his superior officer, Sulaymān Bey Sāmī, had ordered him to come to strengthen the guard. I then instructed him to go back to his regiment because there the Khedive had no need for more troops, the guards already present being sufficient.

Leaving him, I then made my way towards Alexandria. When I approached the waterworks over by the city's East Gate, I met with an enormous mixed crowd of civilians and soldiers, heading towards the

no war raging between his government and the British. But then, strange are the ways of the Lord.[66]

When the guns ceased firing, I went[67] along with the Ministers to the Khedive and we detailed to His Highness what had transpired that day and he expressed his gratitude for the fortitude shown by the troops. I pointed out to him that if the objective had been the destruction of the forts, this was achieved: if the objective was something else, what should we therefore do now?

A council meeting was then convened and presided over by the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha, the Sultan's representative, to decide what should be done now, after the destruction of the forts, if the fighting were to continue. After long discussion, it was decided that if the ships opened fire again then white flags were to be raised on all the forts as a signal that the fighting should cease and peaceful discussions begin. Thereupon Ṭulba Pasha and Dikrān Bey were to go in a state barge over to Admiral Seymour's ship and inform him that the Egyptian government considered it had no substantial area of conflict with the British government, except the fighting itself. We considered, moreover, that we had always properly maintained the rights of the British government and its subjects. The envoys were to point out that if the original objective had been to remove the guns, the forts were now all destroyed and the guns out of action. We had, moreover, no longer any force with which to fight the ships and had no wish for war. They would ask for his (the admiral's) comments on all this. It was night-time when the council meeting ended. I gave the agreed instructions to all the forts and then went to Bāb Sharqī, where I spent the night.

On the morning of July 12, 1882, two hours and a half before mid-day, the ships began firing on the town. White flags were raised on all the forts but the ships paid no attention until after they had fired some twenty - five or thirty shells. Then the firing ceased and Ṭulba Pasha set out to the admiral at sea. He was received by one of the admiral's officers and Ṭulba Pasha informed him of the decisions made by the Khedive and the Council. The officer then informed him that His Excellency the Admiral required the surrender of three positions neighboring one another, namely the forts of al-ʿAjamī, al-Miks, and Bāb al-ʿArab. These he would use as a base for the British army.[68] He wanted, moreover, an order to that effect from the Khedive by three o'clock that afternoon, after which time he would recommence the bombardment and take the positions by force.

By then only an hour and a half remained before the deadline and Ṭulba Pasha hurried back to al-Ramal, where I as well as the Prime Minister had already gone. Ṭulba Pasha presented the Admiral's demand to the Khedive and a Council meeting was convened over which he and Darwīsh Pasha presided. This meeting was attended by Ismāʿīl Pasha Ḥaqqī, known as Abū Jabal and a member of the Ikhtiyārīya (the Khedive's court administration), and by Abū Sulṭān Pasha, the President of the Chamber of Deputies. It was decided to inform Istanbul of the matter since the Sultan's firmān (his decree of appointment) did not authorize the Khedive to give away any portion of

eaten and the weapons in Qā'id Bey, dating from the time of Ismāᶜīl Pasha, were the only ones new when put there.[60]

If the admiral's request were not met then he would start firing on the forts at sunrise on July 11, 1882 and continue until they were totally destroyed. A Council meeting of the Ministers was then held which included selected representatives from the country's notables and took place under the chairmanship of the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha and Qadrī Bey from the Ottoman delegation.[61] Following discussion, it was decided to send the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior, along with the Commissioner of the Navy, and Dikrān Bey, one of the men of the Khedive's court, to Admiral Seymour and to assure him that no work was in progress inside the forts and that no renovated weapons had ever been set up in them. They were, moreover, ready for his own inspection. He would also, despite all this, be permitted to take out three guns from these forts simply for his own satisfaction.

The above envoys went and then returned with the admiral's final communiqué, to the effect that all the weapons were to be brought out. He did, however, concede that Egyptian soldiers instead of British troops could undertake the dismantling of the guns. After lengthy discussion[62] by the above-mentioned Council, it was decided that the removal for no military need of guns positioned in the forts for fifty years would be highly demeaning, an insupportable dishonor. Since we did not desire to go to war with any nation, especially Britain, and would only do so to maintain our honor, we would reply to any bombardment of the forts by the ships only after they had fired five or six shots. The Khedive was meanwhile showing intense enthusiasm and courage and kept saying that if fighting broke out he would himself bear a rifle and be at the forefront of the troops. So the meeting ended and the Khedive and Darwīsh Pasha informed Istanbul of the decision that had been made.

At the stated time next morning a shot was fired from the admiral's ship and then all the other ships began firing. After some fifteen shots from them, the fort guns replied and the fighting blazed continuously for ten and a half hours until the forts were all destroyed, since they were of the old-fashioned type. Their guns were ruined and Ra's al-Ṭīn palace was damaged. Fires broke out where many of the shells struck houses inside the city, especially those towards the Alexandria railway station. This was because many of the shots were fired at Fort Damās where I and all the Ministers were. Consequently some of the shots fell on neighboring houses and on the railway station. Eventually both sides ceased fire.

Throughout this violent battle two aides-de-camp of the Khedive and Muhīy al-Dīn Effendī, Darwīsh Pasha's aide, kept bringing us encouragement and greetings from their masters and praising the fortitude and courage of the troops despite the lack of preparedness in the forts and the excellence of the weaponry of the British ships.[63] We were, nevertheless, very surprised that the Khedive should remain in the palace at al-Ramal,[64] down on the beach, quite unconcerned and fearless[65] for the ships, as if there were

PART TWO: INCIDENTS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Concerning the savage war.[57]

What, then, was this savage war? It was the war waged by the British! That nation with so many champions of civilization; that nation that defends the downtrodden, that nation that emancipates slaves from servitude, that nation that preserves the maintenance of justice and the laws.

And with whom was it fought? With Egypt. That country whose people, as no one can deny, live in slavery and choke on tyranny, a country that endlessly sheds the blood of its people without moral or legal justification, a country whose tyrannical and brutal rulers have perfected the arts of evil, a country whose rulers give no care for what is rightful or legal, a country whose rulers are worshipped even to the exclusion of almighty God Himself, a country that used to think that England alone, so compassionate towards the human race, would be its only savior from the prison-pit of the wicked, its only guide to the clear air of civilization. But the nation's high hopes have been denied. When its people did draw near the mouth of that pit and thought they would escape, along came the British guard, took prisoner those who had emerged from the pit and threw them down into its depths to be torn to pieces by the snakes. Yet this action was quite contrary to the customary kindness and sympathy of the British towards the human race.[58]

This all came about when the Khedive announced that his life and that of the Europeans were in danger and the warships came from all the nations, from the Great Powers of Europe, that is, and most of the Europeans left Egypt. People were most disturbed by the arrival of the naval vessels and the Egyptians greatly regretted the departure of their European brethren with whom they were in complete harmony.

Then it was said that the renovations to the forts constituted a threat to the British fleet,[59] quite apart from the rest of the ships of various European nations present in Alexandria. The repair work was stopped. Then a letter arrived for the officer in charge of the Alexandrian army command from His Excellency the British Admiral, Seymour, that work was underway to block entrance to the port of Alexandria with rocks. If, the letter stated, the positioning of these rocks was not prevented, then he would retaliate. By order of the Khedive and in concurrence with the Ministers, a message was sent to him that there was no foundation to the report of rocks being thrown, nor any need for that. The Under-Secretary for the Navy also sent the admiral a message authorizing His Excellency to take into custody anyone found doing it.

Then, on July 10, 1882 a second letter came from this admiral to the same officer-in-command that guns were being set up in the Forts of Sāliḥ, al-Miks, and Qā'id Bey. He therefore wanted to take down all the weapons in the forts of Alexandria positioned between al-ʿAjamī and Qā'id Bey. This was despite the fact that the only weapons in these forts had been there since the time of Muḥammad ʿAlī pasha! The wooden artillery pieces were worm-

: their proper rights without distinction between civilians and
ıers, so that all the inhabitants of Egypt would be as one, regardless of
:nces of religions and beliefs, since all men belonged to the same
on humanity. A further[54] indication of my inability to leave at that time
:n by the telegrams sent to the Khedive by military and naval
anders at Alexandria on the day when the cabinet of Maḥmūd Pasha
esigned. Further evidence that the people would not accept that note is
ighness the Khedive's own admission in the telegrams he sent out to
:ommanders, in reply to those he received from them on that occasion.
, indeed; before concluding this part, I do wish to say that His
ess the Khedive had despatched Thābit Pasha the Circassian, a man
ned for his racial prejudice, to Istanbul in November 1881 to be his
there. This mission was to turn the Turkish government officials
t the Egyptian army and similarly to prejudice the Sultan himself. And
ıors were spread in official circles in Istanbul that the Egyptian forces
o longer loyal and that they wanted to form an Arab state; it was said I
ached an understanding to that effect with the British. These rumors
great attention and I saw them as serious, since I knew no one in
ul who could defend me and deny the false rumors relating to me.[55] So
arrival in Egypt of al-Sharīf al-Sayyid Aḥmad Asᶜad, the Sultan's
:ntative as 'custodian of holy places'[56] in Medina, I gave him a
ent to take back for me. In it I asserted my innocence, and that of the
of the activities wrongly attributed to us. I later received a reply from
aying that the document had been accepted and that, to please His
:y, the Sultan, I was requested to remain obedient.
; brings to an end the first part of my report, covering all the important
occurring from early February 1881 up to 9th July 1882, shortly
the British war in Egypt broke out.

Before the formation of that Cabinet the usual yearly renovations and repairs to the defense fortifications were already in progress. But then an order was issued by the Khedive, following a command from His Majesty the Sultan, to cease all fortification construction in Alexandria; such work would be considered a threat by the British fleet. If it did not cease then the fleet would bombard the city, destroying it and setting it afire. This was what the secretary of the British Embassy in Istanbul had informed the Sultan.

All the work was stopped. The Khedive even sent two men to go down from the court to establish on his behalf that the work had ceased; these men were Ḥusain Bey al-Turk and Ḥusain Effendī Fawzī. The Khedive sent a report to that effect to Istanbul. We were amazed how the regular repair work on the forts could be considered a threat while the presence of warships surrounding Egyptian ports was not considered threatening! But then we recall that "Right belongs to the strong!"

On July 4, 1882, following the formation of that Cabinet, the "Majīdīa" decoration, along with the firmān of the Sultan on its award, arrived from Istanbul. I received it personally from His Highness the Khedive, who expressed his satisfaction and gratitude and told me how he was sure of the sincerity of my service to him. I thanked him for his graciousness and also sent a telegram expressing my thanks to the Sultan's private apartments.[53] I was honored by a telegram in reply expressing the great satisfaction of His Highness the Sultan in my obedient and sincere good service, and declaring that the decoration was to reward me for my fine conduct.

As for the decorations intended for the army officers, some were distributed to servants at the court and the rest were kept by the Khedive. Not one of the officers received a decoration, even though one officer had reached the rank of Pasha. He was never awarded a decoration, despite all the dedication he displayed on the battlefield and in many areas of service. This was because these officers were Egyptians; this matter was conducted in a manner contrary to the customary practice of those to whom the word justice is attributed.

Following my receipt of the decoration, His Excellency Darwīsh Pasha bade me go to Istanbul to live at the side of His Majesty the Sultan, along with some of my colleagues. I expressed to him my regrets on the same grounds as I had earlier to the Consul General of France. I was afraid that the people would prevent my leaving and would react very emotionally, as His Excellency had himself witnessed when the people had expressed their deep affection for me by gathering in crowds as I passed through Alexandria. His Excellency Rāghib Pasha the Prime Minister, aware of how great would be the shock to the people and how great the damage done if I were to leave for Istanbul, similarly informed Darwīsh Pasha that such an order would be contrary to the public interest. He pointed out that past events had convinced him that I was very popular with all the people of Egypt and had the public good at heart. He was sure I was trustworthy and honorable and devoid of the personal ambitions detractors claimed I had; my sole objective was the emancipation of my country and the prosperity its people would enjoy under a just, truly representative government. Such a government would give the

are highly jealous for their honor and do not put their trust in statements not in accord with either the law or honor.

During that period, the Ottoman Commission[52] under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Darwīsh Pasha arrived and took up residence in the al-Jīza Palace. People of prominence of all types rushed there to greet him, to complain about the Khedive's conduct and to insist on the need for proper adherence to the stipulation of the law. Now all these men are in jail, because of injustice and malice — revenge in fact. The prisons in the provinces, in Cairo, and in Alexandria are overflowing with them.

Having properly inspected the army and established that it had maintained good order and proper obedience and done nothing at all wrong, Darwīsh Pasha requested some two hundred decorations for the officers from His Majesty the Sultan. These awards would compensate them for their fine behavior. For myself, he also recommended the "Majīdīa" Decoration, of the First Class and with Ribbon.

After that, a new Cabinet of Ministers was formed led by His Excellency Rāghib Pasha, who took the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. His Excellency Aḥmad Rashīd Pasha became Minister of the Interior, ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān Rushdī Bey Minister of Finance, Maḥmūd Pasha al-Falakī Minister of Public Works, Sulaymān Pasha Abāẓa Minister of Education, ᶜAlī Pasha Ibrāhīm Minister of Justice, Ḥasan Pasha al-Sharīᶜī Minister of Pious Foundations. They reappointed me Minister of War; it was thus said that the impact of the note had been nullified and that no further disaster would occur. To increase people's sense of security an edict was issued granting pardon to all those involved in the recent incidents — except, that is, for the deplorable events that took place in Alexandria on June 11, 1882. That dreadful incident occurred all of a sudden on that date and blew up between the riffraff of Alexandria and the Europeans.

Following a directive from the court to have the army appoint people to investigate the incident, Yaᶜqūb Pasha Sāmī, Deputy Minister of the Army, was given the task and sent down with two regiments of infantry, two artillery batteries and two battalions of cavalry to keep order in and around Alexandria. All the European newspapers have since praised the alertness of the soldiers of these regiments and their vigilance in winning peace and good order. These soldiers were under the general command of Ṭulbat Pasha ᶜIsmat, who discharged his responsibilities most admirably.

I heard from His Highness the Khedive, based on a report from the Governor of Alexandria, that the incident first arose from a dispute between a Maltese and a donkey-man from Alexandria; as a crowd gathered shots from rifles and pistols were fired down from overlooking windows. Following this report, I sent a letter to the Deputy-Minister of the army, Yaᶜqūb Pasha, telling him of the rumor and asking him to investigate the incident fully and vigorously and to strive to find the real cause of the incident. I also instructed him to protect the honor of the government and of the army while attempting to pursue the truth. This is all I learned of that incident.

trusted my word and believed that all Egyptians, when they knew of my guarantee of safety for the Europeans, would treat the latter with the greatest respect.

Confident that the soldiers would not do anything to disgrace their military honor and that the civilians would respect their foreign guests, I did promise to give the same care to all Europeans living in Egypt and their possessions as I would to myself and my own family and property until such time as a new government would be formed. The Consuls left satisfied.

That evening, the Chamber of Deputies held a meeting in the house of Abū Sulṭān Pasha, their President, and invited me to attend. I accepted and there they charged me with maintaining public order. They had with them a number of legal scholars and the chief judge of Egypt. I reminded them that I had tendered my resignation and that it had been accepted; how could I then be charged with such a matter when I had no position in the government?

Abū Sulṭān Pasha, the Chamber President, and His Excellency Sulaymān Pasha Abāẓa, one of the deputies, replied that they were the nation's representatives and that they were charging me with that responsibility. They stated that they would not accept my resignation and were going to the Khedive to request an order from him restoring me as before to the Ministry of War.

That night I obtained various reports and despatches on the current and recent state of the country, the disasters that had occurred and the blood that had been spilled. All that came about as a result of the despotic statutes in effect and the state of affairs at which the country had arrived and because of that note the Khedive had accepted. Those present agreed unanimously to seek the deposition of the Khedive if he did not refuse to accept the note in question.

The meeting thereupon broke up. Next morning the President of the Chamber of Deputies and Sulaymān Pasha Abāẓa came to my house and the latter handed me an order from the Khedive to resume my office of Minister of War. They fancied that through this action the effects caused by the note would be negated — but "fancy does not avail at all against the truth."[50] I then offered my thanks to the Khedive, who received me most cordially, and set about fulfilling all my duties while the Cabinet remained dissolved, a period of some twenty days during which no disorders occurred.

But during that time Cairo filled with bedouins and their large numbers did make both the civilian population and the Europeans apprehensive.[51] The reason for all that was that His Highness the Khedive had brought them in. He showed them such favor that visitors imagined that the palace at Ismāʿīliyya was a meeting place for bedouins, a very unusual circumstance. The purpose of this was for them to provide a counter-force to the army — quite unnecessarily.

The Governor of al-Buhayra province, Ibrāhīm Bey Tawfiq, was inciting the bedouin and they were transmitting secret instructions into the provinces to cause trouble for those who had signed the declarations in favor of rejection of that note, as well as to spread further disorders. But the bedouins

stipulated in this note were all purely internal and not subject to interference by others, they were not accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers. This was not to preserve our posts but to maintain the rights of the country that had commissioned us to our positions of trust and responsibility. The Khedive himself did at first accept the note's conditions.

Since this matter had become so difficult to resolve and the Khedive and the Ministers were at odds over it, a special cabinet session was held. There it was decided to request the Chamber of Deputies to examine the questions under dispute and to offer an acceptable solution, since the law did permit that procedure if some unusual circumstance should arise for the country. The Deputies did assemble and set about examining that note; the decision to refuse to accept it was unanimous. This news flew far and wide across the country, causing great apprehension. Public opinion was united on the refusal to accept the note, and village mayors and notables began coming in to Cairo asserting their rejection of it and those willing to accept it. They wrote out statements to that effect, signed them and brought them to me as expressions of their confidence in me. And similarly, when the Khedive refused to allow the official opening of the Chamber of Deputies, many of the Deputies signed statements rejecting the note.

Now many religious dignitaries, merchants and notables arrived from all parts, bringing signed statements and legal opinions from the most respected scholars agreeing on the need to remove the Khedive from office to conform with the precepts of Islamic law. Some of these documents are still in my possession and some were held by Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, the Prime Minister. But since the Khedive still remained determined to accept the note and to refrain from opening the Chamber, the Ministers offered their resignations, which he accepted.[48]

During all this, the Consul General of France, M. Sinkiewicz and M. Monge, the Consul of France in Egypt, tried very hard to persuade me to go to Paris[49] and so free myself from all these difficulties. But since I knew that all the people were deeply attached to me and that the members of the Chamber of Deputies believed that only my presence would guarantee the continued existence of the Chamber and the peace and security of the nation, I could not leave. They believed that if I were to leave Egypt, all would be ruined; the people and the army would similarly not let me leave, and felt that if I did a truly terrible commotion would result. Anyone would agree how true this was who witnessed how the people of Alexandria, men and women, young and old, gathered in the streets and windows to greet me and express their affection for me and how they lined up along the railway track from Cairo to Alexandria. All this, then, prevented me from going to Europe or Istanbul.

On the morning after the Ministry's resignation, the Consuls General of Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy came to my house and requested me to give them my word that I would protect the lives and the possessions of all Europeans dwelling in Egypt. I regretfully declined, pointing out that I had resigned my post. They refused, however, to accept this and replied that they

in the ᶜĀbdīn Palace that certain soldiers on guard there had stolen the palace's stock of jewelled ceremonial brooches, despite the fact that they were there to protect the palace and everything in it. The commander of the First Infantry Regiment at ᶜĀbdīn, ᶜAhmad Bey Faraj, conducted an investigation of the palace servants and became suspicious of the custodian of the jewels, Muḥammad Hasan; it was his responsibility to take charge of the Khedive's clothing. This man had actually been brought up in the home of Ahmad Faraj and had eventually married a woman from the Khedive's court. Faraj ordered him to be sent to the police headquarters for questioning and there he confessed that he did have the jewels and had thrown them down a latrine, there in the police headquarters. He showed them where and they got them out, all intact; they were then delivered over to the Khedive and so the honor of the army was maintained.

Under questioning this Muḥammad Ḥasan insisted that he was not a thief but that Ibrāhīm Āghā, the Khedive's **Tūtunji**,[40] had ordered him to take the jewels and look after them until he, Ibrāhīm Āghā returned from a period of absence.[41] Muhammad Hasan said he had no knowledge of the reason for all this. A letter was sent from the War Ministry to the police administration expressing the necessity for an official inquiry to show that the honor of the army was still intact, and to prevent anything similar recurring. It was stated that to discover the truth, the aforementioned Ibrāhīm Āghā should be summoned for questioning about the matters attributed to him.

When the Khedive learned of all this, he gave orders for the despatch of that unfortunate fellow[42] by night to Suez on a special train. Next morning he was embarked on the same steamer with the ill-fated ᶜĀisha Hānim and to this time no other abode than the Red Sea or the 'blood-red' death[43] are known for him. All this took place without judicial inquiry or legal judgement.

As for Ibrāhīm Āghā, he was given the necessary funds and despatched to Syria; and now he has come to threaten me in prison,[44] because I was distressed and sorry for those unfortunate people.

Because of these two affairs and other frightening incidents that occurred continually, no Egyptian could feel secure or sleep well in his home. People felt that they themselves might be afflicted as those unfortunates had been. All this was well known to the Cabinet Ministers and to others, as well as to the members of the Chamber of Deputies. They—the Ministers, that is—petitioned the Khedive to prevent these misdeeds, but to no avail. That is absolute despotism indeed; yet where are those who will free the Egyptians from their slavery?[45]

This hatred continued, then, to have control over the Khedive's mind until the British and French warships arrived and their consuls delivered a note in accordance with an opinion that Abū Sulṭān[46] Pasha had expressed, though not offering it seriously, as he has stated on more than one occasion.[47] This note stipulated that Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha's Ministry must fall, and that I must go to Europe, while ᶜAlī Fahmī Pasha and ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl Hilmī Pasha should be sent out into the provinces within Egypt. Since the matters

he had spoken with him, using the words, "Your life and those of the Europeans are in danger." The Prime Minister denied that this had occurred and told the Consuls of the request he had made to His Highness regarding the Interior Ministry's having no intermediary role in the case of the Circassians' plot. He insisted that that was all they had discussed, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs affirmed this.[34]

Now the truth is that this lamentable statement, so entirely devoid of truth, is the source of the affliction that has descended so heavily on Egypt. That statement caused the despatch of naval units from the European states to the ports of Alexandria and Port Said. It caused the deplorable events of June 11 at Alexandria at a time when the Egyptians and the Europeans were living in the most cordial and friendly of relationships: if the ships of war had not arrived at Alexandria, the hatred would never have arisen and the dreadful tragedy would not have occurred. It was also the cause for the outbreak of war by one nation, great and famous for its justice and love for humanity, the destroyer of the bonds of slavery, against the unfortunate land of Egypt, that had striven for so long to resist the greed of predators. And for how long a time Egypt had been determined to rely on the government of Britain alone to take her by the hand and lead her forth from the snake-pit of tyranny and slavery into the blissful state of freedom! But the thoughts of the ruler who did not love his country destroyed all that. From that time on the Khedive hated the Cabinet of Ministers and especially the Prime Minister; he often stated that he did not want to see and found no pleasure in seeing Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī.[35]

During[36] that period a certain lady of high reputation was betrayed[37] in a most abominable manner. Her name was ʿAisha Hānim and she was from the family of the late Aḥmad Pasha al-Ṭūbjī. She was a 'spiritualist-entertainer'[38] at the Khedive's palace. One night the Khedive sent a carriage with one of his eunuchs to bring her from her house to the palace. But he took her instead to the police headquarters and from there she was sent, with the knowledge of Muṣṭāfa Bey Ṣubḥī, the Director of Police, to the railway station where a special train was waiting for her. It took her to Suez.

When her unfortunate daughter learned of this she sent her mother's clothes with a servant girl to Suez; that unhappy girl then embarked with her ill-fated mistress on a ship out into the Red Sea, the intention being to exile her to the Hedjaz. Then they spread the rumor that the lady had fled to Jidda, even though she was frail, advanced in age and under the watch of special guards. And to this day no one is sure where she or her servant might be, the Red Sea being their last known position. All this took place without the perpetration of any crime or any judicial inquiry being made—where indeed were the champions of humanity[39] then, one asks.

The reward of her poor daughter for sending on her mother's clothes was for her husband to be dismissed. When he learned the reason for his dismissal, he divorced this wife of his and was promptly reinstated — now there's the sort of policy that is favored by the human race, you partisans of truth and justice!

Four days after the incident involving this poor lady, the rumor was spread

From the investigation the magnitude of the plot became clear and also the fact that it originated with the Khedive. The commission records make all this clear.[31]

All the Circassians involved were sentenced to permanent exile to the Sudan. The report giving this judgement and sentence was presented to the Khedive and read out to him in the presence of all the Ministers. But since the Sudan has such an extremely hot climate that would have been very detrimental to the health of Circassians born in cold climates and might well have killed them, I asked my fellow Ministers to help me in saving them from that sentence and having them sent back in full rank and honor to their countries of origin or to any other country outside the domain of the Egyptian government. I was concerned to preserve life, even for those who had sought to destroy mine. The Ministers, despite their amazement, agreed and we presented, in person, a petition signed by us all to His Highness the Khedive, urging him to accept our plea as an act of mercy towards them.

The Khedive replied that there was one man[32] of Pasha rank among the accused and that a sentence could be carried out against him only at the orders of His Majesty the Sultan. Consequently, the matter would have to be submitted to the Sublime Porte. He then issued his instructions to the interior Ministry to carry out the sentences. This was contrary to current practice, which was that all promotions and punishments that might originate with the War Ministry would be presented directly, without intermediary, to the Royal Court which would then similarly issue orders directly to the War Ministry to put the matter into effect. The Interior Ministry had played no part in presenting the prosecution papers and had no rights over the War Ministry to carry out the judgements made in this affair. The Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister, Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, after consultations with colleagues, therefore made their way to His Highness the Khedive and requested him to issue his order of execution directly on the documents relating to the case, asking the War Ministry to fulfil and carry them out without any further intermediary and in accordance with its normal procedures. He did issue an order to that effect on those same documents and they were implemented; the sentenced men were dispatched to Syria and from there they went to Istanbul. When war broke out, the Khedive sent for them to come to Alexandria; this he did precisely because he knew himself to be the cause for what had happened to them and that they would not have entered into that conspiracy except in accord with his wishes.[33]

On the evening of that same day of the Prime Minister's audience with His Highness the Khedive, we were with the Prime Minister, Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, at a party given by ᶜUmar Bey Rahmī when messengers brought the news that the Consuls General of Britain and France were at his house and wished to see him. He left to meet them at once, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī. The Consuls informed the Prime Minister that the lives of the Khedive and of the Europeans were in danger. He replied that all their lives were in fact guaranteed by his own and asked them why they were concerned. They responded that the Khedive had informed them thus: that Maḥmūd Pasha had threatened the Khedive when

I accepted that important post despite my full knowledge of the difficulties that would encompass me in restraining and in organizing that flood of ideas bursting suddenly forth from within the hearts of so many different elements of the citizenry. Each considered only the speed with which progress could be made to that one agreed goal, namely, the emancipation and renewal of the country, completely disregarding the difficulties that might well arise to prevent achievement of those desired objectives.

Despite all this, I did persevere and make progress, working quietly and tactfully to maintain the safety and dignity of the people while protecting their possessions. This I considered to be our national duty, to ensure that Egyptian history would not be blackened in the eyes of the civilized world. Under this Ministry, conditions became more settled and better organized and a large number of important matters that had piled up for consideration by the Cabinet were disposed of. The affairs of the army were put in good order and the deserving were now promoted rather than reduced in rank.

Soon His Highness the Khedive graciously awarded me the rank of Pasha and expressed his satisfaction when he honored my colleagues ʿAlī Fahmī and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Ḥilmī, Ṭulbat ʿIsmat, Yaʿqūb Sāmī and Ḥasan Mazhar with the rank of Pasha, General, that is.

During this period, we all were wishing him a long and successful reign, for the good of the country. We thought we were now free of those trials and difficulties we had been suffering, that prospects for success were secure before us and that all that remained was to enact just laws and to improve the government administration and law courts. We felt that there was no hatred left now.

But then suddenly there before us stood treason, blocking the way. What happened was that one of the Khedive's Mamluk retainers at the Qubba School reached an agreement with a Circassian youth with him at the school who was under the trusteeship of ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Pasha Hilmī, to buy a quantity of arsenic. The objective was to poison the Pasha with it and the fact is they did put the plan into operation. The youth involved, Muḥammad Khurshīd by name, did put the poison in the milk the Pasha was accustomed to drink at night. And if the servant girl had not discovered the youth with the milk, then the Pasha would certainly have died. Within a few hours documents relating to this case were at the police headquarters. It was learned from them that the action had been plotted at the Khedive's palace.[29]

This plot having failed, a large faction of Circassians allied together in a conspiracy to murder me and all other Egyptian-Arab officers of high rank. But when they invited a Circassian named Rāshid Effendy Anwar, a civilised and humanitarian, God-fearing man to join them, he refused and immediately informed Tulbat Pasha ʿIsmat of the facts. He made a written report to the Ministry of War and also informed Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī, the Prime Minister, Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī, the Minister of Justice, and the other Ministers; he also brought the matter to the attention of the Khedive.

An investigation of this Circassian plot was made by a military commission under the chairmanship of that senior General Rāshid Pasha Husnī[30] the Circassian, chosen for his high reputation as a man of honor and good faith.

affixed. They appealed to him to free them from that Ministry which, among all the other sufferings it had brought on them during its term of office, had denied them the interest from the seventeen million pounds[27] taken from them as 'muqābala'[28] tax payments under the reign of the former Khedive in order to make payments on the foreign debts that the government had incurred. They complained also of being deprived of the capital sum itself, in its entirety, even though this money should definitely have been considered a debt owed by the government, just like all the debts owed to the Europeans. The previous Ministry had also, they protested, dismissed native citizens from governmental posts, despite their qualifications and low salaries, and employed many Europeans in their stead at much larger salaries, even though the latter could carry out their work only by the intermediary help of the citizens in lesser positions. Consequently, all the important posts were now, they complained, held by Europeans without regard for the jobs they did, contrary to all just procedures and practices in every equitable government.

So then the new Ministry was formed and Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī was appointed Minister of War. As a consequence of these events, a commission arrived on behalf of His Highness the Sultan, under the leadership of His Excellency ʿAlī Pasha Niẓāmī. But two days before their arrival our regiment was ordered out to al-Tel al-Kabīr (Tel el-Kebir) and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Bey's regiment was sent to Damietta; this was so that the commission would be unable to meet with us and to find out the truth of what had been going on. When the above Pasha did express a wish to carry out an investigation, the Khedive objected on the grounds that the petitions had in fact represented his own ideas, that he had pardoned all, and that the army was now fully obedient and under control. The commission therefore departed.

Then came the formation and opening of a Chamber of Deputies, following the establishment of laws governing it; just regulations were also enacted for the army. Because of a disagreement that occurred between the Chamber of Deputies and the Cabinet of Ministers, a few months later Sharīf Pasha, the Prime Minister, resigned and his Cabinet was dissolved. Thereupon His Highness the Khedive entrusted to the Chamber of Deputies the election of new Ministers. And so it was with the knowledge of the Chamber of Deputies and the approval of the Khedive that Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Muṣṭāfa Pasha Fahmī Minister of both Foreign Affairs and Justice, ʿAlī Pasha Ṣādiq Minister of Finance and Maḥmūd Pasha Fahmī Minister of Public Works ʿAbd Allah Pasha Fikrī Minister of Education and Hasan Pasha al-Sharīʿī as Minister of Pious Foundations. And since I had meanwhile been acting as Deputy Minister for War, I was now elected and appointed as Minister of War. This was something I certainly never hoped for but there was a complete concensus and unity on my appointment to this ministry on the part of all shades of opinion in the army and among the members of the Chamber of Deputies. My presence in that position made unimaginable any possible danger to anyone from either the army or the people; all would then feel secure and at ease

feared for his very safety, wondering what might be done to him.[24] When this malaise became widespread among the upper classes of the Egyptian people, those who are our fathers and our brothers, the heads of our families, gathered in Cairo. They decided that the only way to restore hope and confidence was to create a Chamber of Deputies which would guarantee the Egyptian nation the safety of their persons, their property and their dignity. The Chamber would institute just laws that could be relied upon to preserve the rights of all, similar to the laws of the Mixed Courts[25] and the rights and prerogatives of both plaintiffs and defendents. This would ensure that all would understand and no one exceed the proper limits of his actions. They asked also for a change in that Ministry which, in its period in office, had so reduced public confidence and so increased the sense of fear.

Petitions were so drawn up and delivered to His Excellency Sharīf Pasha when he was appointed Prime Minister by Abū Sulṭān Pasha acting on behalf of the principal representatives and leaders of the Egyptian nation. Since the army and the people, in their structure and in their mutual conduct towards good and evil were one and the same, this petition was entrusted to the army. And since all the regiments delegated their authority to their officers, these officers, because of their confidence and reliance on my good faith, entrusted these petitions to me. And so, because of the gravity of the rash and irresponsible acts of the Minister of War, Da'ūd Pasha and the increasing public malaise,[26] I wrote to the Minister of War on September 9, 1881, informing him that all the soldiers would parade at ʿĀbdīn Square at 9 a.m. on the following Friday, to present their demands and those of the people to His Highness the Khedive.

At the appointed time as above the troops left their barracks and assembled at ʿĀbdīn Square, their conduct extremely orderly and well mannered. Prior to this, I had written to all the Consuls of the European states informing them what was to take place at the time specified and that all would be quiet and orderly. I told them they should have no fear for the lives or properties of their subjects and that all that was being asked of the Khedive was what would render the land free and in full possession of its rights.

Then we presented these petitions to the Khedive through the intermediary of Mr. Cookson, the British Consul at Alexandria, who was present (in Cairo) at the time. The Khedive accepted all our requests which affirmed the first declaration His Gracious Majesty had issued at the beginning of his reign. These petitions, he stated, fulfilled his greatest hopes since they were all in accord with the laws. He then issued his command that the government should be turned over to and headed by His Excellency Sharīf Pasha. The soldiers now departed, all expressing their prayers that he be granted a long life and thanking him for reviving the country and freeing it from the noose of the old Egyptian tyranny.

When it happened that Sharīf Pasha deferred from accepting the Prime Ministership, approaches were made to him from the leaders of the citizens who were gathered there behind us at ʿĀbdīn Square. They presented him petitions, urging him to accept the Ministry, that had some 4,000 seals

officers, whose intrigues and misdeeds were examined at a special mixed military commission consisting of Europeans and others under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of War, Ḥasan Pasha Aflāṭūn. When it became clear that the original source of the trouble was His Highness the Khedive, they were given weak punishments indeed, imprisonment from fifteen days to two months[23] and without any reduction in their salary. Some of them were sent to serve in the Sudan, with full honor and prior rank, instead of any loss there. All this leniency was to satisfy the Khedive. But in any case none of these punishments was carried out, on the basis that the Khedive had forgiven them (since they had been acting under orders from him) through the intermediary of Ibrāhīm Āghā, his personal servant. All that is clear in the report of the official enquiry.

Similar intrigues were instigated in the First Regiment and in the Fourth Regiment as well, which was allied with us. But we eliminated them one by one to prevent the spread of rumors and out of concern for the position of His Highness the Khedive. I acted thus because I was in fact his prime defender and supporter and hoped for his reform and a change in his attitude.

This went on for some time but they were unable to harm us because of their failure to obtain the agreement of the Minister of War Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha to those ideas. So the Khedive ordered Maḥmūd Sāmī Pasha to present his resignation officially. This he did and Da'ūd Pasha Yakan, the Khedive's son-in-law, was appointed in his place. He was a man who had been brought up in his father's house and knew nothing of the government, administration, or the army. He issued orders forbidding any officer to go to his house and forbidding officers to meet with one another. Any officer found accompanying another in the street was to be arrested and the civil and military police notified. This order was contrary to every form of law.

His rash desire for revenge led him to the practice of going by night to the headquarters of the regiments to check on the officers there. He once placed watchmen at night on my house and on that of ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Bey Ḥilmī in order to ensnare and destroy us by some evil and perfidious trick. But ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Bey was already with the regiment and I had left that evening for ʿAbbāsiyya to the headquarters of the regiment. Afraid that an assassin might be following me, I went two hours after nightfall, to visit the home of one of my friends in al-Fajāla street, Khalīl Bey Lubnān. Ten minutes later two cavalry men galloped past on the road at full speed and only stopped when they reached the headquarters at ʿAbbāsiyya. There they were stopped by the guard patrol who asked them what their business was. The cavalry men replied that they were heading for the Qubba Palace and that they had lost their way. The soldiers of the guard patrol then gave them directions to al-Qubba, a village situated in the vicinity of ʿAbbāsiyya. I have no doubt that their real purpose was to find an excuse to entrap and arrest me. That incident occurred on the night of September 6, 1881. I had with me an officer named ʿAbd al-Karīm Effendī; it was, indeed, in his carriage that I rode so that no one would recognize me.

For these reasons that I have given, then, hope had gone and everyone

The events following thereafter.

We had thought that the pardon was genuine and that the orders decreeing friendship, brotherly love and the avoidance of racial discrimination had originated from a sincere good will. Soon, however, the seeds of dissention and emnity became planted in the soil of certain dishonorable hearts. Namely, Yūsuf Kamāl Pasha, a Circassian and manager of the Khedive's administration,[19] was able by means of a certain Circassian Master Sergeant in the Sudan regiment to gather together all the Master Sergeants in the Sudan who were allied by marriage to the Khedive's administration.[20] He made payments to them[21] and persuaded them to draw the soldiers into conflict with the officers and to refuse to obey their orders. He also promised them that they would be promoted into officers; these instructions came from the Khedive.

When the official enquiry established all this, the above-mentioned Pasha was to all appearances dismissed from the Khedive's service, whereas he in fact continued to pursue his activities in secret. This plot having failed Ibrāhīm Āghā, the Khedive's personal servant, began spreading unrest and making intrigues. He ordered Faraj Bey al-Zaynī the Sudanese, an Army reservist, to incite the Sergeants in the Sudan command to kill their officers; the report of those mentioned here and their confessions to this were made at the official investigation. On him was found a document signed by Ibrāhīm Āghā stating that this was to be done in accordance with the command of the Khedive. That paper was seen by Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī at the time and the Military Board issued judgement against this Faraj Bey to the effect that he be sent into the provinces and his rank be reduced to that of Major;[22] it was decided to send him out to Musawwaᶜ. But the Khedive's order came to place him on the reserves and send him to Musawwaᶜ at his present rank and in full honor since he had done nothing at his own volition but had merely obeyed orders. And then later another order came from the Khedive that this Faraj Bey should be sent from Musawwaᶜ to Khartoum and given employment there, as that was his home town and where he had properties. All this occurred without the Ministers having examined the matter at all. Next, the wife of this Bey was sent to Khartoum, via Suwākin and at the expense of the Khedive's administration and without the permit from the government that is normal in such cases.

Attempts to cause corruption through the Master-Sergeants and Faraj Bey the Sudanese having failed, thought was now given to bringing it about through Captain Salīm Sā'ib and Captain ᶜAlī Labīb. Both of these were in the Sudan regiment, which at the time was under the command of ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl Bey Hilmī. This Salīm Sā'ib was related by marriage to the Khedive's court.

Sufficient funds were supplied to the two Captains by Ibrāhīm Āghā and they began doing their best to disrupt and corrupt the operations of the Regiment. Eventually they succeeded in gaining the support of nineteen

Palace and had decided to summon all the regiments, including the artillery, and to demand that the soldiers of the First Regiment give up their arms and surrender. If they refused, they were to be fired upon.

All this would obviously have led to great civil unrest and commotion if it had not been for the arrival of the Sudan regiment from Tura, who, when they heard of the humiliation and imprisonment inflicted on us, came at once. It was that fact that prevented the nobles from persisting in the use of force.

By now His Excellency, Mr. Edward Malet, the Political Agent of England, and the Political Agent of France, His Excellency Baron de Ring, had made contact with us. They acted as mediators in finding a solution to the problem. The Khedive decreed a general amnesty and we were issued Khedivial orders restoring each of us to his original position in the regiment. Further orders were issued to the regiments bringing an end to the system of discrimination by race and instructing people to view one another as brothers, just as we had requested.

Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī[17] was now appointed Minister of War, in place of ʿUthmān Pasha Rifqī, as was in accord with the just laws of the country. On February 2 His Highness the Khedive summoned two officers of the First Infantry Regiment; they agreed to support him while he affirmed that he had truly forgiven them. When this was reported to me, I went and sought permission to see him. This was granted and, when I stood in his august presence, I petitioned him to include me among those he had pledged to forgive. He accepted this request and I solemnly pledged to preserve and protect him as I would myself. I expressed the prayer that his reign would remain stable and secure firmly based on the principles of justice and equality.

On Friday, February 4, 1881, the Khedive ordered me and my close friend Infantry Colonel ʿAlī Bey Fahmī to present ourselves to the Consuls General of Britain and France. We were to inform them that we considered ourselves responsible for and guarantors of the public order and that we would protect the lives and properties of the Europeans. I went with my above-mentioned good friend to visit the Consuls General and we reported to them as we had been ordered to do; this report of ours nevertheless did represent the true nature of our thoughts, on which all our actions had been based. With this, then, ended the difficulties of early February, 1881.[18]

That meeting took place on January 30, 1881 and on 31 we received instructions from the Minister of War to make our way to the dīwān at Qaṣr al-Nīl[10] on the morning of February 1 to attend preparations for wedding celebrations[11] for the sister of His Highness the Khedive. At the appointed time we made our way to the palace; there we found assembled all the Pashas and regimental commanders, both serving and on the reserve.[12] At once the Khedive's order was read out to us, at that meeting; we were informed that we were dismissed from our posts and that other commanders were appointed in our place. Our swords were removed and we were conducted away to prison. As we passed them by, the younger Circassian officers drew their pistols at us.

When we were in our prison cell and the door was locked, we heard Khasru Pasha laughing and saying in Turkish 'zembilli herifler', a derogatory expression meaning 'lowly peasant fruit-pickers.' Previous to that, moreover, an order had been issued by the Minister of War to the Lieutenant Colonel and Chief of Police at Cairo, Ibrāhīm Bey Fawzī, to reinforce the troops at the police stations, to prevent any soldiers from trying to enter Cairo and to maintain ready for action on demand all remaining troops in the battalion. He was also to place under arrest all Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Senior Captains who were Arab, whether serving or on the reserve; those taken into custody were to be sent to jail in the Citadel. When all were under arrest, the Minister would promote him to full Colonel.

He then issued an order to the governmental Steamboat Authority to provide and bring a boat to the Qaṣr al-Nīl barracks. It was obviously going to be used to transport us away; it is said, moreover, that they had there three iron trunks with holes in them in which we were to be placed and later thrown into the water, as was the government's custom under the previous Khedive.

Just when all that was ready, the First Infantry Regiment[13] revolted and arrived at Qaṣr al-Nīl, setting us free from prison. I immediately went and stood in that raised area in front of the council chamber (**dīwān**) and shouted out loudly to the soldiers that they must maintain good conduct and that they should harm none of the Circassians or anyone else.[14] They were, I said, our brothers and I ordered the soldiers to refrain from any act contrary to their duty as human beings. Had I not stood there thus, anger would have made them act rashly.

I then ordered the soldiers back to their quarters and went with them myself to the barracks at ʿĀbdīn. I sent a message setting out what had occurred as I have just explained, addressed to their Excellencies the Consuls-General of Britain and France as well as to the agents of the other states of Europe, seeking their help and asking them to view our situation correctly and justly. I stated that all Europeans were in our safe protection. I despatched this message to his Excellency Baron de Ring,[15] the French Consul, and requested him in it to inform the Consuls of the other nations of its contents. I also sent him the note I had received signed by the Minister of War, inviting me, by trickery, to the marriage of the Khedive's sister.

Meanwhile, the Khedive's top entourage had been meeting[16] at ʿĀbdīn Palace and had decided to summon all the regiments, including the artillery.

PART ONE—CHAPTER ONE

Concerning events that occurred before the war.

In 1880 the Egyptian army was composed of twelve infantry regiments. In 1881, during the Ministry of ʿUthmān Pasha Rifqī, it was decided to reduce it to only six regiments. The practice in Egypt was to tend to discriminate by race. And so all the promotions, decorations and rewards went to those of the Circassian race, since they were from the Mamluks,[1] the paid retainers of either the Khedivial family, or of the aristocracy who were in turn also Mamluks of the Khedivial family. After this faction came that of the Turks and others who were not Egyptians, along with those of mixed origins.[2] Thereafter came those Egyptian by race; they were neither promoted nor indeed employed except by necessity, only when others were not available. That is why, up to that date, not a single man born and bred Egyptian had attained in the army the rank of Pasha,[3] or General that is, despite the undeniable suitability and competence of some.

The Minister of War began, then, reorganizing by filling the essential posts with Circassians and Turks, followed by those of mixed ancestry. The remaining posts were to be filled only where necessary by Egyptians. All this deeply troubled the Egyptian officers, some[4] of whom therefore gathered at my house. I was at the time attending a celebration marking a man's return from the Pilgrimage[5] and so they sent word to me there. I came home to find them in a state of great anger. I pacified them by suggesting they present a petition to the Prime Minister, Riāḍ Pasha, requesting equal treatment for those in government service, the cessation of discrimination by race and the enactment of just laws that would ensure every man his rights; also that he would appoint as Minister of War a Nationalist[6] in accord with the laws of justice-oriented nations. The petition should be signed and sealed, I suggested moreover, by only two or three of the officers whom they chose to represent them. This was their decision and they appointed as their representatives the three Egyptian Colonels, myself Aḥmad ʿUrābī, Colonel ʿAlī Fahmī, and Colonel ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Hilmī.[7]

This petition so formulated was subsequently presented to the Prime Minister. Its sole purpose was to achieve a sense of sincere friendship and good will between all in government service—indeed between all those who lived in Egypt. It would seek to remove from their hearts those feelings of enmity growing from that lack of equality and that racial discrimination which were so harmful to the interests of all.

Consequently, a meeting of the government Ministers,[8] also attended by members of the Circassian court elite, with His Highness the Khedive presiding, was held. It concluded with the issuance of an edict from the Khedive to hold an inquiry[9] in the usual manner in Egypt. But the final outcome was obvious to any observer—for us to be punished by death in the usual Egyptian manner, that is, secretly. For the petition, a complaint against ill-treatment directed to the heads of the government, was without precedent.

This is my report about the events which occurred in Egypt from January 1881 up to October 1882. It is presented by me to my Attorney-at-Law, Mr. Broadley, so that he may use it to defend me before the Egyptian Court.

with the Egyptian leader for some time and had championed his cause vigorously in the London press as well as in his excellent personal contacts with the government and aristocracy, saw the dangers early and hired two English lawyers to defend ʿUrābī in Egypt. The senior lawyer, A.M. Broadley, who had actively supported the Tunisian government in its hopeless struggle against the French occupation in the previous year, cleverly manoevred towards the best outcome he could expect for his client ʿUrābī. The feeling, shared by the Khedivial elite in Egypt and important segments of public opinion in England, that the Nationalists must be "taught a lesson" by ʿUrābī's execution, was frustrated. At ʿUrābī's trial on December 3, 1882, an agreed plea of guilty to charges of rebellion against the Khedive was followed by a pro-forma sentence of death commuted to exile — thanks mainly to the moderate influence of Lord Dufferin, sent as interim administrator to Egypt from his post as Ambassador to the Sultan in Istanbul. ʿUrābī, ʿAbd al - ʿĀl Ḥilmī, ʿAlī Fahmī, Maḥmūd Sāmī al - Barūdī and several others left Egypt on December 26, 1882, along with their families. They lived in comfort and relative freedom in Ceylon until, as late as May 1901, the exile was lifted following a plea from the Prince of Wales, who met ʿUrābī in Ceylon and later used his influence with the then Khedive, Abbas II.

Most of his colleagues died in exile but ʿUrābī returned to a hero's welcome in Cairo. The jubilation was short lived, however, for ʿUrābī soon made it obvious, through press interviews, articles and memoirs, that he was no longer a rebel against the established order in Egypt. His attitude cast doubt, indeed, on the view popularly held of him as a great public leader. He lived on comfortably and in relative obscurity in Cairo for ten more years, until his death on September 21, 1911.

reduced to rubble in a matter of hours. No British ships were lost though the navy did suffer casualties, including some fatalities and several dozen men wounded.

Following the cease-fire, Bedouins entered the city and began looting the shops, and by midnight Alexandria was ablaze. It is not clear exactly who started the fire, although it was probably a result of the shelling. It did, however, give ᶜUrābī and his army a chance to retreat. Gradually ᶜUrābī reestablished a fighting force and based his troops some miles outside Alexandria, near the sweet-water Maḥmūdiyya canal. Sending out requests for supplies and volunteers to all parts of the country, ᶜUrābī was clearly determined to oppose the British in all ways possible. He assumed that the Khedive, whether a prisoner of the British or a turncoat to their side, was no longer ruler of Egypt; his attitude was shared by delegates from all walks of life throughout the country, who came together to hold a great council meeting in Cairo. Their decision to continue the conflict with the Khedive and the British seems to have been overwhelmingly popular.

Administration, such as it was, continued from Cairo under the authority of Deputy-Ministers; a system of martial law, under control of the army, was declared. The provinces remained generally quiet, supportive of ᶜUrābī and the military preparations, although occasional disorders occurred in the countryside and small towns with loss of life involving Europeans and Copts. Orders issued from Alexandria, where the Khedive and his theoretical government remained, were generally ignored. The Khedive's proclamations dismissing ᶜUrābī were, of course, disregarded and derided. A further military confrontation was inevitable.

By the end of August some 20,000 British troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley had landed and surprised ᶜUrābī by advancing towards his defensive positions from the canal; ᶜUrābī had himself given assurances to Ferdinand de Lesseps, the canal's creator, that he would not violate the canal's internationally agreed neutrality and had been led to believe that no British attack would come from it. In a short series of fiercely fought engagements, culminating after several days in a major battle at Tell el-Kebir on September 13, the Egyptian army was soundly defeated with heavy losses. ᶜUrābī surrendered himself on September 15 to General Lowe, Wolseley's second-in-command, who had followed ᶜUrābī into Cairo and ordered the city's garrisons to offer the British no resistance.

Soon the Khedive was back in Cairo and his new administration established; Sharīf Pasha and Riaḍ Pasha, whom he had appointed in August, were named Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior respectively. The army was totally disbanded and the most prominent Nationalist leaders were imprisoned. ᶜUrābī himself was soon removed from the custody of the British and placed along with his chief colleagues in a large administration building, the Dāirat al-Sanīyya, which had been converted into a jail. The main gates of the building were under guard of British soldiers, the inner premises being guarded by Circassians.

Luckily for ᶜUrābi his friends and supporters in England had not been idle in the past weeks. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, who had known and corresponded

groups in Egypt and stressed their continued support for the Khedive, who soon took up residence in Alexandria where his safety could be better assured by the fleets.

On June 7 earlier suggestions made by the British and French representatives in Istanbul bore fruit in the arrival of an Ottoman commission headed by a notoriously brutal general, Darwīsh Pasha, author of a number of atrocities in the Balkans. It seems clear that the British — who, on June 8, had acknowledged the Sultan's sovereignty over Egypt and now seemed to place their hopes in an Ottoman intervention — had suggested his dispatch as a means of disposing of ᶜUrābī once and for all. The second high member of the commission, however, As'ad Effendi, was instructed by the Sultan to make overtures to the ᶜUrābī group, so that if the preferred policy of backing for the Khedive should fail, it would be easy to establish good relations with the then-victorious Nationalists. Soon after his arrival, Darwīsh made veiled threats against ᶜUrābī and tried to persuade him to come aboard a Turkish ship in Alexandria harbor, the intention being to transport him to Istanbul. But ᶜUrābī was strong enough to resist the threats and a bloody outbreak of violence against Europeans in Alexandria on June 11— which ᶜUrābī claims was planned several days beforehand by the Court party with the express purpose of discrediting him just after he had made a pledge to preserve order — actually made his position more dominant: at the head of the army, he was the one figure who could restrain the masses and thus assure that there would be no further violence. In an attempt to reconcile the Court party and the Nationalists, the Khedive, after much deliberation, decided to form a new government with Rāgib Pasha, a loyal servant whom Ismāᶜīl had used in similar circumstances, as Prime Minister and ᶜUrābī as Minister of War (June 17). Germany and Austria, who had influenced this move, failed to persuade Britain and France to approve the new ministry.

Despite the disclaimers ᶜUrābī makes in the **Statement**, it seems abundantly clear from other sources that ᶜUrābī and his army had for some time been building stronger defences for the forts overlooking the sea approaches to Alexandria. Such activity was cited by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the commander of the British fleet then lying off the city, as a military provocation, and he issued a series of demands that it be discontinued. In the meantime, on July 7, a conference of the powers met in Istanbul, where European attempts to persuade the Sultan to countenance military action in Egypt in support of the Khedive came to nothing.

Losing patience, the British government informed the Sultan that Britain would begin bombardment of Alexandria on July 11; the Sultan's mild reply, that any such shelling would meet with his protests, was taken as permission to proceed. Wishing to have no part in these engagements, the French government under de Freycinet, who had replaced Gambetta and favored policies more conciliatory to the Nationalists, ordered its fleet to sail. Shelling began early on the morning of July 11, a variety of ultimata from the admiral having been rejected by the Egyptian government. The battle, between armoured British warships and eight fairly well fortified and manned Egyptian forts, was fierce but the outcome never in doubt — the forts were

he presented them personally and spoke warmly to his former enemies. All seemed secure and serene at the highest levels of government in Egypt. The Nationalists were supreme at last and ʿUrābī instituted those promotions and pay increases for which the Egyptian officers in the army had for so long agitated. But the excitement and scandal in April 1882 of an attempt discovered against the life of ʿUrābī, plotted by some forty Circassian officers, broke the calm. A general, ʿUthmān Pasha Rifqī, who as Minister of War had instigated ʿUrābī's arrest with ʿAlī Fahmī and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl the previous year, was the most prominent officer charged, and an important representative of the Circassian elite. Tried and convicted by court martial, the officers were sentenced to permanent exile from Egypt. The Khedive's attempts to avoid punishing Rifqī, by insisting that only the Sultan could order the execution of a sentence upon a Pasha, further antagonized the Nationalist officers. As ʿUrābī's Defence Statement shows, the Khedive himself was directly charged with having originated the plot, which received prominent exposure in the European press as well as in Egypt.

The delicate fabric of affairs in Egypt was clearly coming apart, in the army Egyptians and Circassians feared and mistrusted one another and discipline suffered, with disorders going unchecked in various provinces. Relations between the Khedive, the Chamber of Delegates, and ʿUrābī deteriorated once again because of mutual suspicion.

It was at this point that Britain and France took a further step that was to lead directly to the crisis that followed. They informed the Khedive that they were about to send warships to Egypt, their stated purpose being to emphasize their support for him and their determination to permit no change in "the order of things established in Egypt." Public reaction to this overt threat was immediate and overwhelmingly adverse throughout the country, but an important grouping of the Chamber of Delegates under Abu Sulṭān Pasha accepted assurances from the European representatives and allied themselves with the Khedive; the stalemate therefore continued. By May 20 the fleets had arrived and on May 25 the British and French Consuls General, Malet and Sinkiewicz, presented a second official Joint Note. It informed the Egyptian government of the two powers' intention to send their fleets into Alexandria, allegedly to ensure the safety of Europeans and the continued stability of Egypt's internal affairs, and demanded the exile of ʿUrābī, the rustication of ʿAlī Fahmī and ʿAbd al-ʿĀl, and the resignation of the government.

In protest against this attempt at overt interference in Egypt's internal affairs and against the Khedive's apparent acceptance of the Note, the entire cabinet now joined Maḥmūd Sāmī in resignation (May 26). The public outcry was so great that Sharīf Pasha declined to form a new government and the Khedive was obliged to appoint deputy ministers to continue the administration of the country. By May 27 pressures from the Chamber of Delegates, the army, and the aroused public forced the Khedive to reinstate ʿUrābī as Minister of War. The British and French representatives again sought "guarantees" for the protection of Europeans and the minority

Khedive; and ᶜUrābī and ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl Pasha, still colonels, acquiesced to being posted outside Cairo, the former to Ras al-Wady, the latter to Damietta. Britain and France agreed that their ships would not threaten within Egyptian waters.

Sharīf Pasha, the respected moderate, was able to proceed with the formation and convocation in January 1882 of a Chamber of Notables with 150 members under the presidency of the octogenarian Abu Sulṭan Pasha. In forming the new government he was careful to provide some satisfaction to all sides: the Nationalist grouping of the army now saw their hero Aḥmad ᶜUrābī installed as Deputy-Minister of War. But negotiations held between the British and French in December resulted on January 8 in their presentation of a Joint Note that reaffirmed, in unmistakeably threatening language, the absolute opposition of the two nations to any move in a constitutional or parliamentary direction. It warned of their "resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external" that might "menace the order of things established in Egypt," and of their intention that the Note should give to the Khedive "the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people."

When coupled with the French occupation of Tunisia, this Note, so unexpected, so crude in its intentions, was clear proof to all that the European nations were prepared to intervene, despite opposition from any quarter, including even the Ottoman Sultan.

Meanwhile a parliamentary crisis arose with the presentation of the Budget. The first part of the Budget, concerned with monies set aside for payment of the Public Debt, remained outside dispute. The Chamber of Notables insisted, however, that it had a right to vote on the disposition of monies in the second part of the Budget, which was devoted to governmental expenses, while Sharīf Pasha and his Ministers, under strong pressure from Britain and France, refused any change in established procedures whereby the Khedive's government of Ministers (with its French and British Comptrollers) maintained sole authority over these monies. The Chamber, supported by the ᶜUrābī Nationalists, resolutely insisted that their rights over the expenditure of public funds should have precedence over those of the representatives of foreign powers, and they demanded a change of government. The Khedive was forced to comply and on February 3, 1882 a new government was formed with Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Prime Minister and Aḥmad ᶜUrābī as Minister of War. Within five days a revised set of regulations defining the prerogatives of the Chamber, including its authority over the Budget, was signed into law, and the Prime Minister presented a program for development of the educational, commercial, and agricultural resources of the country that was widely applauded.

For some weeks affairs in Egypt ran smoothly and peacefully. The Khedive recommended to the Sultan that the title of Pasha be awarded to ᶜUrābī, ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl, and ᶜAlī Fahmī as well as to several other officers prominently allied with them. When the decorations arrived from Istanbul,

men, as permitted by the Sultan's **firmān** of September 1979. The Khedive replied that it was his prerogative to decide such matters; after a short discussion, he withdrew inside the palace. ʿUrābī stood waiting and soon Cookson came out with an interpreter to carry out negotiations. Cookson went back and forth between the Khedive and ʿUrābī a number of times before a general agreement was reached, which included the recall of Sharīf Pasha, a member of both the Constitutionalist grouping and the Turkish-Circassian aristocracy. Sharīf was only persuaded to accept the Prime Ministership after ʿUrābī agreed that upon reinstatement of Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Minister of War and the expansion of the army, the army would recognize the government's authority over it as absolute.

The successful outcome of this dramatic and dangerous confrontation gave ʿUrābī and his fellow officers even greater prestige within the country. Reaction in Europe, however, was distinctly unfavorable. The London press paid particular attention to ʿUrābī, giving prominence to reports from Egypt that strongly criticized him. Concurrent attempts, by Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and others, to persuade English readers and the British government that Urābī represented a genuine and laudable Egyptian national movement were generally unsuccessful. The idea that ʿUrābī was a selfish dictator using and supported by Muslim fanatical elements gained dominance over European public opinion.

It is hardly surprising that ʿUrābī's success was viewed with apprehension from abroad, since he had forced the dismissal and retirement to Europe of Riāḍ Pasha, a favorite of European governments and financiers, a symbol of conservatism and of maintenance of the social, political, and financial **status quo** of Egypt. Moreover, the European powers could scarcely view with equanimity the prospect of the proposed increase in the size of the Egyptian army, with all the financial and military dangers that it would entail. In the weeks that followed, British, French, and Ottoman authorities held extensive discussions. The Sultan, eager to regain control over Egypt and wishing to diminish the influence of both Europe and the Constitutionalists within the country, was prepared to send in troops: and the Khedive himself was prepared to accept an Ottoman military presence because he, too, sought to reduce European interference in his country's affairs and at the same time to keep the Egyptian army in check. But France, conscious of potential dangers for her newly established colony in Tunisia from any reassertion of the Sultan's authority in North Africa, resisted the idea strongly, and the French representative in Egypt, Baron de Ring, was in fact openly supportive of ʿUrābī.

Britain, too, opposed the principle of Ottoman intervention, and on the arrival in Egypt in October 1881 of ʿAlī Niẓāmī Pasha and Fu'ād Bey, delegated by the Sultan as advisors to the Khedive, Britain and France decided to express the intensity of their interest in maintaining the **status quo** by threatening to send warships into Egyptian waters. When rumors of this threat circulated, the reaction inside Egypt was so vehement and the danger of civil disturbance so great that a compromise was immediately sought by all sides. New negotiations resulted in the Sultan withdrawing his advisors to the

by the arrest in February 1881 of ᶜUrābī and his fellow officers ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl Ḥilmī and ᶜAlī Fahmī, following their presentation of a petition seeking reforms in the army and the government.

Dramatically rescued by their angry troops, ᶜUrābī and his associates demanded the dismissal of Rifqī, the installation of Maḥmūd Sāmī al-Barūdī as Minister of War, and the administrative reform of both the government and the army. The Khedive and his advisers, including the Army High Command under General Charles P. Stone, one of the American Civil War veterans introduced into the Egyptian army by the Khedive Ismāᶜīl, sought to bring the supposedly loyal Sudan regiment into Cairo to oppose ᶜUrābī, but its senior officers had already been eliminated and it was clearly siding with the Egyptian rebels. The Khedive had no alternative other than to agree to ᶜUrābī's immediate demand, the installation of Maḥmūd Sāmī as Minister of War.

A period of outward calm followed, with apparent reconciliation between the government and its Egyptian officers. In reality, however, the Khedive and his Prime Minister Riāḍ Pasha were constantly looking for ways to subvert ᶜUrābī's position of growing popularity and power, and he grew more and more concerned for his own safety. Matters came to a head in the summer of 1881, when Maḥmūd Sāmī resisted pressures to have ᶜUrābī and his leading military colleagues posted outside Cairo and was dismissed from office. The Khedive's brother-in-law, Da'ūd Pasha Yaken, was appointed the new Minister of War.

On September 8 Da'ūd Pasha issued the orders for ᶜUrābī to proceed with his regiment to Alexandria; ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl was to go with his to Damietta. The following morning the two colonels, seeing this move as a challenge to their position that they could not ignore, sent word to the Khedive—who was then at the Ismāᶜīlīya Palace, his private residence in a Nile-side suburb of Cairo—that they intended to present certain complaints and petitions to him that afternoon at ᶜĀbdīn Palace, the official residence. The confrontation was dramatic indeed. The regiments of ᶜUrābī and ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl, later joined by the palace guard under Colonel Alī Fahmī, totalled some 3,000 fully armed soldiers with a score of field guns: a section of them surrounded the palace itself and the rest were ranged in formations around the great square before it. Upon his arrival, the Khedive entered the palace by the rear and emerged from the main door accompanied by Sir Auckland Colvin, the British Comptroller, Sir Charles Cookson, the Acting British Consul General, the Austrian Consul, and several of his Circassian and American generals in full uniform.

ᶜUrābī, mounted on horseback and with his sword drawn, advanced slowly, at the head of a group of his officers, towards the Khedive. Tawfīq, apparently acting on Colvin's whispered advice, took the initiative and ordered ᶜUrābī to dismount. ᶜUrābī sheathed his sword and obeyed. He then presented three specific demands to the Khedive. First, that the entire ministry of Riāḍ Pasha be dismissed and a new government be appointed. Second, that a parliamentary Chamber of Delegates be convened. And third, that the strength of the army be raised to the maximum level of 18,000

rose to prominence. The basic facts of his early life may be easily told and in themselves present little controversy. He was born in 1840 in a small village near Zaqāzīq in the province of Sharqiyya in Lower Egypt. His father, who owned some ten acres of land, was the village head-man. Having received an elementary education at the local school, ᶜUrābī was sent to al-Azhar, where he studied for two years before being inducted at the age of fourteen into the army, as it was the policy of the Khedive Saᶜīd to introduce more native-born Egyptians. Accepted as a clerk in the army administration, ᶜUrābī petitioned for service in the ranks, from which he rose rapidly through examination and special promotion, attaining the rank of 'Qāimaqām' (Lieutenant-Colonel) by his early twenties, when he was appointed aide-de-camp to Saᶜīd and accompanied the Khedive on his trip to Medina the year before the latter's death in 1863.

Saᶜīd's successor to the throne, Ismāᶜīl, favored the Turkic-speaking Circassian elite and abandoned the policy of cultivating the Egyptian officers in the army. ᶜUrābī was reduced to obscurity and served at the same rank for a dozen years, until the war with Ethiopia broke out. In that unsuccessful campaign he served without distinction as officer in charge of the transport service between Cairo and the base at Musawwaᶜ in the Sudan. Allegations of misuse of funds, never substantiated, resulted in his being placed on half pay.

Several more years of service in obscurity with his regiment came to an end when he was implicated in the public confrontation and near-riot staged by Ismāᶜīl against the Armenian Prime Minister Nubar Pasha and his British Finance Minister on February 18, 1879. ᶜUrābī, Muḥammad Bey Nādī, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the same regiment, and ᶜAlī Bey Rūbī, a third Egyptian officer and friend of ᶜUrābī from Ethiopian days, were charged by court-martial with complicity in the affair — a false charge which was made to cover up the Khedive's own part in plotting the demonstration. Their protestations of innocence, based on the fact that they had only arrived from Rosetta that very night, were ignored, and the three officers were separated from their regiments and assigned to other duties in the provinces; ᶜUrābī found himself acting as a tax-collection agent in Alexandria. It was only following the deposition and exile of Ismāᶜīl and the accession of his son Tawfīq as Khedive that ᶜUrābī and his associates were restored to their regiments.

The efforts of Sharīf Pasha, the new Khedive's Prime Minister, to institute a Constitution and democratic reforms were strongly opposed by the European powers and the resulting ministerial resignations were followed by the installation of a new government under Riāḍ Pasha, described as a "Moslem of Jewish race belonging to the 'Turkish' party, who had the confidence of the British."[2] ᶜUthmān Pasha Rifqī, a Circassian loyalist who had served on the panel of judges that had court-martialled ᶜUrābī, was appointed Minister of War. Rumors spread of Rifqī's plans to reduce and curtail Egyptian native participation in the army and seemed substantiated

2. Young, G. Egypt. (London. 1927). p 104.

Nationalist resentment, not without encouragement from the Khedive. To provide more money for French and British creditors, for example, Nubar's government sent 2,500 army officers, already owed heavy arrears, into compulsory retirement on half pay, and on February 18, 1879, 400 discontented and impoverished officers and cadets demonstrated, manhandling Nubar and Rivers Wilson, the Minister of Finance, who was rescued only by the intervention of Ismāʿīl in person. It is certain that this confrontation was connived at by the Khedive, who could thus demonstrate that he still retained popularity and prestige, if not real power. Certainly it achieved one of Ismāʿīl's aims, for he was able to dismiss Nubar (February 19), on whom the Europeans were dependent, and replace him with Rāgib Pasha, a trusted courtier. The British riposte, however, was to manipulate the exclusion of the Khedive from his own cabinet, and replace him as President with his son Tawfīq, the two foreign ministers being meanwhile given absolute veto powers— moves that, in light of the Rescript of the previous year, made them the virtual dictators of Egypt.

The increasing Nationalist agitation, however, provided the Khedive with at least one more shot in the locker by giving him an excuse to make the only move legally left to him — another change of government. In early April 1879, in response to written petitions and to widespread and obvious discontentment, Sharīf Pasha, a well-known moderate Constitutionalist, was named Prime Minister and the two European ministers were dismissed. Though officially warned that failure to reinstate the two ministers would be to renounce "all pretension of friendship to Britain and France," the Khedive, supported by Sharīf, refused to do so. At this point Bismarck intervened, declaring on behalf of his old friends the Rothschilds that Germany would champion the British and French creditors if Britain and France should show themselves weak. Stung by this challenge the latter made representations to the Sultan, Ismāʿīl's suzerain, and on June 25, 1879, the Khedive was deposed, the news being brought to him by the acting British and French Consuls-General.

For months after Tawfīq's accession as Khedive, conflicting forces continued to jockey for power. The Sultan, having been encouraged to reassert his authority in the deposition of Ismāʿīl, now sought to repeal the 1873 **firmān** under which Egypt had attained a high degree of autonomy. Britain and France, however, wishing to strengthen their hold on Tawfīq, succeeded in obliging the Ottoman ministers to modify the new **firmān**, retaining the privileges granted to Egypt in 1873. Although Britain and France had gained a strong foothold, and Tawfīq was too weak to curtail their intervention in the country's affairs, Sharīf Pasha and the Constitutionalists he represented adamantly opposed any executive or ministerial powers for Europeans within an Egyptian national government. It was agreed, then, that the British and French Comptrollers would have only an advisory and consultative role over the country's financial affairs and that a newly reorganized Debt Commission would represent the interests of European creditors.

It was during this period of flux and reorganization that Ahmad ʿUrābī

soon translated into a booming economy. The Suez and Sweet Water canals were pushed to completion; roads, shipping and railway facilities were built: irrigation works were further developed, and agriculture, centered on the cotton trade, prospered as never before. If the Khedive's borrowings from European financiers at usurious rates meanwhile built an enormous burden of public debt, which his efforts to repay with fresh issues of Treasury bills made constantly heavier still, the burden for years was kept invisible, hidden behind a facade of apparent progress and prosperity.

Thus, at the same time and in the same spirit — if not on the same scale — as Paris, London, and New York, Cairo and Alexandria were given over to the planners and developers for modernization and each city began to assume the essential physical character it was to have for nearly the next hundred years. Fields and orchards became gardens where first Italianate palaces sprung up, then European style suburbs. European fashions were followed even in internal and external politics: Westernizing institutions closed under Sa'īd were reopened and new ones were founded, including a Chamber of Delegates, and while the Khedive toyed with the idea of applying a parliamentary Constitution in Egypt, he financed imperialist adventures in Ethiopia and Sudan, exploring the waters of the Nile as far as the country of the Kabaka of Buganda, which seemed ripe for exploitation.

The Khedive is unlikely to have realized until too late that Europe regarded his own territory in much the same way he did the Kabaka's. His reign began in a small way with debts contracted to pay the debts of Sa'īd, his predecessor; by the mid-1870's payments to creditors amounted to seventy per cent of total revenues, which were twice the total revenues of ten years earlier, having been expanded by ruthless and desperate means, including collection of taxes for years in advance. Mindful that it would be held responsible at home for default abroad, the British government sent out experts in 1875 and 1876 to assess the situation, and in 1877 an "unofficial" Anglo-French commission persuaded the Khedive to accept the so-called "Dual Control," a system by which Britain and France appointed two Comptrollers to receive and audit all state revenues and a Commission of Debt, with power to insure that European creditors were paid. In 1877 these creditors creamed off nearly three-quarters of the revenues of Egypt, leaving (once the tribute to the Sublime Porte and dividends to stockholders in the Suez Canal had been paid), slightly over a million pounds to cover all public expenses, including the army. In 1878 the Khedive was forced not only to allow the Commission to be temporarily expanded and given vastly enhanced powers as a Commission of Enquiry "into the whole financial situation of Egypt," but also to accept its recommendations, consenting to be stripped first of wealth and then of power: all his lands that had not been mortgaged to creditors directly were handed over to the Commission; and in August 1878 he signed a Rescript that pledged him never to act in opposition to his Ministry, the French and British Comptrollers meanwhile taking office as Ministers of Public Works and Finance, respectively.

The influence of these ministers in the government of Nubar Pasha, which took power in August 1878, was to become a major focus for growing

challenge to the Khedive directly into the very courtroom where he was to be tried. It is unfortunate that we have no record either of whether or not Broadley sought ʿUrābī's permission before making excisions in the English translation, of whether or not ʿUrābī knew about them, or of what his attitude towards them might have been. It is even possible that the Arabic original from which the translators worked was only a draft and therefore incomplete.

The copy Sabry used, however, seems to have been identical with the Blunt manuscript, with the exception of one small paragraph, a passage (see the translated text page 19, and note 45 below) that makes reference to ʿUrābī's relationship with Aḥmad Asʿad, whom the Sultan had sent to Cairo to establish a friendly relationship with the Egyptian Nationalist leader.

Sabry's French translation, included as an Appendix (pp. 249-288) to his excellent **La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien** (Paris 1924), is more faithful by far to the complete original than the **Nineteenth Century Review** version. Though there are certain omissions, usually indicated by lines of dots across the page, and some passages were edited for stylistic reasons, it otherwise accurately reflects the wording of the Blunt manuscript. Sabry likewise effectively captures the emotional tone of parts of the original, although the prevailing plain, direct and soldierly quality of ʿUrābī's writing is somehow lost in the French. The notes here below make reference to those passages where Sabry's version seems defective or incomplete.

INTRODUCTION II — THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The following brief sketch does not pretend to do justice to a period in which not merely the interpretation of events, but the events themselves, i.e.. what actually happened, are still the subject of controversy.[1] Suffice it to say that the 1870's were a period of dramatic change and turmoil on every level of life in Egypt. The death in 1863 of the Viceroy Saʿīd, third in succession from the dynasty's Albanian founder, Muḥammad ʿAlī, gave power to Ismāʿīl, who was created Khedive ("prince") in 1867 when the title was also made hereditary in his line. Educated in Europe and eager to see his country's adoption of its civilization, Ismāʿīl brought with him a sudden release of those energies active both within and from abroad that his predecessors had suppressed: while demands for societal and governmental reform in Egypt began to receive vocal expression, European industrialists and financiers were able to begin in earnest the exploitation of the country's resources they had long desired.

Irresistibly impressive plans for rapid development flooded in upon the eager ruler and investment money borrowed from European speculators was

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1. For a full discussion of the background of Urabi's **Statement,** the reader is referred to Alexander Schölch's study **Ägypten den Ägypten: Die politische und gesellschaftliche Krise der Jahre 1878-1882 in Ägypten, Beiträge zur Kolonialund Unerseegeschichte Band 9** (Zurich and Freiburg: Atlantis, n.d.). As Albert Hourani remarks in his Preface, "It is unlikely that Mr. Schölch's work will be superceded or his main conclusions overturned."

stressed in ʿUrābī's account of the so-called "Circassian plot." The manuscript insists that during the official investigation "the magnitude of the plot became clear, and also the fact that it originated with the Khedive," and points out that the Khedive tried to balk even the execution of sentences that amounted to no more than pleasant exile in Istanbul. Later, ʿUrābī continues, after the outbreak of war and the arrival of the British, "the Khedive sent for them to come to Alexandria; this he did precisely because he knew himself to be the cause for what had happened to them and that they would not have entered into that conspiracy except in accord with his wishes."

Similarly, ʿUrābī charges in the manuscript that the unusual presence of large numbers of bedouin in Cairo during the troubled weeks of early 1882 were the result of deliberate policy on the part of the Khedive. Noting that the bedouin's presence made the civilian population, both Egyptian and European, apprehensive, he explains that "His Highness the Khedive had brought them in. He showed them so much favor that visitors imagined that the Ismāʿīliya palace was a meeting place for bedouins, a very strange circumstance. The purpose of all this was that they would provide a counterforce to the army — quite unnecessarily." News of such acts of bad faith had even reached the Sultan, ʿUrābī declares, adducing the letters to himself from the Sultan's agents, later published by both Broadley and Blunt (see note 45 below), to show that "the evil intentions of the Khedive had become quite clear to His Majesty."

In one involved, emotional, and somewhat confused passage, ʿUrābī openly blames the Khedive for destruction of Egypt's good relations with Britain and for the riots and warfare that followed the arrival of the foreign fleets. Describing him as "the ruler who did not love his country," he charges that Tawfīq sought to discredit his own government, that he "hated the cabinet of Ministers and especially the Prime Minister: he often stated that he did not want and found no pleasure in seeing Maḥmūd Pasha Sāmī."

There is reason to believe that every one of ʿUrābī's allegations is well-founded, yet all these passages were omitted, possibly at Broadley's instigation, from the published English translation, along with other passages whose sheer emotionality, it might have been feared, would further alienate the sympathies of an already largely hostile British reading public.

These omissions are particularly interesting in light of questionable judgments made both at the time of his trial and later against ʿUrābī's character. British writers have almost uniformly, as if by conspiracy, depicted ʿUrābī as a spineless coward only too eager to flee from the British army, to surrender himself and his entire force without a fight in Cairo, and then to sue for and accept comfortable exile, rather than death, by cooperatively pleading guilty at a trial whose outcome was prearranged. D.M. Cameron, for but one example, was content to dismiss him out of hand as a "ridiculous creature."[7] The reader of the Arabic original, however, feels quite otherwise: that ʿUrābī was determined to carry his

7 **Egypt in the Nineteenth Century** (London 1898), p. 267.

difficult to decipher. Broadley refers to one of these mistranslations in **How We Defended Araby**, which quotes extensively from the **Nineteenth Century Review** translation, observing in a footnote how "an extraordinary mistake in punctuation" made one sentence "read very differently in its original publication." Note 31 below discusses the error in translation in the passage in question.

The errors and omissions are more varied and more significant, however, than mere errors of punctuation. The translator does not seem to have had a good grasp, for example, of either Egyptian politics or Egyptian military structure, both of which are central to one of the more serious omissions, a passage that concerns the ᶜĀbdīn palace confrontation of September 1881 and the demands for restitution of the seventeen million Egyptian pounds taken by the government as **muqabala** tax, a motivating factor in public insistence on a new ministry under Sharīf Pasha. Certain small omissions and obvious misreadings suggest similar failures of comprehension on the part of the translator.

Unfortunately, we have no indication of who undertook the translation for Broadley. He recounts in his book how in Cairo he initially hired a Welshman, Edward Evans, as an interpreter, then engaged two Armenian clerks, Najib Abcarius and Joseph Kanawaty, as translators and copyists. As his dealings with Egyptian officialdom became more complicated, however, he felt the need for a more expert Arabist and so telegraphed to Rome for David Santillana, whom he described as one of the most accomplished Arabic scholars of the time and whom he had earlier known as secretary to the Tunisian government and a strong supporter, like himself, of the Nationalists' struggle there against occupation by the French. By the time ᶜUrābī came to trial, Broadley was employing a translation staff of no fewer than ten; and we do not know which of these men, if any, translated ᶜUrābī's Statement.

The most significant differences between ᶜUrābī's original and this first English translation, however, concern areas where the motives and attitudes of the Khedive are brought into question and are possibly not due to the translator alone, but to Broadley, acting as his legal counsel: though it is quite clear from the Blunt manuscript that ᶜUrābī intended his Statement to be a deeply felt, powerful refutation of the charge that he had rebelled against his ruler and his ruler's suzerain, the Sultan, his remarks about the Khedive Tawfīq are often so openly derogatory and accusing that they might well have damaged any case that hinged upon such a plea. Prudence may have suggested to Broadley that if ᶜUrābī's charges against his sovereign were ignored, his client's chances would be considerably improved. In several specific instances, whatever the reason, ᶜUrābī's criticisms and accusations of the Khedive appear to have been muted or excised.

ᶜUrābī's original emphasizes the various plots against himself and his colleagues, underlining the role of the Khedive in each. We are told, for example, that within hours after the attempt to poison ᶜAbd al-ᶜĀl Ḥilmī documents surfaced showing that the assassination had been contrived "at the Khedive's palace." The Khedive's personal involvement is likewise

disgust at the behavior of the British or his treatment in jail, are excised. To this deliberate censorship must be added such occasional errors as, for example, that of giving on page six the name **Fahmī** instead of the correct **ʿAbd al-ʿĀl Bey Ḥilmī**. All in all, the **Taqrīr** printing gives quite false and misleading impressions of important aspects of ʿUrābī's character and of his purposes in writing his deposition. It is, however, the only Arabic version published to date.

The history of the translation of ʿUrābī's manuscript into other languages has been decidedly checkered: two versions have appeared, one in English and the other in French, but the English version is neither full nor accurate and the French version is not easily available. The Statement has consequently received remarkably little attention from Western students of ʿUrābī and his times. This is particularly unfortunate since ʿUrābī's forceful presentation of facts and first-hand impression give a keener sense of the drama and high emotion of that turbulent period than is available from any other written text.

Broadley immediately recognized not only the usefulness of the Egyptian Nationalist's "written instructions" in preparing ʿUrābī's case, but also its' value in helping to create a favorable climate of opinion in England, whence the real pressure emanated that would decide ʿUrābī's fate. Though it appeared only after a compromise had already been reached, ʿUrābī had stood his **pro forma** trial, and had received his sentence, the English version of the Statement that Broadley sent for publication to the **Nineteenth Century Review** had clearly been rushed into print for this purpose. Republishing large portions of it two years later in the twelfth chapter of **How We Defended Araby**, Broadley remarked that it " forms an excellent answer to those who insist on treating him as a wholly illiterate military adventurer."[5]

Published at Blunt's instance, **How We Defended Araby** was an apologia not merely for ʿUrābī, but for the whole Nationalist movement itself, to which Blunt remained actively attached for many years and with which he was sympathetic to the end of his life. Since ʿUrābī was the movement's fallen hero, its most obvious martyr, a defense of his actions and character was important, and the Statement could be regarded as one of its central documents. Blunt referred to it twenty-five years later as " a general history of the whole of the political affairs in which he had been mixed, in a form which was frank and convincing."[6]

It is particularly interesting then, to compare ʿUrābī's complete original as represented in the Blunt manuscript with the English version Broadley sent to the **Nineteenth Century Review**. The frequent lapses in the accuracy of the translation are immediately apparent and are clearly due in the main to error and not to design. The cramped twenty-eight pages and additional notes of the Arabic version from which Broadley's staff worked must have been very

5. **How We Defended Araby and His Friends: A Story of Egypt and the Egyptians** (London 1884), p. 114.

6. **Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, Being a Personal Narrative of Events** (London 1907), p. 452.

would have in any case as belonging to Blunt, ʿUrābī's greatest champion, the man to whom he owed his life.

There were, of course, still further copies. M. Sabry mentions one found in the archives of the Ministry of Justice in Cairo as having been the source for his French translation;[4] and still another is referred to in a forty-six-page pamphlet entitled **Taqrīr Ahmed ʿUrābī Basha al Misrī**, which appeared in Cairo apparently soon after the crisis of 1882 and which includes the only published Arabic version of the Statement.

References to this work in Khayr al-Din al-Zarkali's biographical compendium **Muʿjam al-Maṭbūʿāt al-ʿArabiyya** p. 1317 are brief and confusing. The work itself is clearly rare and lack of access to it has previously prevented its proper examination and assessment. Geoffrey Schofield, in his comments introducing the S.O.A.S. manuscript, laments his failure to locate a copy in England; R.L. Tignor, in his **Middle East Journal** (Spring 1962, vol. 16 no. 2, p. 243) article "Some Materials for a History of the Arabi Revolution," mistakenly refers to this **Taqrīr** as "a report on the state of the Egyptian army." I myself, however, was fortunate in obtaining a photocopy of this work from a personal copy owned by Dr. Muhammad Alwan, presently of Harvard. It has thus been possible to establish, from examination of both, that the **Taqrīr** was drawn either from a copy of the Blunt manuscript or from a similar source. The title page of the **Taqrīr** informs the reader that it was made

« طبقا للنسخة التي وصلت لیدی منقولة عن نسخة بخط يده »

("from the copy in my possession taken from a copy in his own handwriting").

Although the opening page of the **Taqrīr** states that the document is being presented بالحرف الواحد (word for word) it is clear that someone, no doubt the Salīm Habalīn whose name appears on the work's final page below that of the publisher, the **Maṭbaʿat al-Jāmiʿa** in Cairo, indulged in extensive editing. The printed version makes notable omissions from the original, a paragraph structure is provided, occasional words are changed, and grammatical errors are rectified. The omissions are of two kinds. On page twelve, for example, the editor states within parentheses: "Here ʿUrābī makes reference to personal matters which he attributes to the Khedive; and since these are beyond the scope of the **Taqrīr** and it is inappropriate to mention them, as for example the affair of Mme ʿĀisha Khānim, about whose exile to Sudan ʿUrābī tells us, we have refrained from reporting them. We take up the account of the author of the **Taqrīr**, then, where he begins as follows: 'and then the British and French warships arrived....'"

This major excision thus consists of the equivalent of three full pages of the Blunt manuscript. The other omissions from the **Taqrīr** printing, while frequent, are less extensive and fairly consistent: those passages in which ʿUrābī makes overt charges against the Khedive of complicity, for example, in plots against the Nationalist army officers, or where he expresses his

4. **La Genèse de l'Esprit National Egyptien** (Paris, 1924), p. 242.

INTRODUCTION I — THE MANUSCRIPT

In 1961 in the pages[1] of the **Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies** Geoffrey Schofield, Near East Bibliographer at the school, drew attention to his library's acquisition from the estate of Wilfred Scawen Blunt of a manuscript by the Egyptian Nationalist leader Ahmad ᶜUrābī. Catalogued under accession no. 141394, the manuscript is written in ink on one side only of sixty-two unnumbered folios in an inexpensive, unbound, faint-lined exercise book measuring eight by ten inches. Its script is a generally legible **ruqᶜa**, clearly defined, still unfaded and offering few reading difficulties. At the base of the title page is a seal mark that appears identical with ᶜUrābī's mark as reproduced in **How We Defended Arabi**, an account of the Nationalist trials by A.M. Broadley, the lawyer-journalist hired by Blunt as ᶜUrābī's legal counsel. The colophon bears two more seals, the signature, "Ahmad ᶜUrābī the Egyptian," and is dated 29 October 1882 " in the town of Colombo on the Island of Ceylon " From comparison with other documents written by him,[2] the handwriting of the entire manuscript seems clearly to be that of ᶜUrābī himself.

The colophon needs explanation. In his article in the **Nineteenth Century Review**, "Instructions to My Counsel," which appeared just after ᶜUrābī's trial and which contains the only English version of the Statement, Broadley introduces the text of this version as follows:

> During our first interview, on Sunday, the 22nd of October, Arabi proposed to give us his instructions in the shape of a written statement of his case. Unaided by any papers or memoranda, he began it the same day, and finished it on the following Sunday evening, signing it "Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian " It fills twenty-eight pages of close Arabic handwriting.[3]

On 29 October 1882, the day the Statement was presumably finished, dated, signed, and first sealed, ᶜUrābī was thus in jail awaiting his trial and possibly a death sentence. The reference to Colombo in the colophon therefore could not have been written at this time; and the fact that it appears to have been written with a different pen from the rest of the manuscript suggests that it was added, with a second seal, sometime after ᶜUrābī's arrival in Colombo as an exile in January 1883. Blunt visited ᶜUrābī in Ceylon in 1883, and it was probably then that he was presented with a copy of the Statement. Since the Broadley version described in his article consisted of " twenty-eight pages of close Arabic handwriting " and since Broadley later noted that this version was annotated, added to, and corrected, it is reasonable to assume that the sixty-two-page Blunt manuscript is a fair copy, one of two or more. Intended as a final version, it therefore has a special authority, which it

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
1. B.S.O.A.S. Vol. 24 (1961) pp. 139-141
2. Prof. Irene L. Gendzier of Boston College has kindly provided me with copies of letters ᶜUrābī wrote to Yaᶜqūb Sanūᶜ that she acquired from the latter's heirs in Paris
3. Vol. XII, no. 70 (December 1882), p. 971

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THE DEFENSE STATEMENT OF AHMAD ᶜURABI THE EGYPTIAN

From the Blunt Manuscript at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

Translated, edited and with an Introduction by

TREVOR LE GASSICK

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO PRESS
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the defense statement of AHMAD 'URABI



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